Elements had come to the fore in the student struggles who had seen the situation in France as revolutionary. Amongst them were modern day Blanquists who imagined that a courageous group of revolutionary fighters could substitute themselves for the mass activity of the working class. Many, including Maoists and some who claimed to be Trotskyists, were attracted by the romantic idea of adopting the guerilla methods of Ché Guevara and Fidel Castro in the cities of Europe! Consequently, they had build up no base in the factories.
In the street battles of May, the youth grouped around Pierre Frank and Ernest Mandel in the JCR displayed considerable courage and organizational flare. But they were forced to conclude what Trotsky had explained decades before, that 'Even the most heroic intelligentsia is nothing without the masses'.
But when they had gone to seek the aid of the workers in the factories they went with an arrogant attitude, not with the humility that Lenin and Trotsky always urged. They denounced the Communist Party at every opportunity without patiently explaining the origins of the mistakes of its leadership.
Such people fail to understand the role of the mass organizations - what it has taken for workers to build tem up and what deep loyalty they retain. They look for short cuts - easy alternatives to the process of raising the consciousness of millions of workers. They present the need for revolution and the need for a revolutionary party without understanding that these questions are indissolubly linked to the need to transform the existing organizations of the working class.
When it came to the election campaign, a Marxist grouping would have gained tremendously by aiming all its material towards the ranks of the worker-Communists who had been groping for revolutionary ideas during the strike. They could have urged them to demand that their leaders campaigned on the full socialist program offered by Waldeck-Rochet at the height of the events. They would have acted as a catalyst in the process of questioning that was going on already and assisted workers, especially the youth, in building the Communist Party into a mass revolutionary force.
The approach of these quasi-Trotskyists arose from incorrect and un-Marxist political perspective. Occasionally they were correct, as in launching a program, during the events to link up the action committees and use them as organs for establishing a government of genuine workers' representatives. But they squandered any capital they had built up and lost a unique opportunity to reach wider layers of workers with their ideas when they decided to call for workers to 'vote blank' in the general election.
Lenin had generally recommended the boycott of parliamentary elections only if an alternative form of workers' government was already in existence, the soviets. Unless the workers' movement has the strength and influence actively to mobilize an overwhelming majority against participation in elections, it will founder. These sectarians did not recognize that the moment for the revolutionary transfer of power had passed and that no mass alternative to parliament now existed.
In June, as part of de Gaulle's crack-down, the JCR and PCI were banned along with ten other organizations and newspapers. Their leaders went into hiding and some were briefly arrested. They started up again under new names but still were incapable of assessing the period they were in. They imagined that the hundreds of committees set up during the strike could be maintained indefinitely and form the basis of some form of workers' control in industry and society. But committees of the kind thrown up in the course of big class battles cannot outlive the conditions that created them for any length of time.
At the time of the Great Strike in France much discussion was going of in Britain and elsewhere on the questions of workers' control and participation in industry. Tony Benn was advocating more workers' democracy as Minister of Technology at the time. The issue was even more hotly debated under the impact of the French events themselves.
In 'normal' times, elements of control can be exercised by workers in capitalist industry, through bodies like shop stewards' committees, if only to a very limited extent. Branches of workers' parties in factories and mass meetings in every workplace at the time of an election can play an important role. In France discussions in all the factories and offices that had been occupied during the strike of the major issues at stake in the election would have enormously assisted the candidates of the workers' parties. But the Communist Party tried to convert the action committees into election committees for the Popular Front without any systematic campaign on socialist policies.
They turned their backs on the millions of workers still on strike, leaving them to fend for themselves, and launched headlong into the election campaign. With the possibility of political change through the general strike rapidly receding, negotiations opened up everywhere and the bosses began to regain their confidence. They were nevertheless forced to use both the carrot and the stick to get French industry restarted.
Many workers had not been prepared to contemplate a return to work without cast-iron guarantees on wages, conditions and hours. Many took the opportunity of seeking assurances that full trade union rights would be exercised from now on and also that no-one would be victimized for activity during the strike. Where the workers were most entrenched, the employers were forced to offer even more than before. In some cases they offered full pay for the days lost through strike action!
Electricity workers had been offered a 20 per cent rise and a 40-hour week but still would not settle with the management. Bus and metro workers voted to continue the strike. The second biggest group of workers in the country, 1,400,000 shop workers, waited a few days to see which way things were going to go before making a decision. Miners in Northern France voted in a secret ballot not to accept a 10 per cent offer.
Seeing the resolve of their workforce, a number of companies decided to resort to violence and intimidation. Inevitably, new explosions were provoked - new demonstrations and strikes. A thousand riot police were called in to the Renault, Flins, plant where workers were refusing to hold a secret ballot. Big battles and demonstrations took place. As the CRS pursued demonstrators across fields lashing out with their riot sticks, a school student plunged into the Siene to escape the police and drowned. At Sochaux, too, riot police were called in by management and two car workers were killed in violent skirmishes.
The response in Paris was a return to barricade fighting. Five police stations were attacked. Cries of 'They have killed our comrades' rent the air. On the night of 10 June some of the worst violence erupted both sides of the Siene. No less than 72 barricades were thrown up. Cars and police coaches were burned and a massive 1,500 arrests were made.
The CRS were sent in to retake other workplaces - post offices, railway stations and factories. They were sent to clear the Odéon Theatre on 14 June and to the Sorbonne on 16 June. In spite of everything, Renault workers still resisted a return to work until 17 June. Citroën workers in all eight factories returned a few days later and Peugeot stayed out until as late as 24 June.
Fascists began sorties and attacks on buildings of the workers' organizations. Election workers were assaulted by thugs and a Young Communist was shot dead while canvassing.
Hundreds of foreign students and immigrants were deported in the aftermath of the great strike. Many militants in the factories were victimized - no less than 925 workers were sacked from Citroën after the election.
The radio and television journalists had come out on a complete stoppage of work quite late on in the proceedings. They had been fighting an impossible battle to try and keep these media at the service of the whole of the working class. When de Gaulle reasserted his control, army technicians were sent in to ensure the transmitters were fully operational. Later 66 of the journalists were sacked and others found their programs closed down. In an act of international solidarity, Belgian radio journalists collected funds for their sacked colleagues.
Weaknesses through isolation and lack of information made a number of defeats inevitable. A certain amount of demoralization set in. All this was wholly the responsibility of the trade union federations. Once more, the 'leaders' gave no lead. They urged separate negotiations on a plant by plant basis and made no arrangements to encourage workers to march triumphantly back to normal working.
Having flexed their muscles and breathed the mountain air, workers sis not give up the position they had conquered lightly. But, having been defeated in terms of 'who holds the reins in society', there was no alternative for workers but eventually to hand the factories back and accept settlements on wages and conditions.
The giant of French labor had risen to its feet in May of 1968. It had broken every fetter that held it down by sheer muscle power. But to slay the enemy, Capital, a sharp sword was needed with a cutting edge - a revolutionary party with a clear, decisive and incisive leadership.
Bereft of such a weapon this giant would be laid low once more, but not without a Herculean struggle. The enemy moved in using all the weapons at its disposal, including the forces of the state and of the parliamentary organizations like Occident. Worst of all was the role played by the workers' own organizations in assisting the bosses to attach the ropes and drive the stakes. Many sections of workers kicked valiantly against attempts to secure the shackles. One week after the election was called, more than five million were still on strike. Two weeks later, nearly two million. Even in July, some sections were still holding out.
The Economist had commented that whoever won the election would be faced with grave economic crisis and be forced to allow inflation to take back the wage gains of the workers. On 30 May, the Banque de France was making appeals against support for the franc. They wanted its value to fall to increase the competitiveness of French goods on the world market which would in turn increase prices on the domestic front. The franc reached its lowest level since 1958. Projections of a $400 million deficit were reckoned to be an underestimate. The Economist had commented that 'No conceivable redistribution of the national income could satisfy the demands that had been granted even if large sums were diverted to consumption instead of investment, which would mean the healthy growth of the past would come to an end.' The Bonn government and the Brussels EEC Commission were prepared to make allowances for France, limiting its imports and lifting its exports in the interest of saving France from another convulsion. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) made £300 million available. Pompidou had pointed out that every week of the strike lost 2 per cent in annual production; every week of the strike had also meant a loss of 2 per cent in every worker's annual income, but this had seemed a small price to pay for a new future!
One million workers were still on strike when the first round of the election took place at the end of the third week in June. Lycée students were not to return to school even at their normal September starting date. But the CGT even signed a deal accepting 'recovery' working to enable French industry to 'catch up'. The annual increase in productivity soared from 7 per cent to 12 per cent, but prices rocketed too. The general strike had been a victory in terms of the massive reforms but, inevitably, wage rises and extra benefits were undermined by inflation. Many workplace agreements were torn up by the vengeful managements.
From the capitalist point of view, the concessions had to be grabbed back. From the workers' point of view, a struggle on the political plane would be necessary.