Chapter 1
We Must Study the October Revolution
We met with success in the October
Revolution, but the October Revolution has met with little success in
our press. Up to the present time we lack a single work which gives a
comprehensive picture of the October upheaval and puts the proper stress
upon its most important political and organizational aspects. Worse yet,
even the available firsthand material including the most important documents
directly pertaining to the various particulars of the preparation for
the revolution, or the revolution itself remains unpublished as yet. Numerous
documents and considerable material have been issued bearing on the pre-October
history of the revolution and the pre-October history of the party; we
have also issued much material and many documents relating to the post
October period. But October itself has received far less attention. Having
achieved the revolution, we seem to have concluded that we should never
have to repeat it. It is as if we thought that no immediate and direct
benefit for the unpostponable tasks of future constructive work could
be derived from the study of October; the actual conditions of the direct
preparation for it; the actual accomplishment of it; and the work of consolidating
it during the first few weeks..
Such an approach though it may be subconscious is, however, profoundly
erroneous, and is, moreover, narrow and nationalistic. We ourselves may
never have to repeat the experience of the October Revolution, but this
does not at all imply that we have nothing to learn from that experience.
We are a part of the International, and the workers in all other countries
are still faced with the solution of the problem of their own “October.”
Last year we had ample proof that the most advanced Communist parties
of the West had not only failed to assimilate our October experience but
were virtually ignorant of the actual facts.
To be sure, the objection may be raised that it is impossible to study
October or even to publish documents relating to October without the risk
of stirring up old disagreements. But such an approach to the question
would be altogether petty. The disagreements of 1917 were indeed very
profound, and they were not by any means accidental. But nothing could
be more paltry than an attempt to turn them now, after a lapse of several
years, into weapons of attack against those who were at that time mistaken.
It would be, however, even more inadmissible to remain silent as regards
the most important problems of the October Revolution, which are of international
significance, on account of trifling personal considerations.
Last year we met with two crushing defeats in Bulgaria. First, the party
let slip an exceptionally favorable moment for revolutionary action on
account of fatalistic and doctrinaire considerations. (That moment was
the rising of the peasants after the June coup of Tsankov.) Then the party,
striving to make good its mistake, plunged into the September insurrection
without having made the necessary political or organizational preparations.
The Bulgarian revolution ought to have been a prelude to the German revolution.
Unfortunately, the bad Bulgarian prelude led to an even worse sequel in
Germany itself. In the latter part of last year, we witnessed in Germany
a classic demonstration of how it is possible to miss a perfectly exceptional
revolutionary situation of world historic importance. Once more, however,
neither the Bulgarian nor even the German experiences of last year have
received an adequate or sufficiently concrete appraisal. The author of
these lines drew a general outline of the development of events in Germany
last year. Everything that transpired since then has borne out this outline
in part and as a whole. No one else has even attempted to advance any
other explanation. But we need more than an outline. It is indispensable
for us to have a concrete account, full of factual data, of last year’s
developments in Germany. What we need is such an account as would provide
a concrete explanation of the causes of this most cruel historic defeat.
It is difficult, however, to speak of an analysis of the events in Bulgaria
and Germany when we have not, up to the present, given a politically and
tactically elaborated account of the October Revolution. We have never
made clear to ourselves what we accomplished and how we accomplished it.
After October, in the flush of victory, it seemed as if the events of
Europe would develop of their own accord and, moreover, within so brief
a period as would leave no time for any theoretical assimilation of the
lessons of October.
But the events have proved that without a party capable of directing
the proletarian revolution, the revolution itself is rendered impossible.
The proletariat cannot seize power by a spontaneous uprising. Even in
highly industrialized and highly cultured Germany the spontaneous uprising
of the toilers - in November 1918 - only succeeded in transferring power
to the hands of the bourgeoisie. One propertied class is able to seize
the power that has been wrested from another propertied class because
it is able to base itself upon its riches, its cultural level, and its
innumerable connections with the old state apparatus. But there is nothing
else that can serve the proletariat as a substitute for its own party.
It was only by the middle of 1921 that the fully rounded - out work of
building the Communist parties really began (under the slogan “Win
the masses,” “United front,” etc.). The problems of
October receded and, simultaneously, the study of October was also relegated
to the background. Last year we found ourselves once again face to face
with the problems of the proletarian revolution. It is high time we collected
all documents, printed all available material, and applied ourselves to
their study!
We are well aware, of course, that every nation, every class, and even
every party learns primarily from the harsh blows of its own experience.
But that does not in the least imply that the experience of other countries
and classes and parties is of minor importance. Had we failed to study
the Great French Revolution, the revolution of 1848, and the Paris Commune,
we should never have been able to achieve the October Revolution, even
though we passed through the experience of the year 1905. And after all,
we went through this “national” experience of ours basing
ourselves on deductions from previous revolutions, and extending their
historical line. Afterwards, the entire period of the counter - revolution
was taken up with the study of the lessons to be learned and the deductions
to be drawn from the year 1905.
Yet no such work has been done with regard to the victorious revolution
of 1917 no, not even a tenth part of it. Of course we are not now living
through the years of reaction, nor are we in exile. On the other hand,
the forces and resources at our command now are in no way comparable to
what we had during those years of hardship. All that we need do is to
pose clearly and plainly the task of studying the October Revolution,
both on the party scale and on the scale of the International as a whole.
It is indispensable for the entire party, and especially its younger generations,
to study and assimilate step by step the experience of October, which
provided the supreme, incontestable, and irrevocable test of the past
and opened wide the gates to the future. The German lesson of last year
is not only a serious reminder but also a dire warning.
An objection will no doubt be raised that even the most thorough knowledge
of the course of the October Revolution would by no means have guaranteed
victory to our German party. But this kind of wholesale and essentially
philistine rationalizing will get us nowhere. To be sure, mere study of
the October Revolution is not sufficient to secure victory in other countries;
but circumstances may arise where all the prerequisites for revolution
exist, with the exception of a farseeing and resolute party leadership
grounded in the understanding of the laws and methods of the revolution.
This was exactly the situation last year in Germany. Similar situations
may recur in other countries. But for the study of the laws and methods
of proletarian revolution there is, up to the present time, no more important
and profound a source than our October experience. Leaders of European
Communist parties who fail to assimilate the history of October by means
of a critical and closely detailed study would resemble a commander in
chief preparing new wars under modern conditions, who fails to study the
strategic, tactical, and technical experience of the last imperialist
war. Such a commander in chief would inevitably doom his armies to defeat
in the future.
The fundamental instrument of proletarian revolution is the party. On
the basis of our experience—even taking only one year, from February
1917 to February 1918—and on the basis of the supplementary experience
in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria, and Germany, we can posit as almost
an unalterable law that a party crisis is inevitable in the transition
from preparatory revolutionary activity to the immediate struggle for
power. Generally speaking, crises arise in the party at every serious
turn in the party’s course, either as a prelude to the turn or as
a consequence of it. The explanation for this lies in the fact that every
period in the development of the party has special features of its own
and calls for specific habits and methods of work. A tactical turn implies
a greater or lesser break in these habits and methods. Herein lies the
direct and most immediate root of internal party frictions and crises.
“Too often has it happened,” wrote Lenin in July 1917, “that,
when history has taken a sharp turn, even progressive parties have for
some time been unable to adapt themselves to the new situation and have
repeated slogans which had formerly been correct but had now lost all
meaning lost it as ‘suddenly’ as the sharp turn in history
was ‘sudden’ “[CW, Vol.25, “On Slogans”
(mid-July 1917), p.183]. Hence the danger arises that if the turn is too
abrupt or too sudden, and if in the preceding period too many elements
of inertia and conservatism have accumulated in the leading organs of
the party, then the party will prove itself unable to fulfill its leadership
at that supreme and critical moment for which it has been preparing itself
in the course of years or decades. The party is ravaged by a crisis, and
the movement passes the party by and heads toward defeat.
A revolutionary party is subjected to the pressure of other political
forces. At every given stage of its development the party elaborates its
own methods of counteracting and resisting this pressure. During a tactical
turn and the resulting internal regroupments and frictions, the party’s
power of resistance becomes weakened. From this the possibility always
arises that the internal groupings in the party, which originate from
the necessity of a turn in tactics, may develop far beyond the original
controversial points of departure and serve as a support for various class
tendencies. To put the case more plainly: the party that does not keep
step with the historical tasks of its own class becomes, or runs the risk
of becoming, the indirect tool of other classes.
If what we said above is true of every serious turn in tactics, it is
all the more true of great turns in strategy. By tactics in politics we
understand, using the analogy of military science, the art of conducting
isolated operations. By strategy, we understand the art of conquest, i.e.,
the seizure of power. Prior to the war we did not, as a rule, make this
distinction. In the epoch of the Second International we confined ourselves
solely to the conception of social democratic tactics. Nor was this accidental.
The social democracy applied parliamentary tactics, trade union tactics,
municipal tactics, cooperative tactics, and so on. But the question of
combining all forces and resources—all sorts of troops—to
obtain victory over the enemy was really never raised in the epoch of
the Second International, insofar as the practical task of the struggle
for power was not raised. It was only the 1905 revolution that first posed,
after a long interval, the fundamental or strategical questions of proletarian
struggle. By reason of this it secured immense advantages to the revolutionary
Russian social democrats, i.e., the Bolsheviks. The great epoch of revolutionary
strategy began in 1917, first for Russia and afterwards for the rest of
Europe. Strategy, of course, does not do away with tactics. The questions
of the trade union movement, of parliamentary activity, and so on, do
not disappear, but they now become invested with a new meaning as subordinate
methods of a combined struggle for power. Tactics are subordinated to
strategy.
If tactical turns usually lead to internal friction in the party, how
much deeper and fiercer must be the friction resulting from strategical
turns! And the most abrupt of all turns is the turn of the proletarian
party from the work of preparation and propaganda, or organization and
agitation, to the immediate struggle for power, to an armed insurrection
against the bourgeoisie. Whatever remains in the party that is irresolute,
skeptical, conciliationist, capitulatory—in short, Menshevik—all
this rises to the surface in opposition to the insurrection, seeks theoretical
formulas to justify its opposition, and finds them ready-made in the arsenal
of the opportunist opponents of yesterday. We shall have occasion to observe
this phenomenon more than once in the future.
The final review and selection of party weapons on the eve of the decisive
struggle took place during the interval from February to October [1917]
on the basis of the widest possible agitational and organizational work
among the masses. During and after October these weapons were tested in
the fire of colossal historic actions. To undertake at the present time,
several years after October, an appraisal of the different viewpoints
concerning revolution in general, and the Russian revolution in particular,
and in so doing to evade the experience of 1917, is to busy oneself with
barren scholasticism. That would certainly not be a Marxist political
analysis. It would be analogous to wrangling over the advantages of various
systems of swimming while we stubbornly refused to turn our eyes to the
river where swimmers were putting these systems into practice. No better
test of viewpoints concerning revolution exists than the verification
of how they worked out during the revolution itself, just as a system
of swimming is best tested when a swimmer jumps into the water.
Chapter 2
“The Democratic Dictatorship
of the Proletariat and Peasantry”
in February and October
The course and the out come of
the October Revolution dealt a relentless blow to the scholastic parody
of Marxism which was very widespread among the Russian social democrats,
beginning in part with the Emancipation of Labor Group and finding its
most finished expression among the Mensheviks. The essence of this pseudo-Marxism
consisted in perverting Marx’s conditional and limited conception
that “the country that is more developed industrially only shows,
to the less developed, the image of its own future” into an absolute
and (to use Marx’s own expression) supra historical law; and then,
in seeking to establish upon the basis of that law the tactics of the
proletarian party. Such a formulation naturally excluded even the mention
of any struggle on the part of the Russian proletariat for the seizure
of power until the more highly developed countries had set a “precedent.”
There is, of course, no disputing that every backward country finds some
traits of its own future in the history of advanced countries, but there
cannot be any talk of a repetition of the development as a whole. On the
contrary, the more capitalist economy acquired a world character, all
the more strikingly original became the development of the backward countries,
which had to necessarily combine elements of their backwardness with the
latest achievements of capitalist development. In his preface to The
Peasant War in Germany, Engels wrote: “At a certain point,
which must not necessarily appear simultaneously and on the same stage
of development everywhere, [the bourgeoisie] begins to note that this,
its second self [the proletariat] has outgrown it” [p.16].
The course of historical development constrained the Russian bourgeoisie
to make this observation much earlier and more completely than the bourgeoisie
of all other countries. Lenin, even prior to 1905, gave expression to
the peculiar character of the Russian revolution in the formula “the
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.” This
formula, in itself, as future development showed, could acquire meaning
only as a stage toward the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat supported
by the peasantry. Lenin’s formulation of the problem, revolutionary
and dynamic through and through, was completely and irreconcilably counterpoised
to the Menshevik pattern, according to which Russia could pretend only
to a repetition of the history of the advanced nations, with the bourgeoisie
in power and the social democrats in opposition. Some circles of our party,
however, laid the stress not upon the dictatorship of the proletariat
and the peasantry in Lenin’s formula, but upon its democratic character
as opposed to its socialist character. And, again, this could only mean
that in Russia, a backward country, only a democratic revolution was conceivable.
The socialist revolution was to begin in the West; and we could take to
the road of socialism only in the wake of England, France, and Germany.
But such a formulation of the question slipped inevitably intoMenshevism,
and this was fully revealed in 1917 when the tasks of the revolution were
posed before us, not for prognosis but for decisive action.
Under the actual conditions of revolution, to hold a position of supporting
democracy, pushed to its logical conclusion—opposing socialism as
“being premature"—meant, in politics, to shift from a proletarian
to a petty-bourgeois position. It meant going over to the position of
the left wing of national revolution.
The February revolution, if considered by itself, was a bourgeois revolution.
But as a bourgeois revolution it came too late and was devoid of any stability.
Torn asunder by contradictions which immediately found their expression
in dual power it had to either change into a direct prelude to the proletarian
revolution—which is what usually did happen—or throw Russia
back into a semicolonial existence, under some sort of bourgeois oligarchic
regime. Consequently, the period following the February revolution could
be regarded from two points of view: either as a period of consolidating,
developing, or consummating the “democratic” revolution, or
as a period of preparation for the proletarian revolution. The first point
of view was held not only by the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries
but also by a certain section of our own party leadership, with this difference:
that the latter really tried to push democratic revolution as far as
possible to the left. But the method was essentially one and the same—to
“exert pressure” on the ruling bourgeoisie, a “pressure”
so calculated as to remain within the framework of the bourgeois democratic
regime. If that policy had prevailed, the development of the revolution
would have passed over the head of our party, and in the end the insurrection
of the worker and peasant masses would have taken place without party
leadership; in other words, we would have had a repetition of the July
days on a colossal scale, i.e., this time not as an episode but as a catastrophe.
It is perfectly obvious that the immediate consequence of such a catastrophe
would have been the physical destruction of our party. This provides us
wit’a measuring stick of how deep our differences of opinion were.
The influence of the Mensheviks and the SRS in the first period of the
revolution was not, Of course, accidental. It reflected the preponderance
of petty-bourgeois masses—mainly peasants—in the population,
and the immaturity of the revolution itself. It was precisely that immaturity,
‘midst the extremely exceptional circumstances arising from the
war, which placed in the hands of the petty-bourgeois revolutionists the
leadership, or at least the semblance of leadership, which came to this:
that they defended the historical rights of the bourgeoisie to power.
But this does not in the least mean that the Russian revolution could
have taken no course other than the one it did from February to October
1917. The latter course flowed not only from the relations between the
classes but also from the temporary circumstances created by the war.
Because of the war, the peasantry was organized and armed in an army of
many millions. Before the proletariat succeeded in organizing itself under
its own banner and taking the leadership of the rural masses, the petty-bourgeois
revolutionists found a natural support in the peasant army, which was
rebelling against the war. By the ponderous weight of this multi-millioned
army upon which, after all, everything directly depended, the petty-bourgeois
revolutionists brought pressure to bear on the workers and carried them
along in the first period. That the revolution might have taken a different
course on the same class foundations is best of all demonstrated by the
events immediately preceding the war. In July 1914 Petrograd was convulsed
by revolutionary strikes. Matters had gone so far as open fighting in
the streets. The absolute leadership of that movement was in the hands
of the underground organization and the legal press of our party. Bolshevism
was increasing its influence in a direct struggle against liquidationism
and the petty-bourgeois parties generally. The further growth of the movement
would have meant above all the growth of the Bolshevik Party. The soviets
of workers’ deputies in 1914—if developments had reached the
stage of soviets—would probably have been Bolshevik from the outset.
The awakening of the villages would have proceeded under the direct or
indirect leadership of the city soviets, led by the Bolsheviks. This does
not necessarily mean that the SRS would have immediately disappeared from
the villages. No. In all probability the first stage of the peasant revolution
would have occurred under the banner of the Narodniks [populists]. But
with a development of events such as we have sketched, the Narodniks themselves
would have been compelled to push their left wing to the fore, in order
to seek an alliance with the Bolshevik soviets in the cities. Of course,
the immediate outcome of the insurrection would have depended, even in
such a case, in the first instance upon the mood and conduct of the army,
which was bound up with the peasantry. It is impossible and even superfluous
to guess now whether the movement of 1914-15 would have led to victory
had not the outbreak of the war forged a new and gigantic link in the
chain of developments. Considerable evidence, however, may be adduced
that had the victorious revolution unfolded along the course which began
with the events in July 1914, the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy would,
in all likelihood, have meant the immediate assumption of power by the
revolutionary workers’ soviets, and the latter, through the medium
of the left Narodniks, would (from the very outset!) have drawn the peasant
masses within their orbit.
The war interrupted the unfolding revolutionary movement. It acted at
first to retard but afterwards to accelerate it enormously. Through the
medium of the multimillioned army, the war created an absolutely exceptional
base, both socially and organizationally, for the petty-bourgeois parties.
For the peculiarity of the peasantry consists precisely in the fact that
despite their great numbers it is difficult to form the peasants into
an organized base, even when they are imbued with a revolutionary spirit.
Hoisting themselves on the shoulders of a ready’made organization,
that is, the army, the petty - bourgeois parties overawed the proletariat
and befogged it with defensism. That is why Lenin at once came out furiously
against the old slogan of “the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat
and the peasantry,” which under the new circumstances meant the
transformation of the Bolshevik Party into the left wing of the defensist
bloc. For Lenin the main task was to lead the proletarian vanguard from
the swamp of defensism out into the clear. Only on that condition could
the proletariat at the next stage become the axis around which the toiling
masses of the village would group themselves. But in that case what should
our attitude be toward the democratic revolution, or rather toward the
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry? Lenin was
ruthless in refuting the “Old Bolsheviks” who “more
than once already have played so regrettable a role in the history of
our Party by reiterating formulas senselessly learned by rote instead
of studying the specific features of the new and living reality. . . .
But one must measure up not to old formulas but to the new reality. Is
this reality covered by Comrade Kamenev’s Old Bolshevik formula,
which says that ‘the bourgeois democratic revolution is not completed’?
“It is not,” Lenin answers. “The formula is obsolete.
It is no good at all. It is dead. And it is no use trying to revive it”
[CW— Vol.24, “Letters on Tactics" (April 8—13,
1917), pp.44—50].
To be sure, Lenin occasionally remarked that the soviets of workers’,
soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies in the first period of the
February revolution did, to a certain degree, embody the revolutionary
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. And this
was true insofar as these soviets embodied power in general. But, as Lenin
time and again explained, the soviets of the February period embodied
only demi -power. They supported the power of the bourgeoisie while exercising
semi-oppositionist “pressure” upon it. And it was precisely
this intermediate position that did not permit them to transcend the framework
of the democratic coalition of workers, peasants, and soldiers. In its
form of rule, this coalition tended toward dictatorship to the extent
that it did not rely upon regulated governmental relations but upon armed
force and direct revolutionary supervision. However, it fell far short
of an actual dictatorship. The instability of the conciliationist soviets
lay precisely in this democratic amorphousness of a demi- power coalition
of workers, peasants, and soldiers. The soviets had to either disappear
entirely or take real power into their hands. But they could take power
not in the capacity of a democratic coalition of workers and peasants
represented by different parties, but only as the dictatorship of the
proletariat directed by a single party and drawing after it the peasant
masses, beginning with their semi - proletarian sections. In other words,
a democratic workers’ and peasants’ coalition could only take
shape as an immature form of power incapable of attaining real power—it
could take shape only as a tendency and not as a concrete fact. Any further
movement toward the attainment of power inevitably had to explode the
democratic shell, confront the majority of the peasantry with the necessity
of following the workers, provide the proletariat with an opportunity
to realize a class dictatorship, and thereby place on the agenda—along
with a complete and ruthlessly radical democratization of social relations—a
purely socialist invasion of the workers’ state into the sphere
of capitalist property rights. Under such circumstances, whoever continued
to cling to the formula of a “democratic dictatorship” in
effect renounced power and led the revolution into a blind alley.
The fundamental controversial question around which everything else centered
was this: whether or not we should struggle for power; whether or not
we should assume power. This alone is ample proof that we were not then
dealing with a mere episodic difference of opinion but with two tendencies
of the utmost principled significance. The first and principal tendency
was proletarian and led to the road of world revolution. The other was
“democratic,” i.e., petty bourgeois, and led, in the last
analysis, to the subordination of proletarian policies to the requirements
of bourgeois society in the process of reform. These two tendencies came
into hostile conflict over every essential question that arose throughout
the year 1917. It is precisely the revolutionary epoch - i.e...., the
epoch when the accumulated capital of the party is put in direct circulation—that
must inevitably broach in action and reveal divergences of such a nature.
These two tendencies, in greater or lesser degree, with more or less modification,
will more than once manifest themselves during the revolutionary period
in every country. If by Bolshevism—and we are stressing here its
essential aspect ‘we understand such training, tempering, and organization
of the proletarian vanguard as enables the latter to seize power, arms
in hand; and if by social democracy we are to understand the acceptance
of reformist oppositional activity within the framework of bourgeois society
and an adaptation to its legality—i.e., the actual training of the
masses to become imbued with the inviolability of the bourgeois state;
then, indeed, it is absolutely clear that even within the Communist Party
itself, which does not emerge full—fledged from the crucible of
history, the struggle between social democratic tendencies and Bolshevism
is bound to reveal itself in its most clear, open, and uncamouflaged form
during the immediate revolutionary period when the question of power is
posed point—blank.
The problem of the conquest of power was put before the party only after
April 4, that is, after the arrival of Lenin in Petrograd. But even after
that moment, the political line of the party did not by any means acquire
a unified and indivisible character, challenged by none. Despite the decisions
of the April Conference in 1917,28 the opposition to the revolutionary
course—sometimes hidden, sometimes open—pervaded the entire
period of preparation.
The study of the trend of the disagreements between February and the
consolidation of the October Revolution is not only of extraordinary theoretical
importance, but of the utmost practical importance. In 1910 Lenin spoke
of the disagreements at the Second Party Congress in 1903 as “anticipatory,”
i.e., a forewarning. It is very important to trace these disagreements
to their source, i.e., 1903, or even at an earlier time, say beginning
with “Economism.” But such a study acquires meaning only if
it is came to its logical conclusion and if it covers the period in which
these disagreements were submitted to the decisive test, that is to say,
the October period.
We cannot, within the limits of this preface, undertake to deal exhaustively
with all the stages of this struggle. But we consider it indispensable
at least partially to fill up the deplorable gap in our literature with
regard to the most important period in the development of our party.
As has already been said, the disagreements centered around the question
of power. Generally speaking, this is the touchstone whereby the character
of the revolutionary party (and of other parties as well) is determined.
There is an intimate connection between the question of power and the
question of war which was posed and decided in this period. We propose
to consider these questions in chronological order, taking the outstanding
landmarks: the position of the party and of the party press in the first
period after the overthrow of tsarism and prior to the arrival of Lenin;
the struggle around Lenin’s theses; the April Conference; the aftermath
of the July days; the Kornilov period; the Democratic Conference and the
Pre-Parliament; the question of the armed insurrection and seizure of
power (September to October); and the question of a “homogeneous”
socialist government.
The study of these disagreements will, we believe, enable us to draw
deductions of considerable importance to other parties in the Communist
International.
Chapter 3
The Struggle Against War and Defensism
The overthrow of tsarism
in February 1917 signaled, of course, a gigantic leap forward. But if
we take February within the limits of February alone, i.e., if we take
it not as a step towards October, then it meant no more than this: that
Russia was approximating a bourgeois republic like, for example, France.
The petty bourgeois revolutionary parties, as is their wont, considered
the February revolution to be neither bourgeois nor a step toward a socialist
revolution, but as some sort of self—sufficing “democratic”
entity. And upon this they constructed the ideology of revolutionary defensism.
They were defending, if you please, not the rule of any one class but
“revolution” and “democracy.” But even in our
own party the revolutionary impetus of February engendered at first an
extreme confusion of political perspectives. As a matter of fact, during
the March days, Pravda held a position much closer to revolutionary
defensism than to the position of Lenin.
“When one army stands opposed to another army,” we read in
one of its editorial articles, “no policy could be more absurd than
the policy of proposing that one of them should lay down arms and go home.
Such a policy would not be a policy of peace, but a policy of enslavement,
a policy to be scornfully rejected by a free people. No. The people will
remain intrepidly at their post, answering bullet with bullet and shell
with shell. This is beyond dispute. We must not allow any disorganization
of the armed forces of the revolution” (Pravda, No.9, March
15, 1917, in the article “No Secret Diplomacy"). We find here no
mention of classes, of the oppressors and the oppressed; there is, instead,
talk of a “free people"; there are no classes struggling for power
but, instead, a free people are “remaining at their post.”
The ideas as well as the formulas are defensist through and through! And
further in the same article: “Our slogan is not the empty cry ‘Down
with war!—which means the disorganization of the revolutionary army
and of the army that is becoming ever more revolutionary. Our slogan is
bring pressure [!] to bear on the Provisional Government so as to compel
it to make, without fail, openly and before the eyes of world democracy
[!], an attempt [!] to induce [!J all the warring countries to initiate
immediate negotiations to end the world war. Till then let everyone [!]
remain at his post [!].” The program of exerting pressure on an
imperialist government so as to “induce” it to pursue a pious
course was the program of Kautsky and Ledebour in Germany, Jean Longuet
in France, MacDonald in England; but it was never the program of Bolshevism.
In conclusion, the article not only extends the “warmest greetings”
to the notorious manifesto of the Petrograd Soviet addressed “To
the Peoples of the World” (a manifesto permeated from beginning
to end with the spirit of revolutionary defensism), but underscores “with
pleasure” the solidarity of the editorial board with the openly
defensist resolutions adopted at two meetings in Petrograd. Of these resolutions
it is enough to say that one runs as follows: “If the democratic
forces in Germany and Austria pay no heed to our voice [i.e., the “voice”
of the Provisional Government and of the conciliationist soviet ‘L.T.],
then we shall defend our fatherland to the last drop of our blood”
(Pravda, No.9, March 15, 1917).
The above quoted article is not an exception. On the contrary it quite
accurately expresses the position of Pravda prior to Lenin 5
return to Russia. Thus, in the next issue of the paper, in an article
“On the War,” although it contains some criticism of the “Manifesto
to the Peoples of the World,” the following occurs: “It is
impossible not to hail yesterday’s proclamation of the Petrograd
Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies to the peoples of
the world, summoning them to force their governments to bring the slaughter
to an end” (Pravda, No.10, March 16, 1917). And where should
a way out of war be sought? The article gives the following answer: “The
way out is the path of bringing pressure to bear on the Provisional Government
with the demand that the government proclaim its readiness to begin immediate
negotiations for peace.”
We could adduce many similar quotations, covertly defensist and conciliationist
in character. During this same period, and even weeks earlier, Lenin,
who had not yet freed himself from his Zurich cage, was thundering in
his “Letters from Mar” (most of these letters never reached
Pravda) against the faintest hint of any concessions to defensism
and conciliationism. “It is absolutely impermissible,” he
wrote on March 9, discerning the image of revolutionary events in the
distorted mirror of capitalist dispatches, “it is absolutely impermissible
to conceal from ourselves and from the people that this government wants
to continue the imperialist war, that it is an agent of British capital,
that it wants to restore the monarchy and strengthen the rule of the landlords
and capitalists.” And later, on March 12, he said: “To urge
that government to conclude a democratic peace is like preaching virtue
to brothel keepers.” At the time when Pravda was advocating
“exerting pressure” on the Provisional Government in order
to induce it to intervene in favor of peace “before the eyes of
world democracy,” Lenin was writing: “To urge the Guchkov-Milyukov
government to conclude a speedy, honest, democratic and good neighborly
peace is like the good village priest urging the landlords and the merchants
to ‘walk in the way of God’, to love their neighbors and to
turn the other cheek” [CW, Vol.23, “Letters from
Mar” (March 9 and 12, 1917), pp. 31—36].
On April 4, the day after his arrival at Petrograd, Lenin came out decisively
against the position of Pravda on the question of war and peace.
He wrote: “No support for the Provisional Government; the utter
falsity of all its promises should be made clear, particularly of those
relating to the renunciation of annexations.
Exposure in place of the impermissible, illusion breeding ‘demand’
that this government, a government of capitalists, should cease to be
an imperialist government” [CW, Vol.24, “The Tasks
of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution” (April 4, 1917), p.22].
It goes without saying that the proclamation issued by the conciliators
on March 14, which had met with so many compliments from Pravda,
was characterized by Lenin only as “notorious” and “muddled.”
It is the height of hypocrisy to summon other nations to break with their
bankers while simultaneously forming a coalition government with the bankers
of one’s own country. “—The Center’ all vow and
declare that they are Marxists and internationalists, that they are for
peace, for bringing every kind of ‘pressure’ to bear upon
the governments, for ‘demanding’ in every way that their own
government should ‘ascertain the will of the people for peace’[CW,
Vol.24, “Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution a Draft Platform
for the Proletarian Party” (May 28, 1917), p.76].
But here someone may at first glance raise an objection: Ought a revolutionary
party to refuse to “exercise pressure” on the bourgeoisie
and its government? Certainly not. The exercise of pressure on a bourgeois
government is the road of reform. A revolutionary Marxist party does not
reject reforms. But the road of reform serves a useful purpose in subsidiary
and not in fundamental questions. State power cannot be obtained by reforms.
“Pressure” can never induce the bourgeoisie to change its
policy on a question that involves its whole fate. The war created a revolutionary
situation precisely by reason of the fact that it left no room for any
reformist “pressure.” The only alternative was either to go
the whole way with the bourgeoisie, or to rouse the masses against it
so as to wrest the power from its hands. In the first case it might have
been possible to secure from the bourgeoisie some kind of sop with regard
to home policy, on the condition of unqualified support of their foreign
imperialist policy. For this very reason social reformism transformed
itself openly, at the outset of the war, into social imperialism. For
the same reason the genuinely revolutionary elements were forced to initiate
the creation of this new International.
The point of view of Pravda was not proletarian and revolutionary
but democratic’Defensist, even though vacillating in its defensism.
We had overthrown tsarism, we should now exercise pressure on our own
democratic government. The latter must propose peace to the peoples of
the world. If the German democracy proves incapable of exerting due pressure
on its own government, then we shall defend our “fatherland" to
the last drop of blood. The prospect of peace is not posed as an independent
task of the working class which the workers are called upon to achieve
over the head of the Provisional Government, because the conquest of power
by the proletariat is not posed as a practical revolutionary task. Yet
these two tasks are inextricably bound together.
Chapter 4
The April Conference
The speech which Lenin delivered
at the Finland railway station on the socialist character of the Russian
revolution was a bombshell to many leaders of the party. The polemic between
Lenin and the partisans of “completing the democratic revolution"
began from the very first day.
A sharp conflict took place over the armed April demonstration, which
raised the slogan: “Down with the Provisional Government!”
This incident supplied some representatives of the right wing with a pretext
for accusing Lenin of Blanquism. The overthrow of the Provisional Government,
which was supported at that time by the soviet majority, could be accomplished,
if you please, only by disregarding the majority of the toilers.
From a formal standpoint, such an accusation might seem rather plausible,
but in point of fact there was not the slightest shade of Blanquism in
Lenin’s April policy. For Lenin the whole question hinged on the
extent to which the soviets continued to reflect the real mood of the
masses, and whether or not the party was mistaken in guiding itself by
the soviet majority. The April demonstration, which went further “to
the left" than was warranted, was a kind of reconnoitering sortie to test
the temper of the masses and the reciprocal relationship between them
and the soviet majority. This reconnoitering operation led to the conclusion
that a lengthy preparatory period was necessary. And we observe that Lenin
in the beginning of May sharply curbed the men from Kronstadt, who had
gone too far and had declared against the recognition of the Provisional
Government.
The opponents of the struggle for power had an entirely different approach
to this question. At the April Party Conference, Comrade Kamenev made
the following complaint: “In No.19 of Pravda, a resolution
was first proposed by comrades [the reference here is obviously to Lenin
‘L.T.] to the effect that we should overthrow the Provisional Government.
It appeared in print prior to the last crisis, and this slogan was later
rejected as tending to disorganization; and it was recognized as adventuristic.
This implies that our comrades learned something during this crisis. The
resolution which is now proposed [by Lenin’L.T.J repeats that mistake
This manner of formulating the question is most highly significant. Lenin,
after the experience of the reconnoiter, withdrew the slogan of the immediate
overthrow of the Provisional Government. But he did not withdraw it for
any set period of time for so many weeks or months but strictly in dependence
upon how quickly the revolt of the masses against the conciliationists
would grow. The opposition, on the contrary, considered the slogan itself
to be a blunder. In the temporary retreat of Lenin there was not even
a hint of a change in the political line. He did not proceed from the
fact that the democratic revolution was still uncompleted. He based himself
exclusively on the idea that the masses were not at the moment capable
of overthrowing the Provisional Government and that, therefore, everything
possible had to be done to enable the working class to overthrow the Provisional
Government on the morrow.
The whole of the April Party Conference was devoted to the following
fundamental question: Are we heading toward the conquest of power in the
name of the socialist revolution or are we helping (anybody and everybody)
to complete the democratic revolution? Unfortunately, the report of the
April Conference remains unpublished to this very day, though there is
scarcely another congress in the history of our party that had such an
exceptional and immediate bearing on the destiny of our revolution as
the conference of April 1917.
Lenin’s position was this: an irreconcilable struggle against defensism
and its supporters; the capture of the soviet majority; the overthrow
of the Provisional Government; the seizure of power through the soviets;
a revolutionary peace policy and a program of socialist revolution at
home and of international revolution abroad. In distinction to this, as
we already know, the opposition held the view that it was necessary to
complete the democratic revolution by exerting pressure on the Provisional
Government, and in this process the soviets would remain the organs of
“control” over the power of the bourgeoisie. Hence flows quite
another and incomparably more conciliatory attitude to defensism.
One of the opponents of Lenin’s position argued in the following
manner at the April Conference: “We speak of the soviets of workers’
and soldiers’ deputies as if they were the organizing centers of
our own forces and of state power. . . . Their very name shows that they
constitute a bloc of petty bourgeois and proletarian forces which are
still confronted with uncompleted bourgeois democratic tasks. Had the
bourgeois democratic revolution been completed, this bloc would no longer
exist. . . and the proletariat would be waging a revolutionary struggle
against the bloc. . . . And, nevertheless, we recognize these soviets
as centers for the organization of forces. . . Consequently, the bourgeois
revolution is not yet completed, it has not yet outlived itself; and I
believe that all of us ought to recognize that with the complete accomplishment
of this revolution, the power would actually have passed into the hands
of the proletariat” (from the speech of Comrade Kamenev).
The hopeless schematism of this argument is obvious enough. For the crux
of the matter lies precisely in the fact that the “complete accomplishment
of this revolution” could never take place without changing the
bearers of power. The above speech ignores the class axis of the revolution;
it deduces the task of the party not from the actual grouping of class
forces but from a formal definition of the revolution as bourgeois, or
as bourgeois democratic. We are to participate in a bloc with the petty
bourgeoisie and exercise control over the bourgeois power until the bourgeois
revolution has been completely accomplished. The pattern is obviously
Menshevik. Imitating in a doctrinaire fashion the tasks of the revolution
by its nomenclature (a “bourgeois” revolution), one could
not fail to arrive at the policy of exercising control over the Provisional
Government and demanding that the Provisional Government should bring
forward a policy of peace without annexations, and so on. By the completion
of the democratic revolution was understood a series of reforms to be
effected through the Constituent Assembly! Moreover, the Bolshevik Party
was assigned the role of a left wing in the Constituent Assembly. Such
an outlook deprived the slogan “All power to the soviets!”
of any actual meaning. This was best and most consistently and most thoroughly
expressed at the April Conference by the late Nogin, who also belonged
to the opposition: “In the process of development the most important
functions of the soviets will fall away. A whole series of administrative
functions will be transferred to the municipal, district, and other institutions.
If we examine the future development of the structure of the state, we
cannot deny that the Constituent Assembly will be convoked and after that
the Parliament. . . . Thus, it follows that the most important functions
of the soviets will gradually wither away. That, however, does not mean
to say that the soviets will end their existence in ignominy. They will
only transfer their functions. Under these same soviets we shall not achieve
the commune republic in our country.”
Finally, a third opponent dealt with the question from the standpoint
that Russia was not ready for socialism. “Can we count on the support
of the masses if we raise the slogan of proletarian revolution? Russia
is the most petty bourgeois country in Europe. To count on the sympathy
of the masses for a socialist revolution is impossible; and, consequently,
the more the party holds to the standpoint of a socialist revolution the
further it will be reduced to the role of a propaganda circle. The impetus
to a socialist revolution must come from the West.” And further
on: “Where will the sun of the socialist revolution rise? I believe
that, in view of all the circumstances and our general cultural level,
it is not for us to initiate the socialist revolution. We lack the necessary
forces; the objective conditions for it do not exist in our country. But
for the West this question is posed much in the same manner as the question
of overthrowing tsarism in our country.”
Not all the opponents of Lenin’s point of view at the April Conference
drew the same conclusions as Nogin but all of them were logically forced
to accept these conclusions several months later, on the eve of October.
Either we must assume leadership of the proletarian revolution or we must
accept the role of an opposition in a bourgeois parliament that is how
the question was posed within our party. It is perfectly obvious that
the latter position was essentially a Menshevik position, or rather the
position which the Mensheviks found themselves compelled to occupy after
the February revolution. As a matter of fact, the Mensheviks had for many
years tapped away like so many woodpeckers at the idea that the coming
revolution must be bourgeois; that the government of a bourgeois revolution
could only perform bourgeois tasks; that the social democracy could not
take upon itself the tasks of bourgeois democracy and must remain an opposition
while “pushing the bourgeoisie to the left.” This theme was
developed with a particularly boring profundity by Martynov. With the
inception of the bourgeois revolution in 1917, the Mensheviks soon found
themselves on the staff of the government. Out of their entire “principled"
position there remained only one political conclusion, namely, that the
proletariat dare not seize power. But it is plain enough that those Bolsheviks
who indicted Menshevik ministerialism and who at the same time were opposed
to the seizure of power by the proletariat were, in point of fact, shifting
to the pre revolutionary positions of the Mensheviks. The revolution caused
political shifts to take place in two directions: the reactionaries became
Cadets and the Cadets became republicans against their own wishes—a
purely formal shift to the left; the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks
became the ruling bourgeois party—a shift to the right. These are
the means whereby bourgeois society seeks to create for itself a new backbone
for state power, stability, and order. But at the same time, while the
Mensheviks were passing from a formal socialist position to a vulgar democratic
one, the right wing of the Bolsheviks was shifting to a formal socialist
position, i.e., the Menshevik position of yesterday.
The same regroupment of forces took place on the question of war. The
bourgeoisie, except for a few doctrinaires, kept wearily droning the same
tune: no annexations, no indemnities—all the more so because the
hopes for annexation were already very slim. The Zimmerwaldian Mensheviks
and the SRs, who had criticized the French socialists because they defended
their bourgeois republican fatherland, themselves immediately became defensists
the moment they felt themselves part of a bourgeois republic. >From
a passive internationalist position, they shifted to an active patriotic
one. At the same time, the right wing of the Bolsheviks went over to a
passive internationalist position, (exerting “pressure” on
the Provisional Government for the sake of a democratic peace, “without
annexations and without indemnities"). Thus at the April Conference the
formula of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry
was driven asunder both theoretically and politically, and from it emerged
two antagonistic points of view: a democratic point of view, camouflaged
by formal socialist reservations, and a revolutionary socialist point
of view, the genuinely Bolshevik and Leninist point of view.
Chapter 5
The July Days; the Kornilov Episode; the Democratic
Conference and the Pre-Parliament
The decisions of the April Conference
gave the party a correct principled orientation but they did not liquidate
the disagreements among the party leaders. On the contrary, with the march
of events, these disagreements assume more concrete forms, and reach their
sharpest expression during the most decisive moment of the revolution’
in the October days. The attempt to organize a demonstration on June 10
(on Lenin’s initiative) was denounced as an adventure by the very
same comrades who had been dissatisfied with the character of the April
demonstration. The demonstration of June 10 did not take place because
it was proscribed by the Congress of Soviets. But on June 18 the party
avenged itself. The general demonstration at Petrograd, which the conciliators
had rather imprudently initiated, took place almost wholly under Bolshevik
slogans. Nevertheless, the government sought to have its own way. It lightmindedly
ordered the idiotic offensive at the front. The moment was decisive. Lenin
kept warning the party against imprudent steps. On June 21, he wrote in
Pravda: “Comrades, a demonstrative act at this juncture would be
inexpedient. We are now compelled to live through an entirely new stage
in our revolution.” But the July days impended—an important
landmark on the road of revolution, as well as on the road of the internal
party disagreements.
In the July movement, the decisive moment came with the spontaneous onslaught
by the Petrograd masses. It is indubitable that in July Lenin was weighing
in his mind questions like these:
Has the time come? Has the mood of the masses outgrown the soviet superstructure?
Are we running the risk of becoming hypnotized by soviet legality, and
of lagging behind the mood of the masses, and of being severed from them?
It is very probable that isolated and purely military operations during
the July days were initiated by comrades who honestly believed that they
were not diverging from Lenin’s estimate of the situation. Lenin
afterwards said: “We did a great many foolish things in July.”
But the gist of the July days was that we made another, a new and much
more extensive reconnoiter on a new and higher stage of the movement.
We had to make a retreat, under onerous conditions. The party, to the
extent that it was preparing for the insurrection and the seizure of power,
considered - as did Lenin’ that the July demonstration was only
an episode in which we had to pay dearly for an exploration of our own
strength and the enemy’s, but which could not alter the main line
of our activity. On the other hand, the comrades who were opposed to the
policy aimed at the seizure of power were bound to see a pernicious adventure
in the July episode. The mobilization of the right-wing elements in the
party became increasingly intensive; their criticism became more outspoken.
There was also a corresponding change in the tone of rebuttal. Lenin wrote:
“All this whining, all these arguments to the effect that we ‘should
not have’ participated (in the attempt to lend a ‘peaceable
and organized’ character to the perfectly legitimate popular discontent
and indignation!!), are either sheer apostasy, if coming from Bolsheviks,
or the usual expression of the usual cowed and confused state of the petty
bourgeoisie” [CW Vol.25, “Constitutional Illusions”
(July 26, 1917), p.204]. The use of the word “apostasy” at
such a time sheds a tragic light upon the disagreements. As the events
unfolded, this ominous word appeared more and more often.
The opportunist attitude toward the question of power and the question
of war determined, of course, a corresponding attitude toward the International.
The rights made an attempt to draw the party into the Stockholm Conference
of the social patriots. Lenin wrote on August 16: “The speech made
by Comrade Kamenev on August 6 in the Central Executive Committee on the
Stockholm Conference cannot but meet with reproof from al] Bolsheviks
who are faithful to their Party and principles.” And further on,
in reference to certain statements alleging that a great revolutionary
banner was being unfurled over Stockholm, Lenin said: “This is a
meaningless declamation in the spirit of Chernov and Tseretelli. It is
a blatant untruth. In actual fact, it is not the revolutionary banner
that is beginning to wave over Stockholm, but the banner of deals, agreements,
amnesty for the social imperialists, and negotiations among bankers for
dividing up annexed territory” [CW Vol.25, “Kamenev’s
Speech in the Central Executive Committee on the Stockholm Conference”
(August 16, 1917), pp.240—41].
The road to Stockholm was, in effect, the road to the Second international,
just as taking part in the Pre-Parliament was the road to the bourgeois
republic. Lenin was for the boycott of the Stockholm Conference, just
as later he was for the boycott of the Pre-Parliament. In the very heat
of the struggle he did not for a single moment forget the tasks of creating
a new Communist International.
As early as April 10, Lenin came forward with a proposal to change the
name of the party. All objections against the new name he characterized
as follows: “It is an argument of routinism, an argument of inertia,
an argument of stagnation.—. . It is time to cast off the soiled
shirt and to put on clean linen” [CW, Vol.24, “Tasks
of the Proletariat in Our Revolution—a Draft Program for the Proletarian
Party” (April 10,1917), p.88]. Nevertheless, the opposition of the
party leaders was so strong that a whole year had to pass by—in
the course of which all of Russia cast off the filthy garments of bourgeois
domination—before the party could make up its mind to take a new
name, returning to the tradition of Marx and Engels. This incident of
renaming the party serves as a symbolic expression of Lenin’s role
throughout the whole of 1917: during the sharpest turning point in history,
he was all the while waging an intense struggle within the party against
the day that had passed in the name of the day to come. And the opposition,
belonging to the day that had passed, marching under the banner of “tradition,”
became at times aggravated to the extreme.
The Kornilov events, which created an abrupt shift in the situation in
our favor, acted to soften the differences temporarily; they were softened
but not eliminated. In the right wing, a tendency manifested itself during
those days to draw closer to the soviet majority on the basis of defending
the revolution and, in part, the fatherland. Lenin’s reaction to
this was expressed in his letter to the Central Committee at the beginning
of September. “It is my conviction that those who become unprincipled
are people who . . . slide into defencism or (like other Bolsheviks) into
a bloc with the S.R.s, into supporting the Provisional Government. Their
attitude is absolutely wrong and unprincipled. We shall become defencists
only after the transfer of power to the proletariat. . . . Even now we
must not support Kerensky’s government. This is unprincipled. We
may be asked: aren’t we going to fight against Kornilov? Of course
we must! But this is not the same thing; there is a dividing line here,
which is being stepped over by some Bolsheviks who fall into compromise
and allow themselves to be carried away by the course of events”
CW, Vol.25, “To the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.”
(August 30, 1917), pp.285—86].
The next stage in the evolution of divergent views was the Democratic
Conference (September 14—22) and the Pre-Parliament that followed
it (October 7).34 The task of the Mensheviks and the SRS consisted in
entangling the Bolsheviks in soviet legality and afterwards painlessly
transforming the latter into bourgeois parliamentary legality. The rights
were ready to welcome this. We are already acquainted with their manner
of portraying the future development of the revolution: the soviets would
gradually surrender their functions to corresponding institutions—to
the Dumas, the Zemstvos, the trade unions, and finally to the Constituent
Assembly—and would automatically vanish from the scene. Through
the channel of the Pre-Parliament, the political awareness of the masses
was to be directed away from the soviets as ‘temporary” and
dying institutions, to the Constituent Assembly as the crowning work of
the democratic revolution. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks were already in the
majority in the Petrograd and Moscow soviets; our influence in the army
grew, not from day to day, but from hour to hour. It was no longer a question
of prognosis or perspective; it was literally a question of how we were
to act the next day.
The conduct of the completely drained conciliationist parties at the
Democratic Conference was the incarnation of petty vileness. Yet the proposal
which we introduced to abandon the Democratic Conference demonstratively,
leaving it to its doom, met with decisive opposition on the part of the
right elements of the fraction who were still influential at the top.
The clash on this question was a prelude to the struggle over the question
of boycotting the Pre-Parliament. On September 24, i.e., after the Democratic
Conference, Lenin wrote: “The Bolsheviks should have walked out
of the meeting in protest and not allowed themselves to be caught by the
conference trap set to divert the people’s attention from serious
questions” [CW, Vol.26, “Heroes of Fraud and the
Mistakes of the Bolsheviks” (September 22, 1917), p.48].
The discussion in the Bolshevik fraction at the Democratic Conference
over the question of boycotting the Pre-Parliament had an exceptional
importance despite the comparatively narrow scope of the issue itself.
As a matter of fact, it was the most extensive and, on the surface, most
successful attempt on the part of the rights to turn the party onto the
path of “completing the democratic revolution.” Apparently
no minutes of these discussions were taken; in any case, no record has
remained; to my knowledge even the secretary’s notes have not been
located as yet. The editors of this volume found a few scanty documents
among my own papers. Comrade Kamenev expounded a line of argument which,
later on, was developed in a sharper and more defined form and embodied
in the well—known letter of Kamenev and Zinoviev (dated October
11) to the party organizations. The most principled formulation of the
question was made by Nogin:
the boycott of the Pre-Parliament is a summons to an insurrection, i.e.,
to a repetition of the July days. Other comrades based themselves on general
considerations of social democratic parliamentary tactics. No one would
dare—so they said in substance propose that we boycott the Parliament;
nevertheless, a proposal is made that we boycott an identical institution
merely because it is called a Pre-Parliament.
The basic conception of the rights was as follows: the revolution must
inevitably lead from the soviets to the establishment of bourgeois parliamentarism;
the “Pre-Parliament” forms a natural link in this process;
therefore, it is folly to refuse to take part in the Pre-Parliament in
view of our readiness to occupy the left benches in the Parliament itself.
It was necessary to complete the democratic revolution and “prepare”
for the socialist revolution. How were we to prepare? By passing through
the school of bourgeois parliamentarism; because, you see, the advanced
country shows the backward country the image of its own future. The downfall
of the tsarist monarchy is viewed as revolutionary ‘and so it was
- but the conquest of power by the proletariat is conceived in a parliamentary
way, on the basis of a completely accomplished democracy. Many long years
of a democratic regime must elapse in the interval between the bourgeois
revolution and the proletarian revolution. The struggle for our participation
in the Pre-Parliament was the struggle for the “Europeanization”
of the working class movement, for directing it as quickly as possible
into the channel of a democratic “struggle for power," i.e., into
the channel of social democracy. Our fraction in the Democratic Conference,
numbering over a hundred individuals, did not differ greatly, especially
during those days, from a party congress. The majority of the fraction
expressed itself in favor of participating in the Pre-Parliament. This
fact was itself sufficient cause for alarm; and from that moment Lenin
did sound the alarm unceasingly.
While the Democratic Conference was in session, Lenin wrote: “It
would be a big mistake, sheer parliamentary cretinism on our part, if
we were to regard the Democratic Conference as a parliament; for even
if it were to proclaim itself a permanent and sovereign parliament of
the revolution, it would nevertheless decide nothing. The power of decision
lies outside it in the working-class quarters of Petrograd and Moscow”
[CW, Vol.26 “Marxism and Insurrection—a Letter to
the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.” (September 13 and 14, 1917),
p.25). Lenin’s appraisal of the importance of participation or nonparticipation
in the Pre-Parliament can be gathered from many of his declarations and
particularly from his letter of September 29 to the Central Committee,
in which he speaks of “such glaring errors on the part of the Bolsheviks
as the shameful decision to participate in the Pre-Parliament” CW,
Vol.26, “The Crisis Has Matured” (September 29, 1917), p.84].
For him this decision was an expression of the same democratic illusions
and petty-bourgeois vacillations against which he had fought, developing
and perfecting in the course of that struggle his conception of the proletarian
revolution. It is not true that many years must elapse between the bourgeois
and proletarian revolutions. It is not true that the school of parliamentarism
is the one and only, or the main, or the compulsory training school for
the conquest of power. It is not true that the road to power runs necessarily
through bourgeois democracy. These are all naked abstractions, doctrinaire
patterns, and they play only one political role, namely, to bind the proletarian
vanguard hand and foot, and by means of the “democratic” state
machinery turn it into an oppositionist political shadow of the bourgeoisie,
bearing the name of social democracy. The policy of the proletariat must
not be guided by schoolboy patterns but in accordance with the real flux
of the class struggle. Our task is not to go to the Pre-Parliament but
to organize the insurrection and seize power. The rest will follow. Lenin
even proposed to call an emergency party congress, advancing as a platform
the boycott of the Pre-Parliament. Henceforth all his letters and articles
hammer at a single point: we must go, not into the Pre-Parliament to act
as a “revolutionary” tail of the conciliators, but out into
the streets—to struggle for power!
Chapter 6
On the Eve of the October Revolution;—the Aftermath.
An emergency congress proved unnecessary.
The pressure exerted by Lenin secured the requisite shift of forces to
the left, both within the Central Committee and in our fraction in the
Pre-Parliament. The Bolsheviks withdrew from it on October 10. In Petrograd
the soviet clashed with the government over the order transferring to
the front the part of the garrison which sympathized with the Bolsheviks.
On October 16, the Revolutionary Military Committee was created, the legal
soviet organ of insurrection. The right wing of the party sought to retard
the development of events. The struggle of tendencies within the party,
as well as the class struggle in the country, entered its decisive phase.
The position of the rights is best and most completely illumined in its
principled aspects by a letter signed by Zinoviev and Kamenev and entitled
“On the Current Situation.” The letter was written on October
11, that is, two weeks before the insurrection, and it was sent to the
most important party organizations. The letter comes out in decisive opposition
to the resolution for an armed insurrection adopted by the Central Committee.
Cautioning against underestimating the enemy, while in reality monstrously
underestimating the forces of revolution and even denying that the masses
are in a mood for battle (two weeks before October 25!), the letter states:
“We are deeply convinced that to call at present for an armed uprising
means to stake on one card not only the fate of our party but also the
fate of the Russian and international revolution.” But if the insurrection
and the seizure of power are out of the question, what then? The answer
in the letter is also quite plain and precise: “Through the army,
through the workers, we hold a revolver at the temple of the bourgeoisie,”
and because of this revolver the bourgeoisie will be unable to quash the
Constituent Assembly. “The chances of our party in the elections
to the Constituent Assembly are excellent. . . . The influence of the
Bolsheviks is increasing. . . . With correct tactics we can get a third
and even more of the seats in the Constituent Assembly.”
Thus, this letter openly steers a course towards our playing the role
of an “influential” opposition in a bourgeois Constituent
Assembly. This purely social democratic course is superficially camouflaged
by the following consideration: “The soviets, which have become
rooted in life, cannot be destroyed. The Constituent Assembly will be
able to find support for its revolutionary work only in the soviets. The
Constituent Assembly plus the soviets that is that combined type of state
institution towards which we are going.” It is of extraordinary
interest with regard to characterizing the entire line of the rights that
the theory of “combined" state forms, the correlation of the Constituent
Assembly with the soviets, was reiterated in Germany a year and a half
or two years later by Rudolf Hilferding, who also waged a struggle against
the seizure of power by the proletariat. The Austro-German opportunist
was unaware that he was plagiarizing.
The letter “On the Current Situation” refutes the assertion
that the majority of the people in Russia were already supporting us,
on the basis of a purely parliamentary estimate of this majority. “In
Russia a majority of the workers,” the letter states, “and
a substantial part of the soldiers are with us. But all the rest is dubious.
We are all convinced, for instance, that if elections to the Constituent
Assembly were to take place now, a majority of the peasants would vote
for the SRs. What is this, an accident?” The above formulation of
the question contains the principal and fundamental error, flowing from
a failure to understand that the peasants might have strong revolutionary
interests and an intense urge to realize them, but cannot have an independent
political position. They might either vote for the bourgeoisie, by voting
for its SR agency, or join in action with the proletariat. Which one of
these two possibilities would materialize hinged precisely upon the policy
we pursued. Had we gone to the Pre-Parliament in order to constitute an
influential opposition ("a third and even more of the seats") in the Constituent
Assembly, then we would have almost automatically placed the peasantry
in such a position as would have compelled it to seek the satisfaction
of its interests through the Constituent Assembly; and, consequently,
they would have looked not to the opposition but to the majority. On the
other hand, the seizure of power by the proletariat immediately created
the revolutionary framework for the struggle of the peasantry against
the landlords and the officials. To use the expressions so current among
us on this question, this letter expresses simultaneously both an underestimation
and an overestimation of the peasantry. It underestimates the revolutionary
potential of the peasants (under a proletarian leadership!) and it overestimates
their political independence. This twofold error of overestimating and
at the same time underestimating the peasantry flows, in its turn, from
an underestimation of our own class and its party—that is, from
a social democratic approach to the proletariat. And this is not at all
surprising. All shades of opportunism are, in the last analysis, reducible
to an incorrect evaluation of the revolutionary forces and potential of
the proletariat.
Objecting to the seizure of power, the letter tries to scare the party
with the prospect of a revolutionary war. “The masses of the soldiers
support us not because of the slogan of war, but because of the slogan
of peace. . . . If having taken power at present by ourselves, we should
come to the conclusion (in view of the whole world situation) that it
is necessary to wage a revolutionary war, the masses of soldiers will
rush away from us. The best part of the army youth will, of course, remain
with us, but the masses of the soldiers will turn away.” This line
of reasoning is most highly instructive. We have here the basic arguments
in favor of signing the Brest-Iitovsk peace; in the present instance,
however, they are being directed against the seizure of power. It is plain
enough that the position expressed in the letter “On the Current
Situation” later facilitated in the highest degree the acceptance
of the Brest-Iitovsk peace by those who supported the views expressed
in the above letter. It remains for us to repeat here what we said in
another place, namely, that the political genius of Lenin is characterized
not by taking the temporary Brest-Litovsk capitulation as an isolated
fact but only by considering Brest-Litovsk in combination with October.
This must always be kept in mind.
The working class struggles and matures in the never-failing consciousness
of the fact that the preponderance of forces lies on the side of the enemy.
This preponderance manifests itself in daily life, at every step. The
enemy possesses wealth and state power, all the means of exerting ideological
pressure and all the instruments of repression. We become habituated to
the idea that the preponderance of forces is on the enemy’s side;
and this habitual thought enters as an integral part into the entire life
and activity of the revolutionary party during the preparatory epoch.
The consequences entailed by this or that careless or premature act serve
each time as most cruel reminders of the enemy’s strength.
But a moment comes when this habit of regarding the enemy as stronger
becomes the main obstacle on the road to victory. Today’s weakness
of the bourgeoisie seems to be cloaked by the shadow of its strength of
yesterday. “You underestimate the strength of the enemy!”
This cry serves as the axis for the grouping of all elements opposed to
the armed insurrection. “But everyone who does not want merely to
talk about uprising,” wrote the opponents of insurrection in our
own country, two weeks before our victory, “must carefully weigh
its chances. And here we consider it our duty to say that at the present
moment it would be most harmful to underestimate the forces of our opponent
and overestimate our own forces. The forces of the opponent are greater
than they appear. Petrograd is decisive, and in Petrograd the enemies
of the proletarian party have accumulated substantial forces: 5,000 military
cadets, excellently armed, organized, anxious (because of their class
position) and able to fight; also the staff, shock troops, Cossacks, a
substantial part of the garrison, and very considerable artillery, which
has taken up a position in fan-like formation around Petrograd. Then our
adversaries will undoubtedly attempt, with the aid of the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, to bring troops from the front”
["On the Current Situation"].
In a civil war, to the extent that it is not a question of merely counting
battalions beforehand but of drawing a rough balance of their state of
consciousness, such an estimate can, of course, never prove completely
satisfactory or adequate. Even Lenin estimated that the enemy had strong
forces in Petrograd; and he proposed that the insurrection begin in Moscow
where, as he thought, it might be carried out almost without bloodshed.
Such partial mistakes of forecast are absolutely unavoidable even under
the most favorable circumstances and it is always more correct to make
plans in accordance with the less favorable conditions. But of interest
to us in the given case is the fact that the enemy forces were monstrously
overestimated and that all proportions were completely distorted at a
time when the enemy was actually deprived of any armed force. This question
‘as the experience of Germany proved’ is of paramount importance.
So long as the slogan of insurrection was approached by the leaders of
the German Communist Party mainly, if not solely, from an agitational
standpoint, they simply ignored the question of the armed forces at the
disposal of the enemy (Reichswehr, fascist detachments, police, etc.).
It seemed to them that the constantly rising revolutionary flood tide
would automatically solve the military question. But when the task stared
them in the face, the very same comrades who had previously treated the
armed forces of the enemy as if they were nonexistent, went immediately
to the other extreme. They placed implicit faith in all the statistics
of the armed strength of the bourgeoisie, meticulously added to the latter
the forces of the Reichswehr and the police; then they reduced the whole
to a round number (half a million and more) and so obtained a compact
mass force armed to the teeth and absolutely sufficient to paralyze their
own efforts.
No doubt the forces of the German counterrevolution were much stronger
numerically and, at any rate, better organized and prepared than our own
Kornilovites and semi-Kornilovites. But so were the effective forces of
the German revolution. The proletariat composes the overwhelming majority
of the population in Germany. In our country, the question—at least
during the initial stage—was decided by Petrograd and Moscow. In
Germany, the insurrection would have immediately blazed in scores of mighty
proletarian centers. On this arena, the armed forces of the enemy would
not have seemed nearly as terrible as they did in statistical computations,
expressed in round figures. In any case, we must categorically reject
the tendentious calculations which were made, and which are still being
made, after the debacle of the German October, in order to justify the
policy that led to the debacle. Our Russian example is of great significance
in this connection. Two weeks prior to our bloodless victory in Petrograd—and
we could have gained it even two weeks earlier experienced party politicians
saw arrayed against us the military cadets, anxious and able to fight,
the shock troops, the Cossacks, a substantial part of the garrison, the
artillery, in fan ‘like formation, and the troops arriving from
the front. But in reality all this came to nothing: in round figures,
zero. Now, let us imagine for a moment that the opponents of the insurrection
had carried the day in our party and in the Central Committee. The part
that leadership plays in a civil war is all too clear: in such a case
the revolution would have been doomed beforehand—unless Lenin had
appealed to the party against the Central Committee, which he was preparing
to do, and in which he would undoubtedly have been successful. But, under
similar conditions, not every party will have its Lenin. . .
It is not difficult to imagine how history would have been written, had
the line of evading the battle carried in the Central Committee. The official
historians would, of course, have explained that an insurrection in October
1917 would have been sheer madness; and they would have furnished the
reader with awe—inspiring statistical charts of the military cadets
and Cossacks and shock troops and artillery, in fan - like formation,
and army corps arriving from the front. Never tested in the fire of insurrection,
these forces would have seemed immeasurably more terrible than they proved
in action. Here is the lesson which must be burned into the consciousness
of every revolutionist!
The persistent, tireless, and incessant pressure which Lenin exerted
on the Central Committee throughout September and October arose from his
constant fear lest we allow the propitious moment to slip away. All this
is nonsense, replied the rights, our influence will continue to grow.
Who was right? And what does it mean to lose the propitious moment? This
question directly involves an issue on which the Bolshevik estimate of
the ways and means of revolution comes into sharpest and clearest conflict
with the social democratic, Menshevik estimate: the former being active,
strategic, and practical through and through, while the latter is utterly
permeated with fatalism.
What does it mean to lose the propitious moment? The most favorable conditions
for an insurrection exist, obviously, when the maximum shift in our favor
has occurred in the relationship of forces. We are, of course, referring
to the relationship of forces in the domain of consciousness, i.e., in
the domain of the political superstructure, and not in the domain of the
economic foundation, which may be assumed to remain more or less unchanged
throughout the entire revolutionary epoch. On one and the same economic
foundation, with one and the same class division of society, the relationship
of forces changes depending upon the mood of the proletarian masses, the
extent to which their illusions are shattered and their political experience
has grown, the extent to which the confidence of intermediate classes
and groups in the state power is shattered, and finally the extent to
which the latter loses confidence in itself. During revolution all these
processes take place with lightning speed. The whole tactical art consists
in this: that we seize the moment when the combination of circumstances
is most favorable to us. The Kornilov uprising completely prepared such
a combination. The masses, having lost confidence in the parties of the
soviet majority, saw with their own eyes the danger of counterrevolution.
They came to the conclusion that it was now up to the Bolsheviks to find
a way out of the situation. Neither the elemental disintegration of the
state power nor the elemental influx of the impatient and exacting confidence
of the masses in the Bolsheviks could endure for a protracted period of
time. The crisis had to be resolved one way or another. It is now or never!
Lenin kept repeating.
The rights said in refutation: “It would be a serious historical
untruth to formulate the question of the transfer of power into the hands
of the proletarian party in the terms: either now or never. No. The party
of the proletariat will grow. Its program will become known to broader
and broader masses. . . . And there is only one way in which the proletarian
party can interrupt its successes, and that is if under present conditions
it takes upon itself to initiate an uprising. . . . Against this perilous
policy we raise our voice in warning” ["On the Current Situation"].
This fatalistic optimism deserves most careful study. There is nothing
national and certainly nothing individual about it. Only last year we
witnessed the very same tendency in Germany. This passive fatalism is
really only a cover for irresolution and even incapacity for action, but
it camouflages itself with the consoling prognosis that we are, you know,
growing more and more influential; as time goes on, our forces will continually
increase. What a gross delusion! The strength of a revolutionary party
increases only up to a certain moment, after which the process can turn
into the very opposite. The hopes of the masses change into disillusionment
as the result of the party’s passivity, while the enemy recovers
from his panic and takes advantage of this disillusionment. We witnessed
such a decisive turning point in Germany in October 1923. We were not
so very far removed from a similar turn of events in Russia in the fall
of 1917. For that, a delay of a few more weeks would perhaps have been
enough. Lenin was right. It was now or never!
“But the decisive question”—and here the opponents
of the insurrection brought forward their last and strongest arguments,
is the sentiment among the workers and soldiers of the capital really
such that they see salvation only in street fighting, that they are impatient
to go into the streets? No. There is no such sentiment.—If among
the great masses of the poor of the capita] there were a militant sentiment
burning to go into the streets, it might have served as a guarantee that
an uprising initiated by them would draw in the biggest organizations
(railroad unions, unions of postal and telegraph workers, etc.), where
the influence of our party is weak. But since there is no such sentiment
even in the factories and barracks, it would be a self“deception
to build any plans on it” [“On the Current Situation”].
These lines written on October 11 acquire an exceptional and most timely
significance when we recall that the leading comrades in the German party,
in their attempt to explain away their retreat last year without striking
a blow, especially emphasized the reluctance of the masses to fight. But
the very crux of the matter lies in the fact that a victorious insurrection
becomes, generally speaking, most assured when the masses have had sufficient
experience not to plunge headlong into the struggle but to wait and demand
a resolute and capable fighting leadership. In October 1917, the working
class masses, or at least their leading section, had already come to the
firm conviction on the basis of the experience of the April demonstration,
the July days, and the Kornilov events—that neither isolated elemental
protests nor reconnoitering operations were any longer on the agenda—but
a decisive insurrection for the seizure of power. The mood of the masses
correspondingly became more concentrated, more critical, and more profound.
The transition from an illusory, exuberant, elemental mood to a more critical
and conscious frame of mind necessarily implies a pause in revolutionary
continuity. Such a progressive crisis in the mood of the masses can be
overcome only by a proper party policy, that is to say, above all by the
genuine readiness and ability of the party to lead the insurrection of
the proletariat. On the other hand, a party which carries on a protracted
revolutionary agitation, tearing the masses away from the influence of
the conciliationists, and then, after the confidence of the masses has
been raised to the utmost, begins to vacillate, to split hairs, to hedge,
and to temporize—such a party paralyzes the activity of the masses,
sows disillusion and disintegration among them, and brings ruin to the
revolution; but in return it provides itself with the ready excuse ‘after
the debacle—that the masses were insufficiently active. This was
precisely the course steered by the letter “On the Current Situation.”
Luckily, our party under the leadership of Lenin was decisively able to
liquidate such moods among the leaders. Because of this alone it was able
to guide a victorious revolution.
We have characterized the nature of the political questions bound up
with the preparation for the October Revolution, and we have attempted
to clarify the gist of the differences that arose; and now it remains
for us to trace briefly the most important moments of the internal party
struggle during the last decisive weeks.
The resolution for an armed insurrection was adopted by the Central Committee
on October 10. On October 11 the letter “On the Current Situation,”
analyzed above, was sent out to the most important party organizations.
On October 18, that is, a week before the revolution, Novaya Zhizn
[New Life] published the letter of Kamenev. “Not only Comrade
Zinoviev and I, “we read in this letter, “but also a number
of practical comrades think that to assume the initiative of an armed
insurrection at the present moment, with the given correlation of forces,
independently of and several days before the Congress of Soviets, is an
inadmissible step ruinous to the proletariat and to the revolution" [Novaya
Zhizn, No.156, October 18, 1917]. On October 25 power was seized
in Petrograd and the Soviet government was created. On November 4, a number
of responsible party members resigned from the Central Committee of the
party and from the Council of People’s Commissars, and issued an
ultimatum demanding the formation of a coalition government composed of
all soviet parties. “Otherwise,” they wrote, “the only
course that remains is to maintain a purely Bolshevik government by means
of political terror.” And, in another document, issued at the same
time: “We cannot assume any responsibility for this ruinous policy
of the Central Committee which has been adopted contrary to the will of
the great majority of the proletariat and the soldiers who are longing
for the quickest possible cessation of bloodshed between the different
sections of democracy. For this reason we resign from our posts in the
Central Committee in order to avail ourselves of the right to express
our candid opinions to the masses of workers and soldiers and summon them
to support our cry: ‘Long live the government of all soviet parties!’
Immediate conciliation on this basis!” ["The October Revolution,”
Archives of the Revolution, 1917, pp. 407— 10].
Thus, those who had opposed the armed insurrection and the seizure of
power as an adventure were demanding, after the victorious conclusion
of the insurrection, that the power be restored to those parties against
whom the proletariat had to struggle in order to conquer power. And why,
indeed, was the victorious Bolshevik Party obliged to restore power to
the Mensheviks and the SRs? (And it was precisely the restoration of power
that was in question here!) To this the opposition replied: “We
consider that the creation of such a government is necessary for the sake
of preventing further bloodshed, an imminent famine, the crushing of the
revolution by Kaledin and his cohorts; and in order to insure the convocation
of the Constituent Assembly and the actual carrying through of the program
of peace adopted by the All ‘Russian Congress of Soviets of Soldiers’
and Workers’ Deputies” [Ibid., pp.407—10]. In other
words, it was a question of clearing a path for bourgeois parliamentarianism
through the portals of the soviets. The revolution had refused to pass
through the Pre-Parliament, and had to cut a channel for itself through
October; therefore the task, as formulated by the opposition, consisted
in saving the revolution from the dictatorship, with the help of the Mensheviks
and the SRs, by diverting it into the channel of a bourgeois regime. What
was in question here was the liquidation of October—no more, no
less. Naturally, there could be no talk whatever of conciliation under
such conditions.
On the next day, November 5, still another letter, along the same lines,
was published. “I cannot, in the name of party discipline, remain
silent when in the face of common sense and the elemental movement of
the masses, Marxists refuse to take into consideration objective conditions
which imperiously dictate to us, under the threat of a catastrophe, conciliation
with all the socialist parties. . . . I cannot, in the name of party discipline,
submit to the cult of personal worship, and stake political conciliation
with all socialist parties who agree to our basic demands, upon the inclusion
of this or that individual in the ministry, nor am I willing for that
reason to prolong the bloodshed even for a single minute" [Rabochaya
Gazeta (Workers’ Journal), No.204, Nov. 5, 1917]. The author
of this letter (Lazovsky) ends by declaring it urgent to fight for an
emergency party congress which would decide the question “whether
the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks) will remain a Marxist
working class party or whether it will finally adopt a course which has
nothing in common with revolutionary Marxism” [Ibid.].
The situation seemed perfectly hopeless. Not only the bourgeoisie and
the landlords, not only the so-called “revolutionary democracy”
who still retained the control of the leading bodies of many organizations
(the All - Russian Central Executive Committee of Railwaymen [Vikzhel],
the army committees, the government employees, and so on) but also some
of the most influential members of our own party, members of the Central
Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars, were loud in their
public condemnation of the party’s attempt to remain in power in
order to carry out its program. The situation might have seemed hopeless,
we repeat, if one looked only at the surface of events. What then remained?
To acquiesce to the demands. of the opposition meant to liquidate October.
In that case, we should not have achieved it in the first place. Only
one course was left: to march ahead, relying upon the revolutionary will
of the masses. On November 7, Pravda carried the decisive declaration
of the Central Committee of our party, written by Lenin, and permeated
with real revolutionary fervor, expressed in clear, simple, and unmistakable
formulations addressed to the rank and file of the party. This proclamation
put an end to any doubt as to the future policy of the party and its Central
Committee: “Shame on all the faint-hearted, all the waverers and
doubters, on all those who allowed themselves to be intimidated by the
bourgeoisie or who have succumbed to the outcries of their direct and
indirect supporters! There is not the slightest hesitation among the mass
of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd, Moscow, and other places. Our
party stands solidly and firmly, as one man, in defense of Soviet power,
in defense of the interests of all the working people, and first and foremost
of the workers and poor peasants” [CW; Vol.26, “From
the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (B.) to All Party Members and
to All the Working Classes of Russia” (November 5-6, 1917), pp.
3O5-O6].
The extremely acute party crisis was overcome. However, the internal
party struggle did not yet cease. The main lines of the struggle still
remained the same. But its political importance faded. We find most interesting
evidence of this in a report made by Uritsky at a session of the Petrograd
Committee of our party on December 12, on the subject of convening the
Constituent Assembly. “The disagreements within our party are not
new. We have here the same tendency which manifested itself previously
on the question of the insurrection. Some comrades are now of the opinion
that the Constituent Assembly is the crowning work of the revolution.
They base their position on the hook of etiquette. They say we must not
act tactlessly, and so on. They object to the Bolsheviks, as members of
the Constituent Assembly, deciding the date to convoke it, the relationship
of forces in it, and so on. They look at things from a purely formal standpoint,
leaving entirely out of consideration the fact that the exercise of this
control is only a reflection of the events taking place outside the Constituent
Assembly, and that with this consideration in mind we are able to outline
our attitude toward the Constituent Assembly. . . . At the present time
our point of view is that we are fighting for the interests of the proletariat
and the poor peasantry, while a handful of comrades consider that we are
making a bourgeois revolution which must be crowned by the Constituent
Assembly.”
The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly may be considered as marking
the close not only of a great chapter in the history of Russia, but of
an equally important chapter in the history of our party. By overcoming
the internal friction, the party of the proletariat not only conquered
power but was able to maintain it.
Chapter 7
The October Insurrection and Soviet ‘Legality’
In September, while the Democratic
Conference was in session, Lenin demanded that we immediately proceed
with the insurrection. “In order to treat insurrection in a Marxist
way, i.e., as an art, we must at the same time, without losing a single
moment, organize a headquarters of the insurgent detachments, distribute
our forces, move the reliable regiments to the most important points,
surround the Alexandrinsky Theater, occupy the Peter and Paul Fortress,
arrest the General Staff and the government, and move against the officer
cadets and the Savage Division those detachments which would rather die
than allow the enemy to approach the strategic points of the city. We
must mobilize the armed workers and call them to fight the last desperate
fight, occupy the telegraph and telephone exchange at once, move our insurrection
headquarters to the central telephone exchange and connect it by telephone
with all the factories, all the regiments, all the points of armed fighting,
etc. Of course, this is all by way of example, only to illustrate the
fact that at the present moment it is impossible to remain loyal to Marxism,
to remain loyal to the revolution unless insurrection is treated as an
art” [CW, Vol. 26, “Marxism and Insurrection”
(September 13-14, 1917), p.27].
The above formulation of the question presupposed that the preparation
and completion of the insurrection were to be carried out through party
channels and in the name of the party, and afterwards the seal of approval
was to be placed on the victory by the Congress of Soviets. The Central
Committee did not adopt this proposal. The insurrection was led into soviet
channels and was linked in our agitation with the Second Soviet Congress.
A detailed explanation of this difference of opinion will make it clear
that this question pertains not to principle but rather to a technical
issue of great practical importance.
We have already pointed out with what intense anxiety Lenin regarded
the postponement of the insurrection. In view of the vacillation among
the party leaders, an agitation formally linking the impending insurrection
with the impending Soviet Congress seemed to him an impermissible delay,
a concession to the irresolute, a loss of time through vacillation, and
an outright crime. Lenin kept reiterating this idea from the end of September
onward.
“There is a tendency, or an opinion, in our Central Committee and
among the leaders of our Party,” he wrote on September 29, “which
favors waiting for the Congress of Soviets, and is opposed to taking power
immediately, is opposed to an immediate insurrection. That tendency, or
opinion, must be overcome” [CW, Vol.26, “The Crisis
Has Matured” (September 29, 1917), p.82].
At the beginning of October, Lenin wrote: “Delay is criminal. To
wait for the Congress of Soviets would be a childish game of formalities,
a disgraceful game of formalities, and a betrayal of the revolution" [CW,
Vol.26, “Letter to the Central Committee, the Moscow and Petrograd
Committees and the Bolshevik Members of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets”
(October 1, 1917), p. 141].
In his theses for the Petrograd Conference of October 8, Lenin said:
“It is necessary to fight against constitutional illusions and hopes
placed in the Congress of Soviets, to discard the preconceived idea that
we absolutely must ‘wait’ for it” [CW, Vol.26,
“Theses for a Report at the October 8 Conference of the Petrograd
Organization, also for a Resolution and Instructions to Those Elected
to the Party Congress" (September 29 - October 4, 1917), p. 144]. Finally,
on October 24, Lenin wrote: “It is now absolutely clear that to
delay the uprising would be fatal. . . History will not forgive revolutionaries
for procrastinating when they could be victorious today (and they certainly
will be victorious today), while they risk losing much tomorrow, in fact,
they risk losing everything” [CW, Vol.26, “Letter
to Central Committee Members" (October 24, 1917), pp.234 ‘35].
All these letters, every sentence of which was forged on the anvil of
revolution, are of exceptional value in that they serve both to characterize
Lenin and to provide an estimate of the situation at the time. The basic
and all-pervasive thought expressed in them is—anger, protest, and
indignation against a fatalistic, temporizing, social democratic, Menshevik
attitude to revolution, as if the latter were an endless film. If time
is, generally speaking, a prime factor in politics, then the importance
of time increases a hundred fold in war and in revolution. It is not at
all possible to accomplish on the morrow everything that can be done today.
To rise in arms, to overwhelm the enemy, to seize power, may be possible
today, but tomorrow may be impossible. But to seize power is to change
the course of history. Is it really true that such a historic event can
hinge upon an interval of twenty-four hours? Yes, it can. When things
have reached the point of armed insurrection, events are to be measured
not by the long yardstick of politics, but by the short yardstick of war.
To lose several weeks, several days, and sometimes even a single day,
is tantamount under certain conditions to the surrender of the revolution,
to capitulation. Had Lenin not sounded the alarm, had there not been all
this pressure and criticism on his part, had it not been for his intense
and passionate revolutionary mistrust, the party would probably have failed
to align its front at the decisive moment, for the opposition among the
party leaders was very strong, and the staff plays a major role in all
wars, including civil wars.
At the same time, however, it is quite clear that to prepare the insurrection
and to carry it out under cover of preparing for the Second Soviet Congress
and under the slogan of defending it, was of inestimable advantage to
us. From the moment when we, as the Petrograd Soviet, invalidated Kerensky’s
order transferring two-thirds of the garrison to the front, we had actually
entered a state of armed insurrection. Lenin, who was not in Petrograd,
could not appraise the full significance of this fact. So far as I remember,
there is not a mention of it in all his letters during this period. Yet
the outcome of the insurrection of October 25 was at least three-quarters
settled, if not more, the moment that we opposed the transfer of the Petrograd
garrison; created the Revolutionary Military Committee (October 16); appointed
our own commissars in all army divisions and institutions; and thereby
completely isolated not only the general staff of the Petrograd zone,
but also the government. As a matter of fact, we had here an armed insurrection—an
armed though bloodless insurrection of the Petrograd regiments against
the Provisional Government—under the leadership of the Revolutionary
Military Committee and under the slogan of preparing the defense of the
Second Soviet Congress, which would decide the ultimate fate of the state
power. Lenin’s counsel to begin the insurrection in Moscow, where,
on his assumptions, we could gain a bloodless victory, flowed precisely
from the fact that in his underground refuge he had no opportunity to
assess the radical turn that took place not only in mood but also in organizational
ties among the military rank and file as well as the army hierarchy after
the “peaceful” insurrection of the garrison of the capital
in the middle of October. The moment that the regiments, upon the instructions
of the Revolutionary Military Committee, refused to depart from the city,
we had a victorious insurrection in the capital, only slightly screened
at the top by the remnants of the bourgeois democratic state forms. The
insurrection of October 25 was only supplementary in character. This is
precisely why it was painless. In Moscow, on the other hand, the struggle
was much longer and bloodier, despite the fact that in Petrograd the power
of the Council of People’s Commissars had already been established.
It is plain enough that had the insurrection begun in Moscow, prior to
the overturn in Petrograd, it would have dragged on even longer, with
the outcome very much in doubt. Failure in Moscow would have had grave
effects on Petrograd. Of course, a victory along these lines was not at
all excluded. But the way that events actually occurred proved much more
economical, much more favorable, and much more successful.
We were more or less able to synchronize the seizure of power with the
opening of the Second Soviet Congress only because the peaceful, almost
“legal” armed insurrection—at least in Petrograd—was
already three - quarters, if not nine-tenths achieved. Our reference to
this insurrection as “legal” is in the sense that it was an
outgrowth of the “normal” conditions of dual power. Even when
the conciliationists dominated the Petrograd Soviet it frequently happened
that the soviet revised or amended the decisions of the government. This
was, so to speak, part of the constitution under the regime that has been
inscribed in the annals of history as the “Kerensky period.”
When we Bolsheviks assumed power in the Petrograd Soviet, we only continued
and deepened the methods of dual power. We took it upon ourselves to revise
the order transferring the troops to the front. By this very act we covered
up the actual insurrection of the Petrograd garrison with the traditions
and methods of legal dual power. Nor was that all. While formally adapting
our agitation on the question of power to the opening of the Second Soviet
Congress, we developed and deepened the already existing traditions of
dual power, and prepared the framework of soviet legality for the Bolshevik
insurrection on an All- Russian scale.
We did not lull the masses with any soviet constitutional illusions,
for under the slogan of a struggle for the Second Soviet Congress we won
over to our side the bayonets of the revolutionary army and consolidated
our gains organizationally. And, in addition, we succeeded, far more than
we expected, in luring our enemies, the conciliationists, into the trap
of soviet legality. Resorting to trickery in politics, all the more so
in revolution, is always dangerous. You will most likely fail to dupe
the enemy, but the masses who follow you may be duped instead. Our “trickery
proved 100 percent successful” not because it was an artful scheme
devised by wily strategists seeking to avoid a civil war, but because
it derived naturally from the disintegration of the conciliationist regime
with its glaring contradictions. The Provisional Government wanted to
get rid of the garrison. The soldiers did not want to go to the front.
We invested this natural unwillingness with a political expression; we
gave it a revolutionary goal and a “legal” cover. Thereby
we secured unprecedented unanimity within the garrison, and bound it up
closely with the Petrograd workers. Our opponents, on the contrary, because
of their hopeless position and their muddleheadedness, were inclined to
accept the soviet cover at its face value. They yearned to be deceived
and we provided them with ample opportunity to gratify their desire.
Between the conciliationists and ourselves, there was a struggle for
soviet legality. In the minds of the masses, the soviets were the source
of all power. Out of the soviets came Kerensky, Tseretelli, and Skobelev.
But we ourselves were closely bound up with the soviets through our basic
slogan, “All power to the soviets!” The bourgeoisie derived
their succession to power from the state Duma. The conciliationists derived
their succession from the soviets; and so did we. But the conciliationists
sought to reduce the soviets to nothing; while we were striving to transfer
power to the soviets. The conciliationists could not break as yet with
the Soviet heritage, and were in haste to create a bridge from the latter
to parliamentarism. With this in mind they convened the Democratic Conference
and created the Pre-Parliament. The participation of the soviets in the
Pre-Parliament gave a semblance of sanction to this procedure. The conciliationists
sought to catch the revolution with the bait of soviet legality and, after
hooking it, to drag it into the channel of bourgeois parliamentarism.
But we were also interested in making use of soviet legality. At the
conclusion of the Democratic Conference we extracted from the conciliationists
a promise to convene the Second Soviet Congress. This congress placed
them in an extremely embarrassing position. On the one hand, they could
not oppose convening it without breaking with soviet legality; on the
other hand, they could not help seeing that the congress - because of
its composition ‘boded them little good. In consequence, all the
more insistently did we appeal to the Second Congress as the real master
of the country; and all the more did we adapt our entire preparatory work
to the support and defense of the Congress of Soviets against the inevitable
attacks of the counterrevolution. If the conciliationists attempted to
hook us with soviet legality through the Pre-Parliament emanating from
the soviets, then we, on our part, lured them with the same soviet legality
- through the Second Congress. It is one thing to prepare an armed insurrection
under the naked slogan of the seizure of power by the party, and quite
another thing to prepare and then carry out an insurrection under the
slogan of defending the rights of the Congress of Soviets. Thus, the adaptation
of the question of the seizure of power to the Second Soviet Congress
did not involve any naive hopes that the congress itself could settle
the question of power. Such fetishism of the soviet form was entirely
alien to us. All the necessary work for the conquest of power, not only
the political but also the organizational and military-technical work
for the seizure of power, went on at full speed. But the legal cover for
all this work was always provided by an invariable reference to the coming
congress, which would settle the question of power. Waging an offensive
all along the line, we kept up the appearance of being on the defensive.
On the other hand, the Provisional Government—if it had been able
to make up its mind to defend itself seriously—would have had to
attack the Congress of Soviets, prohibit its convocation, and thereby
provide the opposing side with a motive—most damaging to the government—for
an armed insurrection. Moreover, we not only placed the Provisional Government
in an unfavorable political position; we also lulled their already sufficiently
lazy and unwieldy minds. These people seriously believed that we were
only concerned with soviet parliamentarism, and with a new congress which
would adopt a new resolution on power—in the style of the resolutions
adopted by the Petrograd and Moscow soviets—and that the government
would then ignore it, using the Pre-Parliament and the coming Constituent
Assembly as a pretext, and thus put us in a ridiculous position. We have
the irrefutable testimony of Kerensky to the effect that the minds of
the sagest middle ‘class wiseacres were bent precisely in this direction.
In his memoirs, Kerensky relates how, in his study, at midnight on October
25, stormy disputes raged between himself, Dan, and the others over the
armed insurrection, which was then in full swing. Kerensky says, “Dan
declared, first of all, that they were better informed than I was, and
that I was exaggerating the events, under the influence ‘of reports
from my ‘reactionary staff.’ He then informed me that the
resolution adopted by the majority of the soviets of the republic, which
had so offended ‘the self - esteem of the government,— was
of extreme value, and essential for bringing about the ‘shift in
the mood of the masses’; that its effect was already ‘making
itself felt,’ and that now the influence of Bolshevik propaganda
would ‘decline rapidly.’ On the other hand, according to Dan’s
own words, the Bolsheviks themselves had declared, in negotiations with
the leaders of the soviet majority, their readiness to ‘submit to
the will of the soviet majority’; and that they were ready ‘tomorrow’
to use all measures to quell the insurrection which flared up against
their own wishes and without their sanction! In conclusion, after mentioning
that the Bolsheviks would disband their military staff ‘tomorrow’
(always tomorrow!) Dan declared that all the measures I had taken to crush
the insurrection had only ‘irritated the masses and that by my meddling
I was generally ‘hindering the representatives of the soviet majority
from successfully concluding their negotiations with the Bolsheviks for
the liquidation of the insurrection.
To complete the picture, I ought to add that at the very moment Dan was
imparting to me this remarkable information, the armed detachments of
‘Red Guards’ were occupying government buildings, one after
another. And almost immediately after the departure of Dan and his comrades
from the Winter Palace, Minister Kartashev, on his way home from a session
of the Provisional Government, was arrested on Milliony street and taken
directly to Smolny, whither Dan was returning to resume his peaceful conversations
with the Bolsheviks. I must confess that the Bolsheviks deported themselves
at that time with great energy and no less skill. At the moment when the
insurrection was in full blast, and while the ‘red troops’
were operating all over the city, several Bolshevik leaders especially
designated for the purpose sought, not unsuccessfully, to make the representatives
of ‘revolutionary democracy’ see but remain blind, hear but
remain deaf. All night long these wily men engaged in endless squabbles
over various formulas which were supposed to serve as the basis for reconciliation
and for the liquidation of the insurrection. By this method of ‘negotiating’
the Bolsheviks gained a great deal of time. But the fighting forces of
the SRs and the Mensheviks were not mobilized in time. But, of course,
this is Q.E.D.!” (A. Kerensky, "From Mar," pages 197-98).
Well put! Q.E.D.! The conciliationists, as we gather from the above account,
were completely hooked with the bait of soviet legality. Kerensky’s
assumption that certain Bolsheviks were specially disguised in order to
deceive the Mensheviks and the SRs about the pending liquidation of the
insurrection is in fact not true. As a matter of fact, the Bolsheviks
most actively participating in the negotiations were those who really
desired the liquidation of the insurrection, and who believed in the formula
of a socialist government, formed by the conciliation of all parties.
Objectively, however, these parliamentarians doubtless proved of some
service to the insurrection—feeding, with their own illusions, the
illusions of the enemy. But they were able to render this service to the
revolution only because the party, in spite of all their counsels and
all their warnings, pressed on with the insurrection with unabating energy
and carried it through to the end.
A combination of altogether exceptional circumstances—great and
small - was needed to insure the success of this extensive and enveloping
maneuver. Above all, an army was needed which was unwilling to fight any
longer. The entire course of the revolution—particularly during
the initial stages—from February to October, inclusive, would have
been, as we have already said, altogether different if at the moment of
revolution there had not existed in the country a broken and discontented
peasant army of many millions. These conditions alone made it possible
to bring to a successful conclusion the experiment with the Petrograd
garrison, which predetermined the victorious outcome of October.
There cannot be the slightest talk of sanctifying into any sort of a
law this peculiar combination of a “dry” and almost imperceptible
insurrection together with the defense of soviet legality against Kornilov
and his followers. On the contrary, we can state with certainty that this
experience will never be repeated anywhere in such a form. But a careful
study of it is most necessary. It will tend to broaden the horizon of
every revolutionist, disclosing before him the multiplicity and variety
of ways and means which can be set in motion, provided the goal is kept
clearly in mind, the situation is correctly appraised, and there is a
determination to carry the struggle through to the end.
In Moscow, the insurrection took much longer and entailed much greater
sacrifices. The explanation for this lies partly in the fact that the
Moscow garrison was not subjected to the same revolutionary preparation
as the Petrograd garrison in connection with the transfer of regiments
to the front We have already said, and we repeat, that the armed insurrection
in Petrograd was carried out in two installments: the first in the early
part of October, when the Petrograd regiments, obeying the decision of
the soviet, which harmonized completely with their own desires, refused
to carry out the orders from headquarters—and did so with impunity—and
the second on October 25, when only a minor and supplementary insurrection
was required in order to sever the umbilical cord of the February state
power. But in Moscow, the insurrection took place in a single stage, and
that was probably the main reason that it was so protracted.
But there was also another reason: the leadership was not decisive enough.
In Moscow we saw a swing from military action to negotiations only to
be followed by another swing from negotiations to military action. If
vacillations on the part of the leaders, which are transmitted to the
followers, are generally harmful in politics, then they become a mortal
danger under the conditions of an armed insurrection. The ruling class
has already lost confidence in its own strength (otherwise there could,
in general, be no hope for victory) but the apparatus still remains in
its hands. The task of the revolutionary class is to conquer the state
apparatus. To do so, it must have confidence in its own forces. Once the
party has led the workers to insurrection, it has to draw from this all
the necessary conclusions. A la guerre comme a la guerre ("War is war").
Under war conditions, vacillation and procrastination are less permissible
than at any other time. The measuring stick of war is a short one. To
mark time, even for a few hours, is to restore a measure of confidence
to the ruling class while taking it away from the insurgents. But this
is precisely what determines the relationship of forces, which, in turn,
determines the outcome of the insurrection. From this point of view it
is necessary to study, step by step, the course of military operations
in Moscow in their connection with the political leadership.
It would be of great significance to indicate several other instances
where the civil war took place under special conditions, being complicated,
for instance, by the intrusion of a national element. Such a study, based
upon carefully digested factual data, would greatly enrich our knowledge
of the mechanics of civil war and thereby facilitate the elaboration of
certain methods, rules, and devices of a sufficiently general character
to serve as a sort of “manual” of civil war. But in anticipation
of the partial conclusions of such a study, it may be said that the course
of the civil war in the provinces was largely determined by the outcome
in Petrograd, even despite the delay in Moscow. The February revolution
cracked the old apparatus. The Provisional Government inherited it, and
was unable either to renew it or to strengthen it. In consequence, its
state apparatus functioned between February and October only as a relic
of bureaucratic inertia. The provincial bureaucracy had become accustomed
to do what Petrograd did; it did this in February, and repeated it in
October. It was an enormous advantage to us that we were preparing to
overthrow a regime which had not yet had time to consolidate itself. The
extreme instability and want of assurance of the February state apparatus
facilitated our work in the extreme by instilling the revolutionary masses
and the party itself with self-assurance.
A similar situation existed in Germany and Austria after November 9,
1918. There, however, the social democracy filled in the cracks of the
state apparatus and helped to establish a bourgeois republican regime;
and though this regime cannot be considered a pattern of stability, it
has nevertheless already survived six years. So far as other capitalist
countries are concerned, they will not have this advantage, i.e., the
proximity of a bourgeois and a proletarian revolution. Their February
is already long past. To be sure, in England there are a good many relics
of feudalism, but there are absolutely no grounds for speaking of an independent
bourgeois revolution in England. Purging the country of the monarchy,
and the Lords, and the rest, will be achieved by the first sweep of the
broom of the English proletariat when they come into power. The proletarian
revolution in the West will have to deal with a completely established
bourgeois state. But this does not mean that it will have to deal with
a stable state apparatus; for the very possibility of proletarian insurrection
implies an extremely advanced process of the disintegration of the capitalist
state. If in our country the October Revolution unfolded in the struggle
with a state apparatus which did not succeed in stabilizing itself after
February, then in other countries the insurrection will be confronted
with a state apparatus in a state of progressive disintegration.
It may be assumed as a general rule—we pointed this out as far
back as the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern—that the force
of the pre-October resistance of the bourgeoisie in old capitalist countries
will generally be much greater than in our country; it will be more difficult
for the proletariat to gain victory; but, on the other hand, the conquest
of power will immediately secure for them a much more stable and firm
position than we attained on the day after October. In our country, the
civil war took on real scope only after the proletariat had conquered
power in the chief cities and industrial centers, and it lasted for the
first three years of soviet rule. There is every indication that in the
countries of Central and Western Europe it will be much more difficult
for the proletariat to conquer power, but that after the seizure of power
they will have a much freer hand. Naturally, these considerations concerning
prospects are only hypothetical. A good deal will depend on the order
in which revolutions take place in the different countries of Europe,
the possibilities of military intervention, the economic and military
strength of the Soviet Union at the time, and so on. But in any case,
our basic and, we believe, incontestable postulate, that the actual process
of the conquest of power will encounter in Europe and America a much more
serious, obstinate, and prepared resistance from the ruling classes than
was the case with us—makes it all the more incumbent upon us to
view the armed insurrection in particular and civil war in general as
an art.
Chapter 8
Again, on the Soviets and the Party in a Proletarian
Revolution
In our country, both in 1905 and
in 1917, the soviets of workers’ deputies grew out of the movement
itself as its natural organizational form at a certain stage of the struggle.
But the young European parties, who have more or less accepted soviets
as a “doctrine” and “principle,” always run the
danger of treating soviets as a fetish, as some. self-sufficing factor
in a revolution. Yet, in spite of the enormous advantages of soviets as
the organs of struggle for power, there may well be cases where the insurrection
may unfold on the basis of other forms of organization (factory committees,
trade unions, etc.) and soviets may spring up only during the insurrection
itself, or even after it has achieved victory, as organs of state power.
Most highly instructive from this standpoint is the struggle which Lenin
launched after the July days against the fetishism of the organizational
form of soviets. In proportion as the SRs and Menshivik soviets became,
in July, organizations openly driving the soldiers into an offensive and
crushing the Bolsheviks, to that extent the revolutionary movement of
the proletarian masses was obliged and compelled to seek new paths and
channels. Lenin indicated the factory committees as the organizations
of the struggle for power. (See, for instance, the reminiscences of Comrade
Ordzhonikidze.) It is very likely that the movement would have proceeded
on those lines if it had not been for the Kornilov uprising, which forced
the conciliationist soviets to defend themselves and made it possible
for the Bolsheviks to imbue them with a new revolutionary vigor, binding
them closely to the masses through the left, i.e., Bolshevik wing.
This question is of enormous international importance, as was shown by
the recent German experience. It was in Germany that soviets were several
times created as organs of insurrection without an insurrection taking
place—and as organs of state power—without any power. This
led to the following: in 1923, the movement of broad proletarian and semi
‘proletarian masses began to crystallize around the factory committees,
which in the main fulfilled all the functions assumed by our own soviets
in the period preceding the direct struggle for power. Yet, during August
and September 1923, several comrades advanced the proposal that we should
proceed to the immediate creation of soviets in Germany. After a long
and heated discussion this proposal was rejected, and rightly so. In view
of the fact that the factory committees had already become in action the
rallying centers of the revolutionary masses, soviets would only have
been a parallel form of organization, without any real content, during
the preparatory stage. They could have only distracted attention from
the material targets of the insurrection (army, police, armed bands, railways,
etc.) by fixing it on a self-contained organizational form. And, on the
other hand, the creation of soviets as such, prior to the insurrection
and apart from the immediate tasks of the insurrection, would have meant
an open proclamation “We mean to attack you!” The government,
compelled to “tolerate” the factory committees insofar as
the latter had become the rallying centers of great masses, would have
struck at the very first soviet as an official organ of an “attempt”
to seize power. The communists would have had to come out in defense of
the soviets as purely organizational entities. The decisive struggle would
have broken out not in order to seize or defend any material positions,
nor at a moment chosen by us—a moment when the insurrection would
flow from the conditions of the mass movement; no, the struggle would
have flared up over the soviet “banner,” at a moment chosen
by the enemy and forced upon us. In the meantime, it is quite clear that
the entire preparatory work for the insurrection could have been carried
out successfully under the authority of the factory and shop committees,
which were already established as mass organizations and which were constantly
growing in numbers and strength; and that this would have allowed the
party to maneuver freely with regard to fixing the date for the insurrection.
Soviets, of course, would have had to arise at a certain stage. It is
doubtful whether, under the above mentioned conditions, they would have
arisen as the direct organs of insurrection, in the very fire of the conflict,
because of the risk of creating two revolutionary centers at the most
critical moment. An English proverb says that you must not swap horses
while crossing a stream. It is possible that soviets would have been formed
after the victory at all the decisive places in the country. In any case,
a triumphant insurrection would inevitably have led to the creation of
soviets as organs of state power.
It must not be forgotten that in our country the soviets grew up in the
“democratic” stage of the revolution, becoming legalized,
as it were, at that stage, and subsequently being inherited and utilized
by us. This will not be repeated in the proletarian revolutions of the
West. There, in most cases, the soviets will be created in response to
the call of the communists; and they will consequently be created as the
direct organs of proletarian insurrection. To be sure, it is not at all
excluded that the disintegration of the bourgeois state apparatus will
have become quite acute before the proletariat is able to seize power;
this would create the conditions for the formation of soviets as the open
organs of preparing the insurrection. But this is not likely to be the
general rule. Most likely, it will be possible to create soviets only
in the very last days, as the direct organs of the insurgent masses. Finally,
it is quite probable that such circumstances will arise as will make the
soviets emerge either after the insurrection has passed its critical stage,
or even in its closing stages as organs of the new state power. All these
variants must be kept in mind so as to safeguard us from falling into
organizational fetishism, and so as not to transform the soviets from
what they ought to be flexible and living form of struggle into an organizational
“principle” imposed upon the movement from the outside, disrupting
its normal development.
There has been some talk lately in our press to the effect that we are
not, mind you, in a position to tell through what channels the proletarian
revolution will come in England. Will it come through the channel of the
Communist Party or through the trade unions? Such a formulation of the
question makes a show of a fictitiously broad historical outlook; it is
radically false and dangerous because it obliterates the chief lesson
of the last few years. If the triumphant revolution did not come at the
end of the war, it was because a party was lacking. This conclusion applies
to Europe as a whole. It may be traced concretely in the fate of the revolutionary
movement in various countries.
With respect to Germany, the case is quite a clear one. The German revolution
might have been triumphant both in 1918 and in 1919, had a proper party
leadership been secured. We had an instance of this same thing in 1917
in the case of Finland. There, the revolutionary movement developed under
exceptionally favorable circumstances, under the wing of revolutionary
Russia and with its direct military assistance. But the majority of the
leaders in the Finnish party proved to be social democrats, and they ruined
the revolution. The same lesson flows just as plainly from the Hungarian
experience. There the communists, along with the left social democrats,
did not conquer power, but were handed it by the frightened bourgeoisie.
The Hungarian revolution triumphant without a battle and without a victory
‘was left from the very outset without a fighting leadership. The
Communist Party fused with the social democratic party, showed thereby
that it itself was not a Communist Party; and, in consequence, in spite
of the fighting spirit of the Hungarian workers, it proved incapable of
keeping the power it had obtained so easily.
Without a party, apart from a party, over the head of a party, or with
a substitute for a party, the proletarian revolution cannot conquer. That
is the principal lesson of the past decade. It is true that the English
trade unions may become a mighty lever of the proletarian revolution;
they may, for instance, even take the place of workers’ soviets
under certain conditions and for a certain period of time. They can fill
such a role, however, not apart from a Communist party, and certainly
not against the party, but only on the condition that communist influence
becomes the decisive influence in the trade unions. We have paid far too
dearly for this conclusion ‘with regard to the role and importance
of a party in a proletarian revolution ‘to renounce it so lightly
or even to minimize its significance.
Consciousness, premeditation, and planning played a far smaller part
in bourgeois revolutions than they are destined to play, and already do
play, in proletarian revolutions. In the former instance the motive force
of the revolution was also furnished by the masses, but the latter were
much less organized and much less conscious than at the present time.
The leadership remained in the hands of different sections of the bourgeoisie,
and the latter had at its disposal wealth, education, and all the organizational
advantages connected with them (the cities, the universities, the press,
etc.). The bureaucratic monarchy defended itself in a hand-to mouth manner,
probing in the dark and then acting. The bourgeoisie would bide its time
to seize a favorable moment when it could profit from the movement of
the lower classes, throw its whole social weight into the scale, and so
seize the state power. The proletarian revolution is precisely distinguished
by the fact that the proletariat—in the person of its vanguard—acts
in it not only as the main offensive force but also as the guiding force.
The part played in bourgeois revolutions by the economic power of the
bourgeoisie, by its education, by its municipalities and universities,
is a part which can be filled in a proletarian revolution only by the
party of the proletariat.
The role of the party has become all the more important in view of the
fact that the enemy has also become far more conscious. The bourgeoisie,
in the course of centuries of rule, has perfected a political schooling
far superior to the schooling of the old bureaucratic monarchy. If parliamentarism
served the proletariat to a certain extent as a training school for revolution,
then it also served the bourgeoisie to a far greater extent as the school
of counterrevolutionary strategy. Suffice it to say that by means of parliamentarism
the bourgeoisie was able so to train the social democracy that it is today
the main prop of private property. The epoch of the social revolution
in Europe, as has been shown by its very first steps, will be an epoch
not only of strenuous and ruthless struggle but also of planned and calculated
battles—far more planned than with us in 1917.
That is why we require an approach entirely different from the prevailing
one to the questions of civil war in general and of armed insurrection
in particular. Following Lenin, all of us keep repeating time and again
Marx’s words that insurrection is an art. But this idea is transformed
into a hollow phrase, to the extent that Marx’s formula is not supplemented
with a study of the fundamental elements of the art of civil war, on the
basis of the vast accumulated experience of recent years. It is necessary
to say candidly that a superficial attitude to questions of armed insurrection
is a token that the power of the social democratic tradition has not yet
been overcome. A party which pays superficial attention to the question
of civil war, in the hope that everything will somehow settle itself at
the crucial moment, is certain to be shipwrecked. We must analyze in a
collective manner the experience of the proletarian struggles beginning
with 1917.
The above’sketched history of the party groupings in 1917 also
constitutes an integral part of the experience of civil war and is, we
believe, of immediate importance to the policies of the Communist International
as a whole. We have already said, and we repeat, that the study of disagreements
cannot, and ought not in any case, be regarded as an attack against those
comrades who pursued a false policy. But on the other hand it is absolutely
impermissible to blot out the greatest chapter in the history of our party
merely because some party members failed to keep step with the proletarian
revolution. The party should and must know the whole of the past, so as
to be able to estimate it correctly and assign each event to its proper
place. The tradition of a revolutionary party is built not on evasions
but on critical clarity.
History secured for our party revolutionary advantages that are truly
inestimable. The traditions of the heroic struggle against the tsarist
monarchy; the habituation to revolutionary self-sacrifice bound up with
the conditions of underground activity; the broad theoretical study and
assimilation of the revolutionary experience of humanity; the struggle
against Menshevism, against the Narodniks, and against conciliationism;
the supreme experience of the 1905 revolution; the theoretical study and
assimilation of this experience during the years of counterrevolution;
the examination of the problems of the international labor movement in
the light of the revolutionary lessons of 1905’these were the things
which in their totality gave our party an exceptional revolutionary temper,
supreme theoretical penetration, and unparalleled revolutionary sweep.
Nevertheless, even within this party, among its leaders, on the eve of
decisive action there was formed a group of experienced revolutionists,
Old Bolsheviks, who were in sharp opposition to the proletarian revolution
and who, in the course of the most critical period of the revolution from
February 1917 to approximately February 1918, adopted on all fundamental
questions an essentially social democratic position. It required Lenin,
and Lenin’s exceptional influence in the party, unprecedented even
at that time, to safeguard the party and the revolution against the supreme
confusion following from such a situation. This must never be forgotten
if we wish other Communist parties to learn anything from us.
The question of selecting the leading staff is of exceptional importance
to the parties of Western Europe. The experience of the abortive German
October is shocking proof of this. But this selection must proceed in
the light of revolutionary action. During these recent years, Germany
has provided ample opportunities for the testing of the leading party
members in moments of direct struggle. Failing this criterion, the rest
is worthless. France, during these years, was much poorer in revolutionary
upheavals ‘even partial ones. But even in the political life of
France we have had flashes of civil war, times when the Central Committee
of the party and the trade union leadership had to react in action to
unpostponable and acute questions (such as the sanguinary meeting of January
11, 1924). A careful study of such acute episodes provides irreplaceable
material for the evaluation of a party leadership, the conduct of various
party organs, and individual leading members. To ignore these lessons’not
to draw the necessary conclusions from them as to the choice of personalities
‘is to invite inevitable defeats; for without a penetrating, resolute,
and courageous party leadership, the victory of the proletarian revolution
is impossible.
Each party, even the most revolutionary party, must inevitably produce
its own organizational conservatism; for otherwise it would lack the necessary
stability. This is wholly a question of degree. In a revolutionary party
the vitally necessary dose of conservatism must be combined with a complete
freedom from routine, with initiative in orientation and daring in action.
These qualities are put to the severest test during turning points in
history. We have already quoted the words of Lenin to the effect that
even the most revolutionary parties, when an abrupt change occurs in a
situation and when new tasks arise as a consequence, frequently pursue
the political line of yesterday and thereby become, or threaten to become,
a brake upon the revolutionary process. Both conservatism and revolutionary
initiative find their most concentrated expression in the leading organs
of the party. In the meantime, the European Communist parties have still
to face their sharpest “turning point” - the turn from preparatory
work to the actual seizure of power. This turn is the most exacting, the
most unpostponable, the most responsible, and the most formidable. To
miss the moment for the turn is to incur the greatest defeat that a party
can possibly suffer.
The experience of the European struggles, and above all the struggles
in Germany, when looked at in the light of our own experience, tells us
that there are two types of leaders who incline to drag the party back
at the very moment when it must take a stupendous leap forward. Some among
them generally tend to see mainly the difficulties and obstacles in the
way of revolution, and to estimate each situation with a preconceived,
though not always conscious, intention of avoiding any action. Marxism
in their hands is turned into a method for establishing the impossibility
of revolutionary action. The purest specimens of this type are the Russian
Mensheviks. But this type as such is not confined to Menshevism, and at
the most criticial moment it suddenly manifests itself in responsible
posts in the most revolutionary party.
The representatives of the second variety are distinguished by their
superficial and agitational approach. They never see any obstacles or
difficulties until they come into a head on collision with them. The capacity
for surmounting real obstacles by means of bombastic phrases, the tendency
to evince lofty optimism on all questions ("the ocean is only knee deep"),
is inevitably transformed into its polar opposite when the hour for decisive
action strikes. To the first type of revolutionist, who makes mountains
out of molehills, the problems of seizing power lie in heaping up and
multiplying to the nth degree all the difficulties he has become accustomed
to see in his way. To the second type, the superficial optimist, the difficulties
of revolutionary action always come as a surprise. In the preparatory
period the behavior of the two is different: the former is a skeptic upon
whom one cannot rely too much, that is, in a revolutionary sense; the
latter, on the contrary, may seem a fanatic revolutionist. But at the
decisive moment, the two march hand in hand; they both oppose the insurrection.
Meanwhile, the entire preparatory work is of value only to the extent
that it renders the party and above all its leading organs capable of
determining the moment for an insurrection, and of assuming the leadership
of it. For the task of the Communist Party is the conquest of power for
the purpose of reconstructing society.
Much has been spoken and written lately on the necessity of “Bolshevizing”
the Comintern. This is a task that cannot be disputed or delayed; it is
made particularly urgent after the cruel lessons of Bulgaria and Germany
a year ago. Bolshevism is not a doctrine (i.e., not merely a doctrine)
but a system of revolutionary training for the proletarian uprising. What
is the Bolshevization of Communist parties? It is giving them such a training,
and effecting such a selection of the leading staff, as would prevent
them from drifting when the hour for their October strikes. “That
is the whole of Hegel, and the wisdom of books, and the meaning of all
philosophy....”
A Brief Comment on This Book
The initial phase of the “democratic”
revolution extends from the February revolution to the crisis in April,
and its solution on May 6 by the formation of a coalition government with
the participation of the Mensheviks and the Narodniks. Throughout this
initial phase, the writer did not participate directly, arriving in Petrograd
only on May 5, on the very eve of the formation of the coalition government.
The first stage of the revolution and the revolutionary prospects were
dealt with by me in articles written in America. In my opinion, on all
fundamental points these articles are in complete harmony with the analysis
of the revolution given by Lenin in his “Letters from Afar.”
From the very first day of my arrival in Petrograd my work was carried
on in complete coordination with the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks.
Lenin’s course toward the conquest of power by the proletariat I
naturally supported in whole and in part. So far as the peasantry was
concerned, there was not even a shade of disagreement between Lenin and
myself. Lenin at that time was completing the first stage of his struggle
against the right Bolsheviks and their slogan, “Democratic dictatorship
of the proletariat and the peasantry.” Prior to my formal entry
into the party, I participated in drafting a number of resolutions and
documents issued in the name of the party. The sole consideration which
delayed my formal entry into the party for three months was the desire
to expedite the fusion of the best elements of the Mezhrayontsi organization,
and of revolutionary internationalists in general, with the Bolsheviks.
This policy was likewise carried out by me in complete agreement with
Lenin.
The editors of this volume have drawn my attention to the fact that in
one of the articles I wrote at that time in favor of unification, there
is a reference to the organizational “clannishness” of the
Bolsheviks. Some profound pundit like Comrade Sorin will, of course, lose
no time in deducing this phrase directly and posthaste from the original
differences on paragraph one of the party statutes. I see ho necessity
to engage in any discussion on this score, particularly in view of the
fact that I have admitted both verbally and in action my real and major
organizational errors. A somewhat less perverse reader will find, however,
a much more simple and immediate explanation for the above’quoted
phrase. It is to be accounted for by the concrete conditions at that time.
Among the Mezhrayontsi workers there still survived a very strong distrust
of the organizational policies of the Petrograd Committee. Arguments based
on “clannishness"’bolstered as is always the case in such
circumstances by references to all sorts of “injustice"’were
current among the Mezhrayontsi. I refuted these arguments as follows:
clannishness, as a heritage from the past, does exist, but if it is to
diminish, the Mezhrayontsi must terminate their own separate existence.
My purely polemical “proposal” to the First Soviet Congress
that it constitute a government of twelve Peshekhonovs has been interpreted
by some people by Sukhanov, I believe to indicate either that I was personally
inclined toward Peshekhonov, or that I was advancing a special political
line, distinct from that of Lenin. This is, of course, sheer nonsense.
When our party demanded that the soviets, led by the Mensheviks and the
SRs, should assume power, it thereby “demanded” a ministry
composed of Peshekhonovs. In the last analysis, there was no principled
difference at all between Peshekhonov, Chernov, and Dan. They were all
equally useful for facilitating the transfer of power from the bourgeoisie
to the proletariat. It may be that Peshekhonov was better acquainted with
statistics, and made a slightly better impression as a practical man than
Tseretelli or Chernov. A dozen Peshekhonovs meant a government composed
of a dozen stalwart representatives of petty - bourgeois democracy instead
of a coalition. When the Petersburg masses, led by our party, raised the
slogan: “Down with the ten capitalist ministers!” they thereby
demanded that the posts of these ministers be filled by Mensheviks and
Narodniks. “Messrs. bourgeois democrats, kick the Cadets out! Take
power into your own hands! Put in the government twelve (or as many as
you have) Peshekhonovs, and we promise you, so far as it is possible,
to remove you ‘peacefully’ from your posts when the hour will
strike which should be very soon!” There was no special political
line here, it was the same line that Lenin formulated time and again.
I consider it necessary to underscore emphatically the warning voiced
by Comrade Lentsner, the editor of this volume. As he points out, the
bulk of the speeches contained in this volume were reprinted not from
stenographic notes, even defective ones, but from accounts made by reporters
of the conciliationist press, half ignorant and half malicious. A cursory
inspection of several documents of this sort caused me to reject offhand
the original plan of correcting and supplementing them to a certain extent.
Let them remain as they are. They, too, in their own fashion, are documents
of the epoch, although emanating “from the other side.”
The present volume would not have appeared in print had it not been for
the careful and competent work of Comrade Lentsner who is also responsible
for compiling the notes’and of his assistants, Comrades Heller,
Kryzhanovsky, Rovensky, and I. Rumer.
I take the opportunity to express my comradely gratitude to them. I should
like to take particular notice of the enormous work done in preparing
this volume as well as my other books by my closest collaborator, M.S.
Glazman. I conclude these lines with feelings of profoundest sorrow over
the extremely tragic death of this splendid comrade, worker, and man.
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