The internationalist spirit of Che had a big impact on young Cuban people. Delegations of youth arrived to see him and sent letters pleading to be allowed to go and fight in Nicaragua, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela and other countries. A special government department was established, Liberacion, with responsibility “for the Latin American revolution”.
Foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, and like the CDRs, the international departments of Cuba’s government had two sides. To begin with those involved were usually motivated with the desire to spread the revolution and lend assistance to fighters in other countries. Refuge was offered to those throughout the region that were persecuted and had nowhere else to go.
However, the support Liberación offered was almost entirely directed to guerrilla organizations and not orientated to the working class. Guerrilla groups were trained and resources channeled to them. Che was involved in assisting groups from Guatemala, Peru, Venezuela and Nicaragua. Many of the leaders of the Nicaraguan FSLN, such as Tomás Borge and Rodolfo Romero, who were members of the Sandinista leadership which took power in 1979, went through training in Cuba.
This early support, reflecting the role of the Castro regime, later became the instrument to exercise control and to impose Havana’s desired policy over various guerrilla and left-wing groups. Increasingly this was done to meet the needs of the bureaucracy in Moscow.
This was later illustrated when the Sandinistas seized power in a similar process to that which unfolded in Cuba. However, they did not then proceed to nationalize the decisive sectors of the economy and overthrow capitalism.
During 1985, under the threat of counter-revolution backed from the US, the Sandinista leaders were flirting with the idea of “doing a Cuba”. In April, Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega visited Moscow to discuss getting the support of the Soviet bureaucracy. Unwilling to become embroiled in a war in Central America and with different interests and a changed international situation compared to that which existed in 1959/60, the Moscow bureaucracy declined giving its support.
Castro dutifully supported his paymasters and put pressure on the FSLN leaders. A small number of Soviet MIGs destined for Nicaragua were impounded in Havana. He had previously visited Managua in January 1985 to urge the FSLN to support a mixed economy, telling them: “You can have a capitalist economy” and praised Ortega for his “serious and responsible approach”.
Che in the early 1960s was intent on developing the revolution by the application of his guerrilla methods throughout the South American continent. In particular he hoped for a revolutionary upsurge in his native Argentina.
Castro wanted to strengthening his regime and win the support of Khrushchev. After returning from Moscow during 1963 with vast economic aid from the USSR, he was less concerned with the idea of spreading the revolution beyond Cuba’s shores and declared that he was “ready to do whatever is necessary to establish good neighborly relations with the United States of America, based upon the principles of coexistence”.
A guerrilla operation was initiated in Argentina during 1962 by the Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo (People’s Guerilla Army). With its massive urban working class it was the least applicable country to launch a guerrilla war. The offensive was undertaken to coincide with the second anniversary of the military taking power. It was a disaster and the group was slaughtered, including two of his closest collaborators, Hermes and Masetti.
The episode had a devastating effect on Che. “…Here you see me behind a desk, fucked, while my people die during missions I’ve sent them on”, he replied, when asked why he was appearing depressed.
A combination of this and other defeats for guerrilla forces internationally, combined with frustration at the growing bureaucratization of the Cuban regime had led him to decide he should return to the battlefield. He finally left Cuba during 1965 and went not to Latin America but to Africa and fought in the Congo. Ever since the overthrow of Lumumba’s government and his assassination the Congo had been at the center of an important conflict with imperialism.
The Congo Disaster
Che left a letter to Castro, praising his qualities as a “revolutionary leader” and absolving Cuba of any of his future actions. Typically he wrote: “…I am not sorry that I leave nothing material to my wife and children. I am happy it is that way. I ask nothing for them, as the state will provide them with enough to live on and to have an education…”
He finished the text with his famous phrase that was to become a battle cry of the youth throughout Latin America in the struggle against the dictatorships which imprisoned the continent during the 1970/80s, “Hasta la victoria siempre!” (“Always until victory”).
However, the hopes and aspirations with which he departed for the Congo with a force of Cubans were rapidly dashed. The mission was to turn into a disaster and result in defeat. It was ill-prepared and undertaken almost as an act of desperation. Moreover, it was a mission which was imposed from outside. As Che admitted later the Congolese knew little of it until he arrived in their country.
When his forces reached Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania, where the rebel leaders were based, none could be found. They were abroad in Cairo. Amongst them was Laurent Kabila who over thirty years later would take power in the Congo.
The Cuban forces were shocked by what they found amongst the rebel army. Not only did it lack any coherent political direction but was in Che’s words “a parasitic army”. The local peasants were terrified of it. Soldiers would rob them and assault the women. In the conflicts witnessed by Che the fighters would usually flee from battle. Officers would often lead drunken binges followed by fights. Kabila was seen by Cubans driving around Dar-Es-Salaam in a Mercedes Benz and was never present when battles were imminent.
All of this was in marked contrast to what the Cuban forces were used to and expected. Eventually they were compelled to withdraw and admit defeat following an assault by government forces on the rebels. Che found refuge in the Cuban Embassy in Tanzania and via Eastern Europe eventually returned clandestinely to Cuba. However, having built his reputation on fighting to the end he could not return to Havana “empty handed”.
Onto Bolivia and Death
Che’s aim was to return to his homeland of Argentina and continue the struggle there but this proved to be impossible. In 1967 he emerged in Bolivia with the view of igniting a revolutionary movement through a guerrilla campaign. From this he hoped to radiate to the surrounding countries a series of revolutionary struggles. It was an heroic gesture, like much of Che’s political struggle. Like the Congo, it turned out to be another adventure, this time with fatal consequences for him. An iron law of history, that revolution cannot be artificially imposed from the outside, was illustrated in a tragic manner.
Although Bolivia had a bigger rural population than Argentina it had a strong working class spearheaded by the revolutionary traditions of the tin miners. This was ignored by Che despite his having witnessed the mass revolutionary upsurge of 1953. Moreover, an extensive program of land reform was carried out during the Bolivian revolution in the 1950s. This made the peasantry less inclined and receptive to take up an armed struggle and lend support to a guerrilla army.
As his plans were laid for this campaign, Che failed to win the active support of the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), which initially, at least formally, took a neutral stand and even allowed some of its members to help with preparations for the campaign.
In part this was to allow its leadership to appear more “revolutionary” as they feared being outflanked on the left. They were especially fearful of the Trotskyist party, the POR (Workers’ Revolutionary Party), which had a powerful tradition and semi-mass influence in the country, especially amongst the tin miners.
In reality the PCB failed to organize support for the guerrilla force and its leaders were very skeptical about supporting such methods. Monje and the other leaders certainly did not want a guerrilla campaign being fought in their own backyard. The party was still wedded to the idea of coalition with the “progressive” sections of the national bourgeoisie.
Castro had agreed with Monje and other PCB leaders that they should have the monopoly on political and material support. In reality the PCB leadership provided little backup to Che’s forces. This was partly because of the situation in Bolivia.
There were also international factors that bore down on Monje and the PCB leadership. The Moscow bureaucracy wanted to rein in the guerrilla movements that were adding to the instability that was developing in Latin America. The Cuban regime was seen to be encouraging them and its activities needed to be “controlled.” Che was regarded as an irresponsible adventurer in the Kremlin. He was denounced as a “Trotskyist” and a “Maoist” amongst circles in the Kremlin.
This was manifested at an international conference that took place in January 1966, the so-called Tri-Continental Conference. This event took place in Havana and was attended by delegates from Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as China and Russia. Apart from government representatives, guerrilla groups were present, mainly from Latin America. Here Castro attracted the attention of the Chinese bureaucracy whose interests conflicted with their counterparts in the USSR.
At the same time Castro pushed through a resolution supporting guerrilla movements much to the annoyance of the Moscow leaders. Monje made a rapid visit to Moscow after the conference. Arising from discussions he had with CPSU officials he concluded that they like him saw Che as the driving force behind this policy – although he was not present at the conference.
According to Monje he was urged, by CPSU officials, to stand up to the Cubans and not to be pushed around by them. Monje was certainly encouraged by the bureaucracy not to mobilize the Bolivian Communist Party in support of Che’s guerrilla operation.
This, and the friction which existed between the PCB leaders and Che, was known in Havana when Castro agreed to give the Bolivian Communist Party a monopoly on political and practical support to Che and his guerrillas.
In the event, Che launched his crusade in one of the most isolated areas of Bolivia, in the south east of the country, 250 kilometers south of Santa Cruz. His guerrilla force was named the ELN – (National Liberation Army). At its peak his forces numbered 29 Bolivians and 18 Cubans. The area chosen to launch the offensive was one of the least populated with no tradition of struggle amongst the local peasants. Not surprisingly, Che’s expedition failed to gain any local support.
The failure of Che’s forces to win any real local basis also reflected that after the land reform enacted during the revolution of 1953 the peasants were not disposed to take to the road of armed struggle.
After months of fighting the guerrilla force was isolated and suffered setback after setback. Che’s health began to give out and he was forced to ride on horseback, unable to walk because of asthma attacks. No support was forthcoming from Havana and communications with the ELN broke down.
It is safe to assume that the Moscow bureaucracy wanted Che ‘out of the way’. Castro remained passive as one of the principle leaders of the Cuban Revolution faced his final months and weeks. Regis Debray, who was in Bolivia with Che Guevara has since moved to the right politically and became an adviser to Francois Mitterand, the ex-French president. During 1996 he attacked Castro and Havana accusing them of abandoning Che and his forces.
Che’s small force was in battle against 1,500 soldiers from the Bolivian army. In collaboration with the CIA they tracked his forces down. After a hopeless engagement on 8 October he and his guerrillas were captured near the village of La Higuera, east of Sucre.
The next day he was interviewed for forty five minutes by Lieutenant – Colonel Andres Selich, after which his murder was ordered by Cuban-born CIA agent, Felix Rodriquez. He lay bound hand and foot next to the bodies of two dead guerrilla fighters.
When asked: “Are you Cuban or Argentinean?” Che replied, ” I am Cuban, Argentinean, Bolivian, Peruvian, Ecuadorian, etc…You understand.”
He was executed at the age of 39 and buried in a secret grave, which has recently been discovered. His body has now been returned to Cuba. His executioners cut off his hands after his death and sent them back to Havana as proof of his death.
Painted on a wall near his grave in Boliva is a simple slogan: “Che – Alive as they never wanted you to be”. The spirit of a heroic commitment to struggle against oppression has been bequeathed new generations. His example still inspires many to struggle to overthrow capitalism and fight for a socialist alternative. Three decades after his death, Marxists can salute Che as an honest and heroic revolutionary.
The tragedy of Che was that his heroism was not linked with a fully rounded-out program and ideas that could bring about the objective he aspired to – an international socialist revolution. The necessity of achieving this is more urgent than ever. It will be accomplished if today’s revolutionaries learn from the experience of Che Guevara’s struggle and emulate his audacity and self-sacrifice in the struggle to bring about a socialist society.