Such an attitude to the question flows not only from the unfortunate decisions of the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI2 but, as a matter of fact, from the Comintern program itself. The radicalization of the masses is described as a continuous process: today, the masses are more revolutionary than they were yesterday, and tomorrow will be more revolutionary than today. Such a mechanical idea does not correspond to the real process of development of the proletariat or of capitalist society as a whole.

The social democratic parties, especially before the war, had imagined the future as a continual increase in the social democratic vote, which would grow systematically until the very moment of taking of power. For a vulgar or pseudo-revolutionary, this perspective still essentially retains its force, only instead of a continual increase in the number of votes, he talks of the continual radicalization of the masses. The mechanical conception is sanctioned also by the Bukharin-Stalin program of the Comintern. It goes without saying that from the point of view of our epoch as a whole the development of the proletariat advances in the direction of the revolution. But this is not a steady progression, any more than the objective process of the deepening of capitalist contradictions. The reformists see only the ups of the capitalist road. The formal "revolutionaries" see only its downs. But a Marxist sees the road as a whole, all of its conjunctural ups and downs, without for a moment losing sight of its main direction - the catastrophe of wars, the explosion of revolutions.

The political mood of the proletariat does not change automatically in one and the same direction. The upturns in the class struggle are followed by downturns, the floodtides by ebbs, depending upon complicated combinations of material and ideological conditions, national and international. An upsurge of the masses, if not utilized at the right moment or misused, reverses itself and ebbs into a period of decline, from which the masses recover, faster or slower, under the influence of new objective stimuli. Our epoch is characterized by exceptionally sharp periodic fluctuations, by extraordinarily abrupt turns in the situation, and this places on the leadership unusual obligations in the matter of a correct orientation.

The activity of the masses, properly understood, expresses itself in different ways, depending upon different conditions. The masses may, at certain periods, be completely absorbed in economic struggles and show very little interest in political questions. Or, suffering a series of defeats in economic struggles, the masses may abruptly turn their attention to politics. Then - depending upon the concrete circumstances and the past experience of the masses - their political activity may go in the direction of either purely parliamentary or extra-parliamentary struggle.

We give only a very few variants, but they characterize the contradictions of the revolutionary development of the working class. Those who know how to read the facts and understand their meaning will readily admit that these variants are not some kind of theoretical construction but an expression of the living international experience of the last decade.

In any case, it is clear that in a discussion about the radicalization of the masses a concrete definition is demanded. The Marxist Opposition should, of course, make the same demand of itself. A simple denial of the radicalization is of as little use as its complete affirmation. We should have an estimate of what the situation is and what it is becoming.

The official leaders speak of the radicalization of the French working class almost exclusively in connection with the strike movement. The growth of the latter is an incontestable fact, systematically established. We will take this fact as a starting point.

At the high point of the strikes in 1919-20, the diminishing progression takes place until 1928, with a very small break in 1923. In the years 1928-29 we observe an unmistakable and considerable increase in the strike movement, understandably related - it will be shown further on - to the industrial upturn influenced by the stabilization of the currency.

We can surely say that the period 1919-27 forms a certain independent cycle in the life of the French proletariat, including the abrupt rise of the strike movement immediately after the war as well as its defeats and its decline, especially acute after the German catastrophe in 1923. In its most general aspects, this cycle is characteristic not only of France but of Europe as a whole and, to a considerable degree, the whole world. What is characteristic of France alone is the comparatively moderate fluctuation between the highest and lowest points of the cycle; victorious France did not experience a genuine revolutionary crisis. In the tempo of the French strike movement the gigantic events developing in Russia, Germany, Britain and other countries found only a weak reflection.

Other statistics establish these same trends of the French workers' strike movement. The number of strikers and the number of days of each strike fell sharply in the beginning of 1922. In 1921 each strike averaged 800 strikers and altogether totaled more than 14,000 days. By 1925 each strike averaged only 300 strikers and altogether totaled little more than 2,000 days. We can assume that in 1926-27 these averages did not grow larger. In 1929, there were 400 workers per strike.

Do the statistics confirm the thesis of the radicalization of the masses or do they refute it? First of all, we answer, they take the discussion out of the realm of abstraction in which Monmousseau says yes and Chambelland says no3 without defining what is meant by radicalization. The statistics of the strike struggles are indisputable proof of certain shifts in the working class. At the same time, they give a very important estimate of the number and character of these shifts. They outline the general dynamics of the process and make it possible, to a certain degree, to anticipate the future or, more exactly, possible future variants.

In the first place, we can affirm that the statistics for 1928-29, compared with those of the preceding period, characterize the beginning of a new cycle in the life of the French working class. They give us the right to assume that deep molecular processes have taken and are taking place in the masses, as a result of which the momentum of the decline begins - if only on the economic front now - to be overcome.

Nevertheless, the statistics show that the growth of the strike movement is still very modest, and do not in the least give a picture of a tempestuous upsurge that would allow us to conclude this is a revolutionary or at least a pre-revolutionary period. In particular, there is no marked difference between 1928 and 1929. The bulk of the strikes continued to be in light industry.

From this fact Chambelland comes to a general conclusion against radicalization. It would be a different matter, he says, if strikes were spreading to the large enterprises in heavy industry and the machine shops. In other words, he imagines that a radicalization falls ready-made from the sky. As a matter of fact, these figures testify not only that a new cycle of proletarian struggle has begun, but also that this cycle is only in its first stage. After defeat and decline, a revival, in the absence of any great events, could occur only in the industrial periphery, that is, in the light industries, in the secondary branches, in the smaller plants of heavy industry. The spread of the strike movement into the metal industry, machine shops, and transportation would mean its transformation to a higher stage of development and would indicate not only the beginning of a movement but a decisive turn in the mood of the working class. It has not come yet. But it would be absurd to shut our eyes to the first stage of the movement because the second stage has not yet begun, or the third, or the fourth. Pregnancy in its second month is pregnancy. Forcing it may lead to a miscarriage, but so can ignoring it. Of course, we must add to this analogy that dates are by no means as certain in the social field as in physiology.

In discussing the radicalization of the masses, it should never be forgotten that the proletariat achieves "unanimity" only in periods of revolutionary apex. In conditions of "everyday" life in capitalist society, the proletariat is far from homogeneous. Moreover, the heterogeneity of its layers manifests itself most precisely at the turning points in the road. The most exploited, the least skilled, or the most politically backward layers of the proletariat are frequently the first to enter the arena of struggle and, in the case of defeat, are often the first to leave it. It is exactly in the new period that the workers who did not suffer defeats in the preceding period are most likely to be attracted to the movement, if only because they have not yet taken part in the struggle. In one way or another, these phenomena are bound to appear also in France.

Even in relation to the purely economic front, one cannot speak of the offensive character of the struggle, as Monmousseau and company do. They base this definition on the fact that a considerable percentage of the strikes are conducted for higher wages. These thoughtful leaders forget that such demands are forced upon the workers on the one hand by the rise in the cost of living and on the other by the intensified physical exploitation, a result of new industrial methods (rationalization). A worker is compelled to demand an increase in his nominal wages in order to defend his standard of living. These strikes can have an "offensive" character only from the standpoint of trade-union policies, they have a purely defensive character. It is precisely this side of the question that every serious trade unionist should have clearly understood and emphasized in every way possible. But Monmousseau and company believe that they have a right to be indifferent trade unionists because they are, if you please, "revolutionary leaders." Shouting until they are hoarse about the offensive political and revolutionary character of purely defensive strikes, they do not, of course, change the nature of these strikes and do not increase their significance by a single inch. On the contrary, they do their best to arm the bosses and the government against the workers.

It does not improve matters when our "leaders" point out that the strikes become "political" on account of - the active role of the police. An astonishing argument! The beating up of strikers by the police is called - a revolutionary advance of the workers. French history reveals quite a few massacres of workers in purely economic strikes. In the United States, a bloody settlement with strikers is the rule. Does this mean that the workers in the United States are leading the most revolutionary struggle? The shooting of strikers has in itself a political significance. But only a loudmouth could identify it with the revolutionary political advance of the working masses - thus unconsciously playing into the hands of the bosses and their police. When the British General Council of the Trades Union Congress called the revolutionary 1926 strike a peaceful demonstration, it knew what it was doing.4 It was a deliberately planned betrayal. But when Monmousseu and company call scattered economic strikes a revolutionary attack on the bourgeois state, nobody will think of accusing them of deliberate betrayal. It is doubtful that these people can act with deliberation. But that certainly is no help to the workers.

In the next section we will see how these terribly revolutionary heroes render some service to the bosses, ignoring the upturn in commerce and industry, underestimating its significance, that is, underestimating the profits of the capitalists and by the same token undermining the foundation of the economic struggles of the workers.

Capitalist development is generally inconceivable without conjunctural contradictions; they existed before the war and will exist in the future. It is doubtful that even Chambelland would deny this commonplace. But this does not yet open up any revolutionary perspective. On the contrary, from the fact that for the past century and a half the capitalist world experienced eighteen crises, there is no reason to conclude that capitalism must fall with the nineteenth or twentieth. In actuality, conjunctural cycles in the life of capitalism play the same role as, for example, cycles of blood circulation in the life of an organism. The inevitability of revolution flows just as little from the periodicity of crises as the inevitability of death from a rhythmic pulse.

At the Third Congress of the Comintern (1921), the ultra-lefts of that time (Bukharin, Zinoviev, Radek, Thaelmann, Thalheimer, Pepper, Bela Kun, and others) claimed that capitalism would never again know an industrial revival because it had entered the final ("third") period, which would develop on the basis of a permanent crisis until the revolution itself. A big ideological struggle took place at the congress around this question. A considerable part of my report was devoted to proving that in the epoch of imperialism the laws determining industrial cycles remain in effect and that conjunctural fluctuations will be characteristic of capitalism as long as it exists: the pulse only stops with death. But from the state of the pulse, in connection with other symptoms, a doctor can determine whether he is dealing with a strong or weak organism, a healthy or a sick one.

If Vassart5 does not know the dynamics of business cycles and does not understand the relationship between conjunctural crises and revolutionary crises of the capitalist system as a whole, then the dialectical interdependence of the economic conjuncture and the struggle of the working class is just as unclear to him. Vassart conceives of this interdependence as mechanically as his opponent Chambelland does; although their conclusions are directly opposite, they are equally erroneous.

Chambelland says: "The radicalization of the masses is in a certain sense the barometer which makes it possible to evaluate the condition of capitalism in a given country. If capitalism is in a state of decline the masses are necessarily radicalized" (page 23). From this Chambelland concludes that because in France strikes embrace only the peripheral workers, because the metal and chemical industries are only slightly affected, capitalism is not as yet in decline. Before him there is still a forty-year development.

How does Vassart answer this? Chambelland, according to him, "does not see the radicalization because he does not see the new methods of exploitation" (page 30). Vassart repeats the idea that if one recognizes the intensified exploitation and understands that it will develop further "that in itself compels you to rely affirmatively to the question of the radicalization of the masses (page 31).

Reading these polemics, one gets the impression of two blindfolded men trying to catch each other. It is not true that a crisis always and under all circumstances radicalizes the masses. Example: Italy, Spain, the Balkans, etc. It is not true that the radicalism of the working class necessarily corresponds to the period of capitalism's decline. Example: Chartism in Britain, etc. Like Chambelland, Vassart substitutes dead forms for the living history of the labor movement. And Chambelland's conclusion is also wrong. You cannot deny a beginning of radicalization because strikes have not yet embraced the main sections of the workers; what can and must be made is a concrete evaluation of the extent, depth, and intensity of this radicalization. Chambelland, evidently, agrees to believe in a radicalization only after the whole working class is engaged in an offensive. But leaders who wish to begin only when everything is ready are not needed by the working class. One must be able to see the first, even though weak, symptoms of revival, while only in the economic sphere, adapt one's tactics to it, and attentively follow the development of the process. Meantime one must not even for a moment lose sight of the general nature of our epoch, which has proved more than once and will prove again that, between the first symptoms of revival and the stormy upsurge that creates a revolutionary situation, not only forty years but perhaps a fifth or a tenth of that are required.

Vassart fares no better. He simply establishes an automatic parallel between exploitation and radicalization. How can the radicalization of the masses be denied, Vassart asks irritably, if exploitation grows from day to day? This is childish metaphysics, quite in the spirit of Bukharin. Radicalization must be proved not by deductions but by facts. Vassart's conclusion can be turned into the opposite without difficulty. The question can be put this way: How could the capitalists increase exploitation from day to day if there were confronted by the radicalization of the masses? It is precisely the absence of a fighting spirit that permits an intensification of exploitation. True, such arguments without qualification are also one-sided, but they are a lot closer to live than Vassart's constructions.

The trouble is that increasing exploitation does not always raise the fighting spirit of the proletariat. Thus, in a conjunctural decline accompanied by growing unemployment, particularly after defeats, increased exploitation does not breed a radicalization of the masses but, quite the contrary, demoralization, atomization, and disintegration. We saw that, for example, in the British coalmines right after the 1926 strike. We saw it on a still larger scale in Russia, when the 1907 industrial crisis coincided with the wrecking of the 1905 revolution. If in the past two years intensified exploitation brought about the evident growth of the strike movement, the basis for it was created by a conjunctural rise in the economy, not a decline.

The Monmousseau school - if one may give such a title to an institution where people are taught to unlearn thinking, reading, and writing - is afraid of an economic upturn. It must be said plainly that for the French working class - which has renewed its composition at least twice, during the years of the war and after the war, drawing into its ranks tremendous numbers of youth, women, and foreign-born and still far from having assimilated these new elements - for this French working class the further development of an industrial upturn would create an incomparable school, would allow it to gather its strength, would prove to the most backward sections their meaning and role in the capitalist structure, and would thereby raise the general class consciousness as a whole to new heights. Two or three years, even one year, of a broad, successful economic struggle would rejuvenate the proletariat. After a properly utilized economic upturn, a conjunctural crisis might give a serious impetus to a genuine political radicalization of the masses.

At the same time it must not be forgotten that wars and revolutions in our epochs result not from conjunctural crises but from the contradictions between the development of the productive forced on the one hand and the national boundaries of the bourgeois state on the other, carried to their ultimate conclusion. The imperialist war and the October Revolution have demonstrated the depth of these contradictions. The new role of America has further accentuated them. The more serious the development of the productive forces in one country or another, or in a number of countries, the sooner a new upturn in industry will find itself confronted with the basic contradictions of world industry and the sharper will be the reaction - economic and political, domestic and international. A serious industrial revival would be, in any case, not a minus but a tremendous plus for French communism, creating a mighty strike movement as a forerunner to a political offensive. There will be no lack of revolutionary situations. It is quite likely, however, that there will be a lack of ability to utilize them.

But is a continuing upward trend in the French industrial conjuncture guaranteed? This we cannot dare to assume. All sorts of possibilities remain open. At any rate, it does not depend on us. What does depend of us, and what we are obliged to do, is not to close our eyed to facts in the name of pitiful schemata, but to see the course of economic development as it really is and to work out trade-union tactics on the basis of facts. We speak now of tactics in distinction to strategy which is determined, of course, not by conjunctural changes but by basic tendencies of development. But if tactics are subordinate to strategy, strategy is only realized through tactics.

The question of the radicalization of the masses is not exhausted, however, by an analysis of the strike movement. What is the level of the political struggle? And above all, what is the size and influence of the Communist Party?

It is remarkable that in speaking of radicalization the official leaders pointedly ignore the question of their own party. Yet the facts are that beginning with 1925 the membership of the party has been falling from year to year in five years, the membership fell by more than half.

It may be said that quality is more important that quantity, and that there now remain in the party only the fully reliable communists. Let us assume that it is so. But this is not the real question. The process of the radicalization of the masses can in no way mean the isolation of the cadres, but, on the contrary, the influx into the party of reliable and partially reliable members and the conversion of the latter into "reliables". The political radicalization of the masses can be reconciled with the regular decline in party membership only if one sees the role of the party in the life of the working class as a fifth wheel to a wagon. Facts speak louder than words. We observe a steady decline of the party not only during the years 1925-27, when the strike wave was ebbing, but also during the last two years, when the number of strikes was beginning to grow.

At this point the honorable Pangaloss6 of official communism will interrupt, pointing to the "disproportion" between the size of the party and its influence. This is now the general Comintern formula, invented by the shrewd for the simple. However, the canonized formula not only fails to explain anything but in some respects even makes matters worse. The experience of the workers' movement testifies that the more a revolutionary party assumes a "parliamentary" character - all other conditions being equal - the more the extent of its influence exceeds its size. Opportunism is a lot easier in Marxism, for it bases itself on the masses in general. This is obvious from a simple comparison between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. The systematic growth of the "disproportion", with the decline in the number of organized communists, consequently can only mean that the French Communist Party is being transformed from a revolutionary into a parliamentary and municipalist party. Nevertheless, the difference between the Communist Party as it is today and the social democratic agents of the bourgeoisie remains enormous. The Pangaloss in the leadership merely slander the French Communist Party when they discourse on some gigantic disproportion between its size and its influence. It is not difficult to show that the political influence of communism, unfortunately, has grown very little in the last five years.

For Marxists, it is no secret that parliamentary and municipal elections distort and even falsify the underlying moods of the masses. Nevertheless, the dynamics of political development find a reflection in parliamentary elections; this is one of the reasons why Marxists take an active part in electoral struggles.

Other indications of political life also, to say the least, speak against the premature parrotings on the so-called political radicalization of the masses that is supposed to have taken place in the last two years. The circulation of l'Humanité, to our knowledge, has not grown. The collections of money for l'Humanité are certainly gratifying. But such collections would have been large, in view of the demonstrative reactionary attack on the paper, a year, two, and three years ago as well.

On the first of August7 - it must not be forgotten for a minute - the party was incapable of mobilizing either all the workers who had voted for it or even all the unionized workers. In Paris, according to the probably exaggerated reports in l'Humanité, about fifty thousand workers participated in the first of August, that is, less than half of the unionized workers. In the provinces, things were infinitely worse. This proves, by the way, that the "leading role" of the political bureau among the CGTU apparatus people does not guarantee a leading role of the party among the unionized workers. But the latter make up only a tiny fraction of the class. If the revolutionary upsurge is such an irrefutable fact, what good is a party that, at the critical moment of the Sino-Soviet conflict, could not mobilize an anti-imperialist demonstration even a quarter - rather, even a tenth - the size of the country's electorate? No one demands the impossible of the party leadership. A class cannot be manipulated. But what stamped the August 1 demonstration a failure was the monstrous "disproportion" between the victorious shouts of the leadership and the real response of the masses.

As far as the trade-union organizations are concerned, they paralleled the party's decline - judging by the official figures - one year later. In 1926, the CGTU numbered 475,000 members; in 1927, 452,000; in 1928, 375,000. The loss of 100,000 members by the trade unions at a time when the strike struggles in the country were increasing is incontestable proof that the CGTU does not reflect the basic process at work in the economic struggles of the masses. As an enlarged reflection of the party, it merely experiences the discipline of the latter, after some delay.

The data given here doubly confirms the preliminary conclusions we came to on the basis of our analysis of the strike movement. Let us recapitulate. The years 1919-20 were the culminating point of the proletarian struggle in France. After that, an ebb set in, which in the economic field began slowly to change. In the political field, however, the ebb or stagnation continues even now, at least among the majority of workers. The awakening of activity of certain sections of the proletariat in economic struggle is irrefutable. But this process too is only in its first stage. It is primarily light industry that is drawn into the struggle, with an evident preponderance of the unorganized workers over the organized, involving a large number of foreign-born workers.

The impetus to the strike wave was the upturn in the economic conjuncture, with a simultaneous rise in the cost of living. In its first stages, the strengthening of economic struggle is not ordinarily accompanied by a revolutionary upswing. It is not evident now either. On the contrary, the economic struggles for a certain time may even weaken the political interests of the working class, at least some of its sections.

If we further take into consideration the fact that French industry has been on the upturn for two years now, that there is no talk of unemployment in the basic branches of industry, and that in some branches there is even a shortage of workers, then it is not difficult to conclude that under these exceptionally favorable conditions for trade-union struggle the present strike wave is extremely modest. The main indications of its moderate character are the quiescence of the masses that caries over from the preceding period and the slowness of the industrial upturn itself.

Regardless of the tempo of the conjunctural changes, it is only possible to approximate the change in the phases of the cycle. This was true also of prewar capitalism. But in the present epoch the difficulties of conjunctural prediction have multiplied. After the disruption of the war, the world market has not attained a uniform conjuncture, even though it has now approached it appreciably compared to the first five years after the war. This is why one must be extremely careful in attempting to describe beforehand the alternating changes in the world conjuncture.

At the present moment the following basic variants appear likely:

1. The New York stock market crisis proves to be the forerunner of a commercial-industrial crisis in the United States, which reaches great depths in the very next months. United States capitalism is compelled to make a decisive turn towards the foreign market. An epoch of frenzied competition opens up. European goods retreat before this unrestrained attack. Europe enters a crisis later than the United States but as a result of the European crisis assumes extraordinary acuteness.

2. The stock market crash does not immediately call forth a commercial-industrial crisis, but results only in a temporary depression. The blow at stock market speculation brings about better correlation between paper values and commercial-industrial realities, and between the latter and the real buying power of the market. After the depression and period of adjustment, the commercial-industrial conjuncture turns upward again, even though not as sharply as in the previous period. The variant is not excluded. The resources of American capitalism are great, in which not the last place is held by the government budget (orders, subsidies, etc.).

3. The withdrawal of funds from American speculation generates commercial and industrial activity. Its fate will in turn depend just as much on purely European factors as on worldwide factors. Even in the event of a sharp economic crisis in the United States, an upturn may be maintained in Europe for a certain time, because it is unthinkable that capitalism in the United States will be able to reassert itself in a few short months for a decisive attack on the world market.

4. Finally, the actual course of development may be somewhere between the above-outlined variants in a wavering curve, with slight fluctuations up or down.

The development of the working class, especially as expressed in the strike movement, from the very beginning of capitalism has been closely bound up with the development of the conjunctural cycle. But this must not be considered mechanically. Under certain conditions that go beyond the commercial-industrial cycle (sharp changes in the world economy or politics, social crises, wars, revolutions), the strike wave may express fundamental historical revolutionary tasks of the working class, not their immediate demands evoked by the given conjuncture. Thus, for example, the postwar strikes in France did not have a conjunctural character but expressed the profound crisis of capitalist society as a whole. If we use this criterion, we see that the strike movement in France today has a primarily conjunctural character; its course and tempo will depend in the most immediate sense on further fluctuations of the market, alternating conjunctural phases, and their scope and intensity. The instability of this current period makes it all the more impermissible to proclaim the "third period" without any regard for the real development of economic events.

There is no need to explain that even if there should be a favorable conjuncture in America and a commercial-industrial upturn in Europe, a new crisis is entirely unavoidable. There is no doubt that when a crisis does develop, the current leaders will declare that their "prognosis" was fully justified, that the stabilization of capitalism did not occur, and that the class struggle took on sharper form. Clearly, such a "prognosis" costs very little. One who predicted daily the eclipse of the sun would finally live to see this prediction fulfilled. But we are unlikely to consider such a prophet a serious astronomer. The tasks of communists is not to predict crises, revolutions, and wars every single day, but to prepare for wars and revolutions by soberly evaluating the circumstances and conditions that arise between wars and revolutions. It is necessary to foresee the inevitability of a crisis after an upturn. It is necessary to warn the masses of a coming crisis. But the masses will be the better prepared for the crisis the more that they, with correct leadership, utilize the period of the upturn.

Dorelle8 demanded that the revolutionary Communist trade unionists - there are no other revolutionary trade unionists at the present time - show the workers in every strike the relation of isolated examples of exploitation to the contemporary regime as a whole, and consequently the connection between the immediate demands of the workers and the proletarian revolution. This is ABC for Marxists. But this in itself does not determine the character of a strike. A political strike is not a strike in which Communists carry on political agitation, but a strike in which the workers of all occupations and plants conduct a struggle for definite political aims. Revolutionary agitation on the basis of strikes is a task under all circumstances; but the participation of workers in political, that is, revolutionary strikes is one of the most advanced forms of struggle and occurs only under exceptional circumstances, which neither the party nor the trade unions can manufacture artificially according to their own desires. The identification of economic strikes with political strikes creates confusion that prevents the trade-union leaders from correctly approaching the economic strikes, from organizing them and working out a practical program of workers' demands.

Matters are worse still in respect to general economic orientation. The philosophy of the "third period" demands an economic crisis immediately and at all costs. Our wise trade unionists, therefore, close their eyes to the systematic improvement of the economic conjuncture in France in the last two years, although without a concrete estimate of the conjuncture it is impossible to work out correct demands and to struggle for them successfully. Claveri and Dorelle would do well to think the question through to the end. If the economic upturn in France continues for another year (which is not out of the question), then primarily the development and deepening of the economic struggles will soon be off the agenda. To be able to adapt to such circumstances is a task not only of the trade unions but also of the party. It is not enough to proclaim the abstract right of communism to have a leading role; it is necessary to gain this by deeds, not only within the narrow framework of the trade-union apparatus but in the arena of class struggle. To the anarchist and syndicalist formula of trade-union autonomy, the party must counterpoise serious theoretical and political aid to the trade unions, making it easier for them to orient correctly in the economic and political developments and to elaborate correct demands and methods of struggle.

The unavoidable shift in the upturn caused by a crisis will change the tasks, putting economic struggles into the background. It has already been said that the onset of a crisis will in all probability serve as an impetus to the political activity of the masses. The force of this impetus will depend on two factors: the duration and extent of the upturn and the depth of the crisis succeeding it. The more abrupt and decisive the change, the more explosive will be the action of the masses. This is natural. Because of inertia, strikes generally acquire their greatest sweep at the moment when the economic upturn begins to collapse. It is as if, in the heat of running, the workers encounter a solid wall. Economic strikes can then accomplish very little. The capitalists, with a depression under way, easily make use of the lockout. It is then that the deep-ended class-consciousness of the workers begins to seek other means of expression. But which? This depends not only upon the conjunctural conditions but on the total situation in the country.

There is no basis to declare in advance that the next conjunctural crisis will create an immediate revolutionary situation in France. On the basis of the convergence of a number of conditions that go beyond the conjunctural crisis this is quite possible. But at this point only theoretical conjunctures can be made. To put forward today the slogan of a general political strike on the basis of a future crisis that will push the masses onto the road of revolutionary struggle is to try to appease the hunger of today with the dinner of tomorrow.

The political activity of the masses, before it assumes a more decisive form, for a shorter or longer period may express itself in more frequent attendance at meetings, in broader distribution of Communist literature, in additional electoral votes, in increased membership of the party. Can the leadership adopt in advance a worked-out orientation based on a stormy tempo of development, come what may? No. It must be prepared for one or another tempo. Only in this way can the party, not altering its revolutionary direction, march in step with the class.

The art of revolutionary leadership is primarily the art of correct political orientation. Under all conditions, communism prepares the political vanguard and through it the working class as a whole for the revolutionary seizure of power. But it does it differently in different fields of the labor movement and in different periods.

One of the most important elements in orientation is the determination of the temper of the masses, their activity and readiness for struggle. The mood of the masses, however, is not predetermined. It changes under the influence of certain laws of mass psychology that are set into motion by objective and social conditions. The political state of the class is subject, within certain limits, to a quantitative determination - press circulation, attendance at meetings, elections, demonstrations, strikes, etc. In order to understand the dynamics of the process it is necessary to determine in what direction and why the mood of the working class is changing. Combining subjective and objective data, it is possible to establish a tentative perspective of the movement, that is, a scientifically based prediction, without which a serious revolutionary struggle is in general inconceivable. But a prediction in politics does not have the character of a perfect blueprint; it is a working hypothesis. While leading the struggle in one direction or another, it is necessary to attentively follow the changes in the objective and subjective elements of the movement, in order to opportunely introduce corresponding corrections in tactics. Even though the actual development of the struggle never fully corresponds to the prognosis, that does not absolve us from making political predictions. One must not, however, get intoxicated with finished schemata, but continually refer to the course of the historic process and adjust to its indications.

The Communist parties in the capitalist countries, which still have to struggle for power or to prepare for such a struggle, cannot live without prognosis. A correct, everyday orientation is a question of life or death for them. But they fail to learn this most important art because they are compelled to leap about at the command of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Bureaucratic centralism,9 which is able to live for a time off the capital of already captured proletarian power, is completely incapable of preparing the young parties for the conquest of power. In this lies the principal and most formidable contradiction of the Comintern today.

Is it not a suspicious circumstance that the revolutionary situation emerges simultaneously in the whole world, in the advanced countries and the colonies, circumventing in this period the "law of uneven development", that is, that single historic law which, at least by name, is known to Stalin? Actually, there can be no talk of such simultaneity. The analysis of world conditions is replaces, as we see, by the summing up of isolated conflicts occurring in different countries and under different conditions.

The rise of the strike movement in a number of countries was caused, as we know, by the improvement of the economic conjuncture in the last two years. This occurred primarily in France. True, the industrial upturn, which is far from general for all of Europe, remained limited now even in France, and its future is far from certain. But in the life of the proletariat even a small conjunctural turn in one direction or another does not take place without having an effect. If workers are laid off daily, those who remain on the job do not have the same morale as they do when workers are being hired, even though in small numbers. The conjuncture has no less an influence on the ruling classes. In a period of an industrial revival, which always arouses workers' expectations for a still greater upturn in the future, the capitalists are inclined toward easing international contradictions, precisely in order to safeguard the development of the favorable conjuncture. And this is the "spirit of Locarno and Geneva."10

In the past we have had a good illustration of the relation between conjunctural and fundamental factors.

From 1896 to 1913 there was, with few exceptions, a powerful industrial expansion. In 1913 this changed to a depression, which, for all informed people, clearly began the long drawn-out crisis. The threat of a turn in the conjuncture, after the period of unprecedented boom, created an extremely nervous mood in the ruling classes and served as a direct impetus to the war. Of course, the imperialist war grew out of basic contradictions of capitalism. This generalization is known even to Molotov.11 But on the road to war there were a series of stages when the contradictions either sharpened or softened. The same applies to the class struggle of the workers.

In the prewar period, the basic and the conjunctural processes developed much more evenly than in the present period of abrupt changes and sharp downturns, when comparatively minor shifts in the economy breed tremendous leaps in politics. But from this it does not follow that it is possible to close one's eyes to the actual development and to repeat three incantations: "contradictions are sharpening", "the working masses are turning to the left", "war is imminent" - every day, every day, every day. If our strategic line is determined in the final analysis by the inevitability of the growth of contradictions and revolutionary radicalization of the masses, then our tactics, which serve this strategy, proceed from the realistic evaluation of each period, each stage, each moment, which may be characterized by a temporary softening of contradictions, a rightward turn of the masses, a change in the relation of forces in favor of the bourgeoisie, etc. If the masses were to turn leftward uninterruptedly, any fool could lead them. Fortunately or unfortunately, matters are more complicated, particularly under the present inconstant, fluctuating "capricious" conditions.

It would seem that isolated and episodic strikes occur in different countries for quite different reasons but, in general, arising as they do out of a conjunctural upturn in the world market, are not yet - precisely because they are isolated and episodic - "tremendous revolutionary events". But Molotov wants to unite the isolated strikes; a praiseworthy task. In the meantime, however, this is still the task, not an accomplished fact. To unite isolated strikes - Molotov teaches - is possible by means of mass political strikes. Yes, under the necessary conditions, the working class may be united in revolutionary mass strikes. According to Molotov, then, the mass strike is "that new, that basic and most characteristic problem which stands in the center of the tactical tasks of the Communist parties at the given moment. And this means" - continues our strategist - "that we have approached [this time only 'approached'!] new and higher forms of class struggle". And in order to affirm definitively the Tenth Plenum religion of the third period, Molotov adds: "We could not have advanced the slogan of a mass political strike if we had not found ourselves in a period of ascent." His logic is truly unexampled! At first both feet entered the most tremendous revolutionary events. Later it appeared that facing the theoretical head stood only the task of the general strike - rather, not the general strike itself, but only the slogan. And from this, by inverse method, the conclusion is drawn that we "have approached the highest forms of class struggle". Because, don't you see, if we had not approached them, how could Molotov advance the slogan of the general strike? The whole construction is based on the word of honor of the newly made strategist. And the powerful representatives of the parties respectfully listened to the self-confident blockhead and on roll call replied: "Right you are!"

At any rate, we learn that all countries, from Britain to China - with France, Germany, and Poland at the head - are now ready for the slogan of the general strike. We are finally convinced that not a trace is left of the unhappy law of uneven development. We might manage to be reconciled to this, if they would only tell us for what political aims the slogan of the general strike is advanced in every country. It should at least be mentioned that the workers are not at all inclined toward general strikes just for the sake of general strikes. Anarcho-syndicalism broke its head on the failure to understand this. A general strike may sometimes have the character of a protest demonstration. Such a strike may occur when some clear, sometimes unexpected, event stirs the imagination of the masses and produces the necessity for unanimous resistance. But a protest strike demonstration is not yet, in the real sense of the word, a revolutionary political strike: it is only one of the preparatory rehearsals for it. As far as the revolutionary political strike is concerned, in the real sense of the word, it constitutes, so to speak, the final act in the struggle of the proletariat for power. Paralyzing the normal functions of the capitalist state, the general strike poses the question: Who is the master in the house? This question is decided only by armed force. That is why a revolutionary strike which does not lead to an armed uprising ends finally with the defeat of the proletariat.

Along with the general strike is set the task of "the conquest of the streets". The question - at least in words - is not that of the defense of one of the "democratic" rights, trampled upon by the bourgeoisie and the social democracy, but the defense of the "right" of the proletariat to the barricades. That is precisely how "the conquest of the streets" by way of the barricades. But it is necessary to clearly understand what this means. Above all, it must be understood that the working class does not go onto the barricades for the sake of the barricades, just as it does not participate in strikes for the sake of strikes. Immediate political ends are required, which weld together millions and give firm support to the vanguard. That is how revolutionaries pose the question. The opportunities gone berserk approach the question quite differently.

For the revolutionary "conquest of the streets" - like art for art's sake - special days are set aside. The latest exhibition of this sort appeared, as is known, on the first of August. Ordinary mortals wondered, why August 1, whose failure was forecast by the failure of May 1?12 What do you mean, Why?, the official strategists answered excitedly: "for the conquest of the streets!" Just what is to be understood by this, the conquest of the sidewalk or the pavement? Up to now we thought that the task of the revolutionary party is the conquest of the masses, and that policy which can mobilize the masses in the greatest numbers and activity inevitably opens up the street, regardless how the police guard and block it. The struggle for the street cannot be an independent task, separated from mass political struggle and subordinated to Molotov's office schedule. And what is most important, you cannot fool history. The task is not to appear stronger, but to get stronger. A noisy masquerade will not help.

But there is another important tactical deduction from the "third period" that Molotov expresses in these words: "Now more than at any other time the tactic of alliances between the revolutionary organizations and the organizations of the reformists is inadmissible and harmful" (Pravda, number 177, August 4, 1929).

Alliances with the reformists are inadmissible now "more than at any other time. " Does this mean that they were inadmissible before too? How then shall we explain the policy of the years 1926-28? And why have alliances with the reformists, inadmissible in general, become particularly inadmissible now? Because, they explain, we have entered a period of revolutionary ascent. Yet we cannot help remembering that the conclusion of a bloc with the General Council of the British trade unions was motivated precisely by the fact that Britain had entered a period of revolutionary ascent, and that the radicalization of the British working class pushed the reformists to the left. By what incident is yesterday's tactical super-wisdom of Stalinism turned upside-down? One could look in vain for a solution to this riddle. Yet the problem is quite simple. The empiricists of centrism burned their hands on the experiment of the Anglo-Russian Committee13 and with a strong oath they want to guard against scandals in the future. But an oath will not help, for our strategists still have not understood the lessons of the Anglo-Russian Committee.

The mistake was not in making an episodic agreement with the General Council, which was actually moving to the "left" in that period under the pressure of the masses. The first mistake was that the bloc was concluded, not on concrete practical goals clear to the working class, but on general pacifist phrases and false diplomatic formulas. The chief mistake, however, which grew into a gigantic historical crime, lay in the fact that our strategists could not immediately and openly break with the General Council when it turned its weapons against the general strike, that is, when it turned from an unreliable partial ally into an open enemy.

The influence of the radicalization of the masses on the reformists is quite similar to the influence that the development of a bourgeois revolution has on the liberals. In the first stages of the mass movement, the reformists move leftward, hoping in this way to retain the leadership in their hands. But when the movement surpasses the limits of reform and demands from the leaders a clean break with the bourgeoisie, the majority of the reformists quickly change their tune. From cowardly fellow travelers of the masses, they turn into strikebreakers, enemies, open betrayers. At the same time, however, some of them, not necessarily their better elements, jump over into the camp of the revolution. An episodic alliance with the reformists, at the moment they happen to be compelled by circumstances to make a step or half-step forward, may be unavoidable. But it must be understood beforehand that the communists are ready to break mercilessly with the reformists the moment they jump back. The reformists are betrayers not because they carry out, at every given moment and in every one of their acts, the instructions of the bourgeoisie. If that were the case, the reformists would have no influence on the workers and consequently would not be needed by the bourgeoisie. Precisely in order to have the necessary authority for betrayal of the workers at the decisive moment, the opportunists are compelled during the preparatory period to assume the leadership of the workers' struggles, particularly at the beginning of the radicalization of the masses. From this follows the necessity of the united-front tactic, wherein we are compelled for the sake of a broader unification of the masses to cater into practical alliances with their reformist leaders.

Only a hopeless ignoramus can imagine that with the miraculous power of the "third period" the working class as a whole will turn away from the social democracy, driving the whole reformist bureaucracy into the fascist camp. No, the process will develop in a more complicated and contradictory fashion. A growing dissatisfaction with the Social Democratic government in Germany and with the Labourites in Britain, the transformation of partial and isolated strikes into mass movements, etc. (when all these developments actually do take place), will have as their unavoidable consequence - all the Molotovs had better mark it well - a leftward turn of broad layers of the reformist camp, just as the internal processes in the USSR necessitated the leftward turn of the centrist camp, to which Molotov himself belongs.

The social democrats and those of the Amsterdam International, with the exception of the more conscious right-wing elements (Thomas, Herman Meuller, Renaudel types, etc.),14 will be compelled under corresponding conditions to assume the leadership of the advance of the masses, in order to confine these advances within narrow limits, or in order to attack the workers from the rear when they overstep these limits. Although we know that in advance when they overstep these limits. Although we know that in advance and openly warn the vanguard about it, nevertheless, in the future there will still be tens, hundreds, and thousands of cases when the communists will not only be unable to refuse practical alliances with the reformists, but will have to take the initiative in such alliances so that, without letting the leadership out of their hands, they can break with the reformists the moment they turn from shaky allies into open betrayers. This policy will be unavoidable, especially in regard to the left social democracy, which during a growing radicalization of the masses will be compelled to oppose the right wing more decisively, even to the point of a split. This perspective in no way contradicts the fact that those in the leadership of the left social democracy are often the most pernicious and dangerous allies, collaborators of the bourgeoisie.

How is it possible to refuse practical alliances with the reformists in those cases where, for example, they are leading strikes? If there are very few of such cases now, it is because the strike movement itself is very weak as yet and the reformists can ignore and sabotage it. But with mass participation in the struggle, alliances will become unavoidable for both sides. It will be just impossible to block the road to practical alliances with the reformists - not only with the social democratic masses, but in many instances also with their leaders or more likely with a section of the leaders - in the struggle against fascism.

Let the present leaders of the French Communist Party and in addition all the other parties in the International remember their own recent past. All of them, with the exception of the youth, came from the ranks of the reformists under the influence of the leftward-moving workers. That did not prevent the Bolsheviks from entering into agreements with the leftward-moving reformists, putting very precise conditions to them, of which the Zimmerwald agreement15 was one of many. It is true, the capacity of opportunists to move leftward is not unlimited. When the Rubicon - the decision, the uprising - is reached, the majority of them jump back to the right. The desertion of such rotten elements is a gain for the party. But the sad part of the situation is that the simultaneously false, irresponsible, adventurist, smug, and cowardly policy of the official leadership creates a very favorable cover for the deserters and pushes toward them proletarian elements whose place belongs in the ranks of communism. In order to further entangle matters, the imminent revolutionary situation is combined with an immediate war danger.

There is no doubt that in case of war, or even the serious possibility of war, the reformists will be entirely on the side of the bourgeoisie. An alliance with them for a struggle against war is just as futile as a bloc to carry out the proletarian revolution. Precisely for this reason, Stalin's justification of the Anglo-Russian Committee as an instrument of struggle against imperialism was a criminal deception of the workers.

But history knows not only wars and revolutions but also periods between wars and revolutions, that is, periods when the bourgeoisie makes preparations for war and the proletariat for revolution. This is the period we are living in today. We must win the masses away from the reformists, who, far from declining, have grown in recent years. By this growth, however, they have become dependent on their proletarian base. It is this dependence that the tactic of the united front is directed toward.

It is certain, however, that right-wing elements will actually try to make use of some of our points of criticism. This is absolutely unavoidable. Not all the arguments of the right-wingers are wrong. Quite often they have a basis for their criticism in the goat-leaps of left-opportunism.

A straight line is determined by two points. For the determination of a curve, not less than three are necessary. The lines of politics are very complicated and curved. In order to evaluate correctly the different groupings, their activities must be examined during different stages: at the moments of revolutionary upsurge and at the moments of revolutionary ebb. Marxists view the problem as a whole, carrying out their basic strategy consistently despite changes in circumstances. This method does not give instantaneous results, but it is the only reliable method. Let the spoilers despoil. We will prepare for tomorrow.

1 L'Humanité was the paper of the French Communist Party.

2 Tenth Plenum of the ECCI - Tenth full meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

3 Monmousseau and Chambeland were both members of the French CGTU, the left Trade Union confederation, which was dominated by the Stalinists. They disagreed over policy. Chambelland was a syndicalist while Monmousseau supported the Stalinists.

4 The 1926 General Strike was described, correctly, by the British ruling class as a political struggle for power. As the TUC refused to wage a political struggle, the strike was defeated.

5 Vassart was a leader of the French Communist Party and CGTU.

6 Pangaloss was a character from Voltaire's Candide who had un unfounded optimism, saying, "All was for the best in the best of all possible worlds".

7 The Comintern declared August 1 an international Red Day of demonstrations. In words, this day appeared to be the start of the revolution while in deeds it was a fiasco.

8 Dorelle was a member of the French CGTU.

9 Bureaucratic Centralism was Trotsky's initial description of the developing bureaucracy in Russia which, at that stage, had not fully consolidated its grip on power.

10 The spirit of Locarno and Geneva describes moves in the mid-1920s to reduce rivalries between capitalist countries through diplomatic efforts and organizations such as the League of Nations.

11 Molotov was a leading member of the Russian Communist Party and the Comintern. He was a strong supporter of Stalin's policies.

12The failure of May 1, 1929 was a demonstration called in Berlin by the Communist Party against government orders. It was poorly prepared and 25 workers were killed.

13 The Anglo-Russian Committee was a joint committee of British and Russian trade union leaders. The British TUC used this committee as a left cover after they betrayed the general strike of 1926.

14 The Amsterdam International was an international federation of reformist trade unions.

15 Zimmerwald, Switzerland, was where a conference of socialists against the first world war was held.