The conquest of Chile, begun in 1536-37 by Diego de Valdivia, was carried out with the same brutality that was used in other parts of the continent. But the conquerors did not find any 'El Dorado' in Chile. The rather scarce deposits of gold did not compensate for the costly wars in the Aracuan frontiers which lasted until 1880 and which made Chile a deficit area for the Spanish Crown.

In the north and in the south the climate made the development of agriculture very difficult. Whilst Mexico and Peru attracted the most adventurous and imaginative elements of the Castillian ruling class, Chile didn't offer the same perspectives for personal enrichment and prestige. On the other hand the Aracuan Indians heroically resisted the foreign invader until 1880, demonstrating a great intelligence and strength of courage, changing their military tactics and way of life according to the changing conditions of struggle.

The invaders only achieved "pacification" of the Aracuans through a policy of systematic extermination. In the bloody wars against the Indians we can see the real character of the Chilean landlords, a character forged in the conquest and enslavement of the population, methods which they became accustomed to for centuries as they considered the Indians to be inferior beings, slightly better than animals. This mentality of a superior race has characterized the Chilean ruling class up the present time.

Behind their "civilized" and "enlightened" skin there is hidden the mentality of the conqueror and feudal master, with the exception that nowadays the Chilean "nobles" and their bourgeois allies are nothing more than the sub-agents of imperialism, depending shamefully but voluntarily on foreign capital. For centuries the best agricultural land, concentrated in the central part of the country, was divided into enormous private estates ("haciendas" or "fundos") that were set up immediately after the conquest. According to a 1925 census these estates covered nearly 90% of all the land in this region. In the valley of the river Aconcagua, near Valparaiso, 98% of all the land is in the hands of 3% of landowners. Some of these estates cover more than 5,000 hectares. Only a very small part of the land is in the hands of small peasants who are hardly able to live.

The land problem has always been the central problem of Chilean society, together with the emancipation of the country from imperialism. There has always been a shortage of agricultural land: in the north because of insufficient rain, in the south because of too much rain. Only the central region offered good chances for the development of prosperous agriculture. This part was ideally suited for the development of a Mediterranean type of agriculture based on the production of wine, olives and fruit ... but the biggest obstacle to this development has precisely been the concentration of agricultural land in the hands of a few landlords.

The big landowners always used their estates for the cattle raising. The biggest part of the land was used for growing alfalfa grass and other feedstuffs for the herds. Resting on the cheap labor of the agricultural population which lived in very bad conditions almost like feudal slaves, the landlords didn't have the slightest interest in modernizing agriculture.

The rudimentary methods of the big landlords have been the main factor that impeded the development of agriculture. In the south from 1850 the German immigrants established small farms based on the production of wheat and dairy cows. But in the greatest part of the country there did not exist a numerous class of prosperous peasants, but rather a clear division between the big landlords and their "tenants" living in semi-feudal conditions, with a large class of rural semi-proletarians, the "broken ones" (rotos), subjected to the most brutal exploitation and living in sub-human conditions.

In contrast to other countries Chile never new an agrarian reform that is worthy of the name. From 1925, but especially from 1945 they tried to divide the big estates. But these attempts, beside being very partial ones, didn't take place as a consequence of a revolution (Mexico) or government policies (Bolivia), but on the initiative of the landlords themselves who realized that it was far more profitable, in some cases, to divide their lands and sell them off in lots. The feudal mentality of the Chilean landlords didn't present any serious obstacle when it came to participating in the most shamefaced speculation. The landlords sold a part of their land and invested their profits in business in the towns. They controlled their banks and other financial institutions.

In a much clearer form than in other countries in Latin America the interests of the big landlords, the bankers, and the capitalists in Chile, are completely fused together in a powerful oligarchy which controls, together with imperialism, the economic life of the country. It is therefore virtually impossible to establish a clear line of demarcation between the big landlords and the Chilean bourgeoisie, who quickly recognized their identity of interests and united in a more or less homogenous bloc opposed to radical changes in the structure of Chilean society. This explains the absence of a bourgeois democratic revolution in Chile, and the frustration of all attempts to carry out a real land reform as one of the most important historic tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Chile, and the frustration of all attempts to carry out a real land reform as one of the most important tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution. The achievement of a whole number of democratic rights in Chile in the past were not the result of a bourgeois democratic revolution, which in reality had never existed, but because of the existence of a powerful working class and powerful trade unions. The pressures of the Chilean working class compelled the oligarchy to make a number of concessions, which they could do thanks to the relatively privileged position of the Chilean economy in the period between the two world wars.

After winning independence in 1818 the best and most radicalized elements in the army, strongly influenced by the example of the French Revolution, tried to carry out a number of reforms, which went against the interests of the church and the large landlords. But these attempts clashed with the resistance of the feudalist faction, the 'pelucones', who imposed the reactionary constitution of 1833.

The development of capitalist elements provoked a confrontation between Liberals and Conservatives in the second half of the 19th century. But at the end of the same century they fused together and distributed the booty amongst themselves thanks to their control of the government and the state. An important element in this fusion was the constant wars against Peru and Bolivia for possession of the mineral wealth in the northern zone. With the conquest of the Arcuan desert important nitrate deposits passed into the hands of the Chilean oligarchy. The Pacific War resolved the question of these deposits in favor of Chile in 1883. Chile took possession of the ancient Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica, with a commitment to carry out a referendum (which, of course, never took place). The capitalists were content to share their power with the feudal class and the military caste, whose military victories opened up the perspective unprecedented enrichment. The profits from the nitrate workings were a launching pad for Chilean capitalism, which saw no reason for creating a confrontation with the feudalists and the military caste, which for its part, didn't hesitate in participating in the business of the bourgeoisie.

In this way from the very moment of its birth, the Chilean national bourgeoisie showed all the symptoms of a senile degeneration. Instead of a thoroughgoing fight against the power of the big landlords they submitted to a servile alliance, handing over to the landowners the biggest part of state power and sharing with them the wealth extracted from the super-exploitation of the workers and peasants, as well as the booty from the frontier wars. The bourgeois had lands and the landlords had shares in industry, mining and commerce: both classes were closely linked by the banking and financial interests.

For these reasons the Chilean bourgeoisie ended up being totally impotent for carrying out the fundamental tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution which had been realized by the English and French bourgeoisie in the 17th and 18th centuries.

We saw the alliance between the bourgeoisie and the landowners strengthened after the military victory of 1883 and the final defeat of the Aracuan Indians in the same decade. This alliance had given them very satisfactory results: expansion of the national frontiers and an enormous increase in national wealth derived from the nitrates. The 'historic compromise' between the different factions of the ruling class found its expression in the political field with a long period of parliamentarianism. The world economic boom of the 1891-1913 period gave the Chilean ruling class a certain room for manoeuvre. Chile's neutrality in the First World War also produced a number of economic benefits. The fusion of banking, landlordism and big business was completed. There were no fundamental differences between the political parties represented in parliament.

The following figures show the secret of 'Chilean democracy' of those days:

Production of nitrates
1832; 300,000 tns
1896; 1,000,000 tns
1901-10; 1,700,000 tns p.a. average
1911-20; 2,500,000 tns p.a. average

The rise in the world trade and the demand for Chilean nitrates forced up the price of this product. It rose 75% between 1910 and 1918.

Something similar happened with copper, which, little by little, was replacing nitrates as the most important export of this country. The annual production of copper rose by 33,000 tns per year on average between 1901 and 1910, and by 68,000 tns a year between 1911 and 1920. The foreign trade of the country rose from a total value of 140m pesos in 1986 to 580m pesos in 1906.

But in the same way that the Chilean bourgeoisie was incapable of carrying out a land reform, even in the field of industry and mining, in this 'golden age' of Chilean capitalism, the national bourgeoisie surrendered itself in a most servile manner to foreign imperialism. Already in the years of the First World War some 50% of the investments in the mines were of foreign origin. Very soon imperialism, above all that of the USA, came to own the copper industry. El Teniente, which produced a third of the national total, went into the hands of a US company in 1904. Chuquicamata was bought by another US company in 1912. This mine produced about half of the national total. In 1927 Anaconda and Kennecott Copper represented one sixth of national copper production. For more than half a century companies like Anaconda and Kennecott Copper have carried out a real plundering of the mineral resources of the country, accumulating immense fortunes at the cost of the Chilean working class.

What is true for copper is also true for other sectors, like iron, a mineral which is of good quality and in abundance in Chile. Bethlehem Steel took control of El Tojo in 1913 and worked it until it was exhausted. The greatest part of Chilean steel went to the USA.

In this respect too the Chilean bourgeoisie has given enough evidence of its complete incapacity to carry out another fundamental task of the bourgeois democratic revolution: the emancipation of the country from the domination of imperialism. Before the First World War Chile was a semi-satellite of British imperialism. These people, who nowadays talk so much about the country ('fatherland') and the 'national ideal,' are and always have been, absolutely incapable of freeing Chile from its humiliating dependence on imperialism. From the first instance they have been content with the role of being the local administrators of imperialist interests, the bellboy of the large multinationals. Under the rule of the bourgeoisie all the enormous wealth of Chile has been robbed by the imperialists or squandered by the oligarchy.

They have not even been capable of modernizing the country and developing a minimally decent infrastructure, as the deplorable conditions of the roads show. The few good roads that there are in the north were built by foreign companies in the mines. The greatest part of Chilean exports are carried in foreign ships.

All this demonstrates the need to carry out in Chile a whole number of historic tasks that were accomplished in Western Europe a long time ago, in the epoch of the bourgeois democratic revolution. But the whole history of Chile demonstrates in a thorough manner the complete incapability of the 'national' bourgeoisie to carry out these tasks.

Capitalism had already become the decisive force in the country before the First World War. But Chilean capitalism, from its birth, was tied in a decisive manner to foreign imperialist interests. On the other hand it was tied to the interests of the big landlords through banking and commerce. It is precisely for this reason that the 'national' bourgeoisie has never been capable of carrying out the historic tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution and never will be capable of so doing.

How could a serious fight against imperialist control of the country be posed when the vital interests of the Chilean bourgeoisie were dependent upon foreign investment and foreign trade? How could a real agrarian reform be posed when an important part of its capital came from the same landlords with whom the bourgeoisie were connected by thousands of ties of family, education, etc.?

In short the historic tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution could not be carried out by the bourgeoisie. Which other social class could carry them out? The peasantry? These 'dark masses', dispersed, ignorant, and subjected to the most brutal oppression for centuries, were only capable of periodically carrying out desperate acts of rebellion, without any possibility of success, because they didn't find a conscious leadership in another social class, based in the nerve centers of the country, the towns. The peasantry, the most heterogenous social class has been the social class that is least capable of playing an independent political role. It either acted under the leadership of the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. In fact the struggle for political hegemony in the peasantry is a key question for the socialist revolution in Chile. In this sense the first step is the recognition that it is impossible for this social class to play an independent role.

The middle class? The political representatives of the middle class in Chile have got nothing in common with the French Jacobins, the petit-bourgeois revolutionaries of the 18th century who made up the spearhead of the bourgeois democratic revolution. The long period of the economic boom which lasted from 1891 to 1918 gave the Chilean oligarchy a wide margin for manoeuvre to buy the loyalty of the middle class, offering it bureaucratic careers in the State and in government. In this way there arose a new caste of professional politicians. The 'liberal' politicians of the middle class sold themselves to the oligarchy for a small amount of money. From that moment the middle class in Chile thought of politics as a very profitable business: this has been even more true for the so-called 'progressive' politicians of the bourgeoisie. The 'liberals', 'radicals' and 'Christian democrats' fully participated in this repugnant spectacle of corruption and prostitution, whilst the masses of the peasantry and the working class were mere passive spectators of the parliamentary game. The political representatives of the middle class were tied hand and foot to the carriage of the oligarchy, which guaranteed them positions in the administration. For them the system functioned quite well. For them the system functioned quite well. From the very beginning the Chilean 'liberals' have been the left boot of the oligarchy.

On the other hand the rise of the Chilean economy carried with it the development of industry and the working class. With the development of industry and commerce masses of poor peasants emigrated to the towns from the country. In 1907 some 43.2% of the population lived in urban centers. In 1920 this figure reached 46.4%. In Santiago alone there was 14% of the total population. This rapid process of proletarianization led to the first attempts to organize the working class, beginning in the trade union field.

From the beginning of the century Luis Emilio Recabarren already headed the process of organization in the nitrate mines. Much later in 1910 the FOCh was formed. Two years later Recabarren tried to give the first political expression to the Chilean labor movement with the formation of the POS in Iquique.

But it was the events which followed the First World War, above all the Russian Revolution, which provoked an enormous radicalization within the young Chilean working class. The world recession which began in 1918 caused a fall in the price of copper and nitrates. All the social contradictions which were hidden in the previous period came to the surface. Between the years 1913 and 1923 the real wages of the workers were reduced by 10% because of inflation. The importance of this period of radicalization is demonstrated by the wave of strikes that took place between 1911 and 1920: some 293 were counted.

The key event in the process of the awakening consciousness of the Chilean workers was the Russian Revolution. In an atmosphere of general radicalization the Socialist Workers Party of Chile (POS) came out in favor of the Russian Revolution and in 1922 accepted the 21 conditions by which it could enter the Communist International, changing its name to the Communist Party of Chile.

In the following years Chilean society experienced a permanent crisis at all levels, which created enormous possibilities for the triumph of the socialist revolution. The illusions of the masses in the 'progressive' politicians of the bourgeoisie were frustrated after the elections of 1918. The 'Liberal Alliance' government of Alessandri Palma showed its complete inability to solve even one of the problems of the working class.

The workers learnt through bitter experience to completely distrust the 'liberal' politicians of the bourgeoisie. Economic power remained in the hands of the monopolies and the landowners. The economic crisis went from bad to worse. With the growing control of imperialism over the economy it became increasingly evident to everyone that the Chilean bourgeoisie was nothing more than the local agency of foreign capitalism.

The political instability was reflected in the number of 'pronanunciamentos' (military coups) and in the change in constitution in 1925.

The world recession of 1929 hit Chile very hard, forcing it to abandon the gold standard and to repudiate its foreign debt. Mining production in 1929 only reached 52% of the average for the period of 1927-29. Unemployment rose massively. In 1929 there were 91,000 miners employed, at the end of 1931, only 31,000.

The generalized discontent at all levels of society found its most clear agitation amongst the students at the University of Chile. In general intellectuals and students are a very sensitive barometer of the contradictions and tensions within society. Lenin explained many times that the objective conditions for carrying out a socialist revolution were (and are) four in number: in the first place that the ruling class looses confidence in itself and cannot continue exercising its rule with the same methods as before. Secondly, that the social reserves of reaction, the middle class, are vacillating or at least neutral. Thirdly, that the working class is ready to fight for a radical and decisive change in socially. And fourthly that there exists a revolutionary party with a revolutionary leadership that is able to lead the masses towards the taking of power.

The crisis of the Chilean ruling class was shown by the permanent government crises that characterized the decades of the 1920s. The ferment amongst the students indicated a generalized discontent amongst the middle class. Doctors and other professional sections joined in the protests of the students. There were a number of violent demonstrations, which led to the collapse of the Ibanez dictatorship and his fleeing the country. If there had existed an authentically mass revolutionary party in Chile, the pre-revolutionary situation could have been transformed into a revolutionary situation with the taking of power by the working class.

The tragedy of the Chilean working class was that the consolidation of the Communist Party coincided with the Stalinist degeneration of the USSR. We saw the same process reflected in all the parties of the Communist International, which continued to blindly follow the political line determined by the interests of the Russian bureaucracy. From 1928 onwards the International, created under the Leninist policy of proletarian internationalism, officially approved the Stalinist line of 'socialism in one country,' which effectively converted the Communist Parties into mere instruments of the foreign policy of the Russian bureaucracy. This was the decisive step in the national reformist degeneration of all the parties of the Comintern.

At the same time, under the instructions of the Stalinist clique in Moscow, the parties of the International approved the ultra-left madness of the so-called 'Third Period', according to which all the other organizations of the working class were 'social fascist.' This policy was the cause of the terrible failure of the German working class in 1933. In all the other countries the Communist Parties lost their base amongst the masses as a consequence of this madness, which went directly against the policy of the United Front as advocated by Lenin. In Chile too the Stalinist policy produced disastrous results. We saw the CP reduced to a sectarian grouplet isolated from the masses at a decisive moment, and totally incapable of giving serious leadership to the revolutionary movement.

Consequently the opportunity was lost. The short-lived 'socialist' government of Carlos Davila was overthrown in September 1932 by the coup d'etat of Arturo Alessandri. It's interesting to draw attention to the fact that the 'liberal' party of the Chilean bourgeoisie, the Radicals, supported Alessandri. During the 1930s in fact the Radical Part was controlled by a clique of landlords and big capitalists.

In the main the disaster of '32 was caused by the absence of a mass revolutionary party. The Davila government had proclaimed the 'socialist republic' of Chile, but not continuing on the active support of the masses it remained suspended in mid-air. The method of the 'pronanciamento' is sometimes sufficient to carry out a radical change without breaking the bourgeois order. But the socialist movement has to be based on the conscious movement of the working class. In this context Adonis Sepúlveda comments in his article on the history of the PSCh ('El Socialismo Chileno' May 1976, No. 1):

"The movement didn't maintain its support in the masses, it didn't hand over arms to the people to defend the government, there wasn't a party to give a lead to the resolve of the workers to fight."

The experience of these events convinced the best fighters of the Chilean working class of the urgent need for a new party, a party which would really defend the interests of the working class, which would not base itself on the social-democratic reformism of the Second International, nor the Stalinist perversion of the Comintern, but which had to return to the authentic ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Bolshevism and the October Revolution. Many cadres of the old POS, discontent with the Stalinist line of the CP, joined in with this initiative to found the Socialist Party in April 1933.

Here it would be convenient to précis some of the most outstanding points of the old 'Declaration of Principles' of the Socialist Party.

'Methods of Interpretation.'

"The Party accepts Marxism, enriched and altered by all the scientific contributions of constant social developments, as a method of interpreting reality."

'The Class Struggle'

"The present capitalist organization divides human society into two classes which are clearly defined as each day passes. One class which has appropriated the means of production and which exploits them for its own benefit, and another class which works, which produces and which has no other means to live than its wage.

"The need of the working class to achieve its economic well-being and the eagerness of the possessing class to maintain its privileges determines the struggle between the classes."

'The State'

"The capitalist class is represented by the existing state which is an oppressive organism of one class over another. Once classes have been eliminated the oppressive character of the state should disappear and it should limit itself to guide, harmonize and protect the activities of society."

'Transformation of the System'

"The system of capitalist production based on the private ownership of the land, the instruments of production, exchange, credit and transport, should of necessity be replaced by a socialist economic system in which the above-mentioned private property is transformed into collective property."

'Dictatorship of the Workers'

"During the process of the total transformation of the system a dictatorship of organized workers is necessary.

"The evolutionary transformation by means of the democratic system is not possible because the ruling class has organized itself into official armed bodies and has erected its own dictatorship to maintain the workers in poverty and ignorance and prevent their emancipation."

'Internationalism and Economic Anti-Imperialism'

"The socialist doctrine has an international character and demands a joint and coordinated action by the workers of the world.

"In order to realize this aim the Socialist Party will propose the economic and political unity of the economic and political unity of the peoples of Latin America to achieve the Federation of Socialist Republics of the continent and the creation of an anti-imperialist policy." ('Socialismo Choleno' pages 15-16)

These basic principles were kept in a written form in the membership card of every militant of the PSCh for the first 25 years of its existence.

After the victory of Hitler in Germany the foreign policy of the Russian bureaucracy took a new turn. Initially Stalin tried to arrive at an agreement with Berlin. When this failed Moscow embarked on a new policy based on the idea of an alliance with the 'democratic countries' (mainly with French and English imperialism) against Germany. From one day to the next the 'communist' parties received new orders: finish with the previous policy of the 'Third Period' and enter into new pacts and alliances not only with the Social Democratic parties (which yesterday were called 'social fascists') but also with the 'progressive' parties of the bourgeoisie in order to stop the danger of fascism.

In this way the leaders of the 'communist' parties became the most ardent allies of the 'liberal' bourgeoisie. Lenin had fought all his life against this policy of collaboration with the so-called 'progressive' elements of the bourgeoisie, refusing to enter the provisional government in coalition with the bourgeois liberals after the February revolution in Russia. The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries at that time justified their entry into the provisional government - the first edition of the 'Popular Front' in history - by alleging that in Russia, a backward country where the working class was a small minority of the population, the immediate tasks were those of the bourgeois democratic revolution, and that therefore socialists should ally themselves with the 'progressive' bourgeois parties in order to fight against the remnants of feudalism and the fascist counterrevolution. Lenin came out with a hard-hitting reply. No confidence in the bourgeoisie, no support for the provisional government. Distrust above all the most 'radical' elements of the bourgeoisie, like Kerensky. No rapprochement with the other parties (mainly referring to the Mensheviks). In other words - trust exclusively on the forces of the organized working class in the soviets, or workers' councils, as the only power capable of destroying reaction, carrying out the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in alliance with the masses of the poor peasants through the seizure of power, and consequently, going over in an uninterrupted manner to the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and beginning the process of socialist revolution.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks understood that the building of socialism was not possible in a single country, and even less in a backward country like Russia at that time. They therefore raised the urgent need of extending the revolution to other countries, above all to the developed capitalist countries of Europe. They therefore created the Communist International, which proclaimed the need for a world revolution, the united socialist states of Europe, and finally a world socialist federation.

Under Lenin and Trotsky the Communist International cemented together the most revolutionary conscious elements of the working class on a world scale. Learning from the bitter experience of the Social-Democratic International (which, in the words of Lenin, wasn't an International but rather a 'post-office' with hardly any links between the different national parties) the Bolsheviks returned to the authentic concept of the International that Marx and Engels had during the days of the International Workingmen's Association - a world party of socialist revolution, with a common program, strategy and leadership. This idea was not in the slightest anti-democratic, nor did it mean the dominance of one party over the others. The complete opposite was the case. In the first four congresses of the Comintern the internal debates show the wide margin of internal democracy, of freedom of discussion, where even the smallest party could express its differences with the policy of the biggest party, the Bolshevik Party. There was a wide autonomy for the national sections within the general policy established by the congress of the International, which until the death of Lenin were held despite all the difficulties.

With the bureaucratic degeneration of the Russian revolution, which came about as a result of the isolation of the workers state in a backward country, this situation changed completely.

The process of the Stalinization of the Communist Parties was mirrored by a parallel process in the Comintern. All the critical elements were bureaucratically eliminated, something which never took place in the days of Lenin. The leaders of the International became Stalinist functionaries whose only aim was to carry out the orders of Moscow. From 1928 these elements carries out the ultra-left policy of the 'Third Period'. Then in 1935, without any problem whatsoever, they took a turn of 180 degrees towards the 'Popular Front' policy, which Trotsky had correctly characterized as a "malicious caricature of Menshevism" and a "strike-breaking conspiracy."

But the Stalinists could not carry out their policy of collaboration between the classes without the participation of the socialists. The Chilean workers had learnt to distrust completely the 'liberal' politicians of the bourgeoisie. The creation of the SP was an expression of the instinctive desire of the working class for the necessity of an independent class policy. The declared policy of the Socialists was the workers' united front, which was fought for in the candidacy of Marmaduke Grove, a prominent leader of the labor movement who was jailed by the government and elected senator for Santiago with the slogan 'From Jail to the Senate.'

The revolutionary spirit of the movement at that time was expressed in the famous words of Grove: "When we get power there won't be enough lampposts from which to hang the oligarchy." These words reflected the mood of the masses of workers and the rest of the oppressed sectors of Chilean society who were seeking the road of the socialist revolution and not the one of collaboration with the bourgeoisie.

The radicalization of the masses and the crisis of capitalism forced the oligarchy to look for the 'final solution', just like in Germany and Italy, by organizing armed fascist bands. Under the Bonapartist government none of the problems of Chilean society had been solved. But the fascist movement met with the heroic resistance of the working class. The workers' militias of the Socialist Party and the Young Socialists, 'The Steel Shirts', fought against the fascists all over Chile. Frightened by this the same government of Alessandri was forced to act against the fascists when they attempted a coup d'etat.

The failure of the fascist attempt, the crisis of the Alessandri government, and the growing wave of radicalization of the masses created very favorable new conditions for an offensive of the working class. But here the Chilean Stalinists played a completely ignominious role. The leaders of the SP, unfortunately, were completely incapable of offering any alternative. The Stalinists took the initiative and strongly pressured the leadership of the SP to accept the idea of a Popular Front with the Radical Party. This idea went against all the principles of the party and met with a decisive opposition from the working class, which instinctively understood the traitorous character of the liberal bourgeoisie and wanted a workers' government. In the words of Adonis Sepúlveda:

"When the changes in the strategy of the labor movement place on the table for discussion the formation of a Popular Front, the Socialist Party resists this alliance which surrenders the leading role of the labor movement to certain sections of the bourgeoisie. It has at this moment a profound popular attraction and a charismatic leader. There is a tremendous upsurge in its militancy. No socialist accepts the surrender of leadership to another force." ('Socialismo Chileano' page 20.)

Unfortunately the lack of experience on the part of the young cadres and the vacillations of the leadership of the party, which did not know how to resist the persistent pressures of the Stalinists, led to the fatal error of entering the Popular Front, despite the opposition of the rank and file and in complete contradiction to the principles and policy of the Party. In the extraordinary Congress held in 1938 the General Secretary, Oscar Schnake, needed five hours to convince the delegates to accept the withdrawal of the candidature of M Grove, which had been agitated for since 1936.

This tragically mistaken decision had disastrous consequences for Chilean socialism and for the working class as a whole. From the entry of the Socialists in the Popular Front government, which won the elections in 1938, Sepúlveda draws the following conclusions:

"The young party doesn't resist class collaboration. Its least mature and most opportunist sections 'grow fond' of the State apparatus and forget the objectives which motivated them to become a part of it. There is a flowering of the weakness and reformism of some leaders, which had remained permanently hidden during the hard battles of the early years. Those with the best Marxist understanding and firm class-consciousness firmly battle with the reformist wave that invades the party. The combative and revolutionary youth is at the forefront of the struggle internally for ideological recuperation.

"The rank and file reacts vehemently against the corruption and the deals with the powers-that-be which break out in the bureaucratic summit. The disagreement not only comes from the radicalized groups but from veteran working-class contingents. The expulsion of the Youth is the straw that breaks the camel's back; the most serious split in the 43 years of the life of socialism takes place." ('Socialismo Chileno, pages 20-21)

In spite of all the agreements made by the party, the leadership of the government coalition passed into the hands of the bourgeois politicians of the Radical Party. Under the pressure of the masses, the Popular Front carried out certain reforms, but later on opted for a policy of counter-reforms, which provoked open confrontations with the workers' movement. An official document of the Socialist Party in Chile, published to commemorate the 45th anniversary of its foundation recalls the workers' response to the January 1945 anti-working-class measures taken by the government:

"The working class of Santiago replied to the first decree with a vigorous mass mobilization, tragically repressed by the public forces. The massacre was followed by a general stoppage, and resignation of the cabinet and, as the first act in a senseless adventure between the leadership of the SP and certain sections of the armed forces, came the formation of a bastard coalition bereft of principles, program and popular base. At the general congress which took place in October 1946 those leaders were stripped of their positions." (45th Anniversary of the CSP, pp 4-5)

From the word go, the participation of the socialist leaders in a coalition with the bourgeoisie had been an unprincipled adventure which had catastrophic consequences for the party. There began a series of internal crises and splits. The party was only saved thanks to the Young Socialists and the Marxists, who fought against the class collaborationist policy of the leadership, in favor of a revolutionary policy of class independence. In the Presidential elections of 1946, the Chilean Stalinists once again supported a bourgeois candidate and entered the government of Gonzalez Videla with the Liberals and the Radicals. Two years later, they got their reward, being expelled from the government and illegalized until 1958.

Once again, the Videla government showed to the world the utterly reactionary character of the "liberal" Chilean bourgeoisie. This "radical", "Left-wing" government turned out to be the most servile tool in the hands of US imperialism and the Chilean oligarchy. Finally the PS split over the reformist leaders' cooperation into the reformist 'Socialists of Chile' and the left 'Popular Socialists'. In a conference on their program held in 1947, the Popular Socialists stressed "the lack of independence displayed by the bourgeoisie when it comes to standing up to imperialism and the criole of oligarchies," and reaffirmed the policy of the Workers' Front, as opposed to collaboration with the liberal bourgeoisie. At this point it would be interesting to quote a few lines from the program, which sum up the experience of the Chilean workers' movement in the previous decades and draw a series of very important conclusions:

"At the present time, it is the task of the Socialist and like-minded parties in Latin America to carry out in our semi-colonial countries the economic achievements and legal changes which in other parts of the world have been propelled and directed by the bourgeoisie. The abnormal and contradictory conditions in which we find ourselves, determined by the belatedness of or social and economic evolution in the middle of what appears to be the definitive crisis of capitalism, demands a speeding-up of the process of collective life: we must cut short the stages by means of national effort and solidarity with a view to bringing about the utilization of the labor, technique and capital we have at our disposal."

"The material process, in better-off nations has been the effect of the spontaneous interplay of vital and social sources in creative tension. With us, it will have to be the result of collective activity, realized with a technical criterion and directed to social ends. The turn taken by world events, and the urgency of internal problems do not permit us to wait. By the ineluctable imperative of historical circumstances, the great economic transformations of the bourgeois-democratic revolution - agrarian reform, industrialization, national liberation - will be brought about in our Latin American countries, through the socialist revolution." (Our emphasis)

The experience of successive bourgeois governments showed this thesis to be correct. After the years of prosperity after the Second World War and for a while after, the price of copper began to fall once more, causing a crisis in the national economy. The level of unemployment in Chilean industry in 1949 fell below the level of 1947. Inflation kept on rising, and the Chilean capitalists made their fortunes speculating with the national currency. 75% of the cultivable land remained in the hands of 5% of the population, and US capital strengthened its grip on the national industry.

In the meanwhile the reunification of the trade union movement was achieved, after being broken in 1946. The CUT, formed in 1953m affirmed as its principle aim the organization of all workers of town and countryside "to fight against the exploitation of man by man until the achievements of complete socialism."

In the '50s, the Chilean socialists came to the following conclusion, on the basis of all their previous experience:

"This situation hinged on the possibility or not of collaboration with governments not representing the workers, characteristic of the historical evolution of socialism, until, coming to terms with the poverty of its ideological possibilities, it decides to rediscover in its principles a policy which traces before it a perspective of ideological, class independence and which, fundamentally, represents the workers. It is for this reason that in August 1956, the so-called 'Workers' Front' Thesis came to light, the first fundamental lesson of which is that the bourgeoisie in our countries is not a revolutionary class. On the other hand, the industrial and mining workers, the peasants, the intellectual petty bourgeoisie, the artisans and independent operatives, all sections of the population whose interests clash with the established order are [revolutionary classes - JM]. And within this whole the working class plays an increasingly decisive role. By its organization, its trade union and political experiences, its class sense, it is the most resolute nucleus of the social struggle." (45th Anniversary of the CSP, p9, our emphasis).

The same document, published in April 1978, affirms: "Many objective details remain to be reaches and must, therefore, be seen as vital aims for Chile, but we deny that our incipient and anemic bourgeoisie has the independence and capacity to attain them. Here it is a tributary class of imperialism, profoundly linked to the landowners, making illegitimate use of economic privileges, which now lack all justification. We conclude, then, that only the exploited classes, the manual and intellectual workers, can take upon themselves that mission in terms of forming a new society, sustained by a modern and progressive structure."

It also explains that "the task of our generation does not consist in bringing about the final stage of bourgeois democratic transformations, but to take the first step of the socialist revolution." In reality, the basic tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Chile can only be carried out by means of the seizure of power by the working class, at the head of the masses of poor peasants and the other oppressed sections of society. But a workers' government in Chile could not limit itself to bourgeois democratic tasks, but the very situation would lead, uninterruptedly, to an attack on the capitalist system and the socialist transformation of society."

In the 1958 Presidential elections, Salvador Allende, common candidate for the reunited SP and CP under the banner of the FRAP (Popular Action Front) got 356,000 votes, only 30,000 less than the candidate of the right, Alessandri. The right-wing government carried out an austerity program, which weighed heavily on the shoulders of the working class. The reply was a wave of strikes, met with bloody repression by the government.

Unfortunately, once again in the FRAP we see a tendency on the part of the SP leaders to back down under the pressure of the CP. In the common program there is a noticeable and fundamental change with respect to the Socialist Party program. As the document '45th Anniversary of the CSP' says:

Once more it is difficult to identify the principles of socialism implemented in the line of the FRAP, which includes a nebulous mass of principles in which it is impossible to recognize those of the party ... 20 years later we have a correct national and international policy, an adequate social identification: the Workers' Front, which is absolutely consistent with our principles, but we have become hopelessly implicated in the common path undertaken, in which every alliance has led to a softening-up and making us give way and for the third time again we decide, wrongly, to agree to a pact forgetting the working class, the class struggle, forgetting that the bourgeoisie is not revolutionary and although it is written in our principles, in our reports to the congresses, in the inter-party polemics, once again we establish a holy alliance which contradicts the basic postulates of our party and of the Workers' Front. In this way is born a new coalition, the possibility of the popular unity."

Once again the leaders of the so-called 'Communist' Party insist on their thesis of the bourgeois democratic character of the Chilean revolution and the need to seek pacts and alliances with the so-called 'progressive' bourgeois parties.

And yet again, the socialist leaders proved incapable of standing up to these pressures. Although, evidently, their intentions were good: to maintain at all costs the unity of the Chilean working class, the leaders of the SP paid too high a price, the results of which only became evident with the coup d'etat of the 11th of September, 1973.

What is clear here is that, in order to lead the working class to the seizure of power it is not enough to have more or less correct principles. Of course, without clear ideas, without a revolutionary program, without Marxist principles and without correct perspectives, it will never be possible to build the revolutionary party, nor to make the socialist revolution. But what is necessary is a revolutionary leadership, a Bolshevik leadership, which is not going to lose sight of the principal aim of the revolution, giving way on basic questions, under the guise of 'tactical agreements' or 'unity'.

In this respect, Lenin was always totally intransigent. More than once, he was accused of 'sectarianism' or 'dogmatism' for refusing to enter into agreements in principle, not only with the bourgeois (that was self-evident), but also with other working-class parties. The clearest example was his intransigent attitude in 1917 towards the Mensheviks who precisely accused him of 'sectarianism' and of 'seeking to break the unity of the revolutionary camp.' Such accusations must never frighten a revolutionary leadership. Lenin understood perfectly the need for temporary pacts and agreements with other workers' parties. But Lenin's slogan was always: 'March separately and strike together': never to confuse the different programs and different banners of these workers' parties when they reached agreement concerning some concrete action. The tragedy of Chilean socialism throughout its history has been that, after drawing a series of correct conclusions from the experience of struggle, its leaders always gave way on fundamental questions in the face of the demands of the Stalinists who on each occasion managed to dominate the united front in which both of the parties were united, imposing their ideas, their programs and their views. And this recipe has always led to the most resounding defeats for the working class.

The reactionary policy of the 1958-64 Alessandri government produced a wave of radicalization in the country, reflected in the strike movement. The annual rate of growth oscillated around 4.5%. Whilst inflation increased enormously, the real wages of the workers remained on practically the same level as in 1945. 60% of the population received only 20% of the national income. The situation in the countryside was so bad that in the richest agricultural provinces of Aconcagua and Santiago, for example, only 7% of the landlords held more than 90% of the land. In general, about 86% of all the cultivatable land of the country was concentrated in approximately 10% of agricultural entities. Despite all the promises of agrarian reform, the conditions of the poor peasants, the 'inquilinos' (tenants) and the 'afuerinos' (laborers) continued exactly as before: poverty, hunger, illiteracy, endemic sickness and alcoholism.

Furthermore, the stranglehold on agriculture by the latifundists led to a situation in which Chile had to import agricultural produce to feed its people, although it has more cultivable land per head of population than many European countries. The reason is not difficult to find. The latifundists employ cheap labor instead of machinery and do not bother in the slightest to introduce new agricultural methods. In this way, the starvation wages of the Chilean peasantry are also the cause of the low level of productivity in Chilean agriculture. The urgent necessity of a profound agrarian reform in Chile has been evident for decades. But not one of the 'progressive' bourgeois governments was capable of tackling the problem seriously for reasons already outlined above.

On the eve of the presidential elections of 1964, the peasantry still represented about 30% of the active population. But in the previous decades the process of urbanization had intensified. According to the census of 1940, 52% of the population lived in the cities. This figure had reached 66% of the population in 1960.

The wave of strikes and the high level of consciousness of the Chilean working class was a warning to the bourgeoisie of what might happen in the presidential elections of 1964. The Alessandri government was totally discredited. The oligarchy needed a political alternative capable of stopping the advance of the workers' parties. This alternative was the Christian Democrat Party, formed in 1957.

As the clearest symptom of the weakness of the Chilean bourgeoisie and the growing radicalization of society, both in the countryside and in the towns, the elections of 1964 were reduced to a struggle between the Christian Democrats, represented by Frei, and the FRAP, represented by Allende. Both sides fought under the banner of a radical reform of Chilean society.

The Christian Democrats, the most skillful representatives of the interests of the oligarchy, made use of a very 'leftist' demagogy to win the votes of the petty bourgeois masses of the towns and, above all, in the villages. The peasantry, and the middle class in general, is not a homogenous class like the working class and the bourgeoisie. There are rich peasants and poor peasants, as well as a whole series of intermediate layer. In their upper layers, the peasants draw close to the bourgeoisie, while the poor peasants, the 'inquilinos' and the 'afuerinos' are natural allies of the proletariat. 'Liberal' bourgeois parties like the Christian Democracy have influence among the masses of peasants and the middle class through the privileged layer of this class: the lawyers, teachers, intellectuals, doctors and, of course, priests, the men of village in whose presence the peasant is accustomed to remove his cap, from his earliest years; the gentlemen who 'knew how to speak.'

These elements are capable, on occasion, of using very radical, even 'revolutionary,' phraseology with a view to maintaining their influence among the masses. They present themselves to the peasants and small shopkeepers as the 'friends of the people,' the spokesmen and mediators between the people and the authorities, the defenders of the poor and humble folk.

But, once elected, these well-to-do elements invariably place themselves at the service of Capital in the most servile way. In reality, this is their true function: the transmission belt between the bankers and big monopolists on the one hand and the masses of the middle class on the other. The usefulness of these political exploiters of the middle class to Capital depends on its ability to fool and confuse the millions of peasants, small shopkeepers and potentially backward workers, women, etc. The socialist revolution is only possible once the stranglehold of the liberals and 'Christian Democrats' over the middle class and the peasantry is broken. Nevertheless, the totally anti-Leninist policy of the 'Communist' Party of Chile has been based for a long time on the necessity of an alliance with these hardened enemies of socialism.

As a clear symptom of the social ferment and discontent of the masses, it is enough to recall the fact that the slogan of the Christian Democrats in 1964 was none other than 'Revolution in Freedom.' And indeed, the masses placed their confidence in Frei who received a decisive majority: 56% of the 2.5 million votes cast. The results of the elections of the Lower Chamber the following year confirmed the triumph of the Christian Democrats, who saw their seats go up from 23 to 82. On the other hand, the right-wing party suffered a total defeat. All the hopes of the majority of the population were placed on the 'Revolution in Freedom,' the agrarian reform and the 'Chileanization' of the economy.

The experience of the Frei government again showed up the inability of the bourgeois liberals to carry out the most urgent tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution. Under Frei, the state got control of 51% of the shares of the big US copper companies. But this did not eliminate in the slightest degree that suffocating control of US imperialism over the Chilean economy. The agrarian reform crept forward at a snail's pace. Its results are summed up in the following words:

"From a qualitative point of view, the Christian Democratic government's action concerning the distribution of land, favored some 28,000 peasant families who were organized into agrarian reform settlements or cooperatives in 1,300 farms which were either expropriated or intended to be included in the agrarian reform, with a global surface of 3.4 million hectares. This represented 13% of the total cultivated land in Chile, or 14.5% of productive land, and the beneficiaries consisted of between 5% and 10% of the peasant families which were either landless or had insufficient land. The aim of the Christian Democratic government itself for its period of 6 years was to grant access to land to 100,000 peasant families, which means that it carries out one-third of its program on this point." ('Chile-America' No. 25-26-27 p16)

Other aspects of Frei's program, such as state intervention in banking, remained on paper. The masses of workers and peasants had passed through the school of Christian Democracy and understood it for what it was: a gigantic fraud. What they wanted was a deep-going transformation of society. What they had got was the continuation of the oligarchic and imperialist domination behind a new and 'more democratic' façade. The role of the Christian Democracy - that of the most faithful defender of the oligarchy - was shown by the brutal repression of workers and peasants. Among the victims of Mineral de El Salvador and Puerto Mott there were more than 20 socialists, murdered by the Frei government's 'forces of Order',

After the electoral defeat of the leaders of the 'Communist' Party raised the possibility of collaboration with the Christian Democratic government. The disastrous consequences that this would have are self-evident. In the words of A Sepúlveda:

"What would have happened after the Presidential elections of 1964 of the Party would have reached agreement or oriented itself to a deal with the governmental party? Only the submission of the working class to the hegemony of the bourgeoisie for a long period of time...

"If this (the conduct of the SP towards the Christian Democracy, -JM) had been one of direct collaboration, of critical support or of a simply legislative opposition, we would not have weakened its social base of support and would not have opened the way to a popular alternative." ('Socialismo Chileno', pp 26-8)

The support of the Christian Democracy among the masses was fast disappearing. The discontent and ferment among the petty bourgeoisie found a reflection in the ranks of Frei's own party, which experienced the 1969 split-off of the left wing which formed the MAPU and evolved towards a radicalized position.

In these conditions there was a new attempt to reconstitute the electoral front of the SP and the CP. At the round table conference, when the idea of the Popular Unity was mooted, there was a discrepancy between the representatives of the SP and those of the CP. The latter saw the question of socialism in Chile as "a perspective put off for an indefinite period of time." ('Socialismo Chileno,' p31)

Whilst Allende, without doubt, believed sincerely in the possibility of the socialist transformation of society by the parliamentary road, for the Stalinist leaders, the question of socialism did not even come up. The result was an incoherent document, replete with ambiguities. As the document '45th Anniversary of the CSP' affirms:

"These round table conversations ended by calling themselves the 'Popular Unity.' This round table conference had as its result the governmental program of the Popular Unity, a program, which, in all its essentials, sums up the contradictory positions of two different political projections: the socialist character and the bourgeois-democratic character of the Chilean revolution, the latter defended by the CP, the former by the SP. This contradiction was to be present throughout the lifetime of the Popular Unity government." (page 16)

"The triumph of the 4th of September and the consequent broadening of the program unleashed a revolutionary process which placed the classes in a situation of historic tension: revolution or counterrevolution. It was not the actions carried out by the popular government, or the program itself, which the ruling classes were afraid of, but the revolutionary dynamic of the masses which objectively placed in jeopardy the capitalist system. Above all, they feared the working class leadership of the process, expressed by the predominance of Socialists and Communists in the government, in the Popular Unity and in the mass movement."

"Nevertheless, it was this latter subjective element - the leadership factor - which did not know how to respond to the new reality brought about by the march of the revolution, a reality which overstepped the bounds of the objectives set forth by the Popular Unity in 1969." (Chilean Socialism', page 85)

The Popular Unity coalition included not only the CP and SP but a whole series of small petty bourgeois parties and grouplets (MAPU, API, PSD and Radicals) with a very sparse base amongst the masses. The Radical Party, in the moment of its entry into the coalition was undoubtedly a bourgeois party, which later split under the pressure of the masses. As opposed to the Popular Front of the 1930s, in which the old Radical Party was the majority force, the Radicals of Alberto Baltra were a sect, while the workers' parties, the SP and CP, were the dominant forces. Nevertheless, the Stalinist leaders had a vested interest in the presence of the Radicals in the government, not because of their electoral importance, but as an excuse for not carrying out a socialist program. "We cannot go too fast, because that could mean the break-up of the coalition." The same tactic has been used by the CP and SP leaders in France, also with the miniscule Radical Party.

Against the Popular Unity stood the two parties of the bourgeoisie: the National Party of Alessandri, the open representatives of the oligarchy, and the Christian Democracy, represented by Tomic, who, in a desperate attempt to try to recover the image of a 'left-wing' party, advocated "the total nationalization of the copper industry" and the foreign banks and the "speeding up" of the Agrarian Reform. But this time the masses were not to be deceived by the fake promises of the Christian Democrats. The results of the elections were as follows:

Allende	1,075,616	36.3%
Alessandri	1,036,278	34.9%
Tomic	824,849	27.8%

The abysmal collapse of the Christian Democratic vote clearly shows the process of class polarization in Chilean society. In fact, the Christian Democrats had already lost their absolute majority in the elections in the Lower House (Congress) in March 1969. Out of a total of 150 seats in the Congress and 50 in the Senate there were the following results (the results of the 1965 elections are given in brackets):

	Congress	Senate	% of Votes
Christian Democracy	55 [82]	23 [13]	31.1
National Party	34 [12]	5 [8]	20.9
Communist Party	22 [18]	9 [3]	16.6
Radicals	24 [20]	6 [10]	13.9
Socialist Party	15 [15]	5 [7]	14.4
Other Left Groups	- [-]	2 [4]

The results of the 1970 elections meant that the Popular Unity had won, but it did not have an absolute majority. This argument was used by the Right in order to impose conditions on Allende before allowing the formation of the government. The leaders of the Popular Unity had two alternatives: either reject the blackmail of the bourgeoisie and make an appeal to the masses, denouncing the dirty manoeuvres to impede the people's will, organizing massive demonstrations all over the country, or give in to the pressures and accept the imposed conditions.

Many socialist militants were indignant at these manoeuvres of the bourgeoisie. And undoubtedly, the indignation of the masses would have been greater still, had the Popular Unity leaders organized a campaign of mobilizations and explanation. Already in June 1970, the CUT were threatening a general strike. In those moments, the working class had become the decisive majority of society; 75% of the active population were wage-earners, fundamentally in the towns (in industry and services) and less than 25% of the active population was dedicated to agriculture. The power of the workers' movement in Chile had already been demonstrated in the wave of strikes under the Ibanez and Alessandri governments. The workers knew that the election campaign had been characterized by all kinds of trickery and dirty manoeuvres against the Popular Unity, staged by imperialism and the oligarchy. The attempt to block Allende's entry into the government would have been the signal for an unprecedented movement, which would have had a radicalizing effect in every town and village in the land.

Moreover, for a Marxist, although election results have a great importance as a barometer of the degree of consciousness of the masses, they can never be the only factor, or even the determining factor in our strategy. Marxists are not anarchists. For that reason we participate in elections and are willing to use all the mechanisms of bourgeois democracy, and even attempt to change society by peaceful means, through parliamentary legislation, in the degree to which it is permitted us to do so. Nevertheless, the whole of history, and above all the history of Chile, shows that the ruling class is prepared to tolerate the existence of democracy only within certain clearly demarcated limits. In the moment when the bourgeoisie sees its power and privilege threatened, it does not hesitate to break unilaterally with the "rules of the game" (rules established by them in defense of the power and privileges) and destroy the democratic conquests of the working class. No, we Marxists are not anarchists. But we are realists, and have learned from history. In this respect, comrade Sepúlveda is absolutely right when he states that:

"On the question of power, it is not a question of the numerical correlation of forces, of having a majority. For example, if in March 1973, we had obtained 51% or 55%, would that have meant that imperialism and the big bourgeoisie would have ceased to prepare the coup, would not have continued to develop the forces to overthrow us? At least, historical experience shows that, even when in a minority, the reaction defends the class predominance by violent means." ('Socialismo Chileno,' p36)

Many Socialist comrades, and probably communists as well, foresaw the trap that the bourgeoisie was preparing with its famous conditions.

The main protagonist of this manoeuvre was, of course, the Christian Democracy, which once again revealed its real nature as the most cunning defenders of the interests of its masters, the big capitalist, bankers and US imperialism.

Under the insistent pressure of Corvalán and Co., Allende reached agreement with the Christian Democracy and accepted the so-called "constitutional guarantees pact" which formed "private militias" or the nomination of officers in the armed forces who had not been to military academy. On the other hand, no changes were to be made in the army, navy, air force or police force, except with the approval of the Congress, where the bourgeois parties still had a majority. In this way, Allende and the other leaders of the popular unity fell into trap from the very first, forgetting the fundamental principles of Marxism, and the words of the founding program of Chilean socialism: "Evolutionary transformation by means of the democratic system is not possible because the ruling class has organized itself in armed civil bodies and has erected its own dictatorship to maintain the workers in poverty and ignorance and prevent their emancipation."

Lenin had explained many times that the state consists fundamentally of "groups of armed men in defense of property." The acceptance of the "constitutional guarantees pact" by the leaders of the Popular Unity meant a compromise, on their part, not to arm the working class and not to touch any part of the repressive apparatus erected by the bourgeoisie "to maintain the workers in poverty and ignorance and prevent their emancipation."

But then, how could they possibly carry out a serious struggle against the oligarchy and imperialism? Throughout the life-time of the Popular Unity government, the leaders of the SP and, above all, those in the CP deceived themselves, and therefore deceived the masses of workers and peasants when they insisted upon the "patriotic" and impartial character of the military caste. In an entirely utopian manner, they thought to neutralize the generals and admirals by soothing words, medals and wage increases.

The state apparatus, and above all the military caste, is not something above class and society, but an organ of repression in the hands of the ruling class. The top layers of the army in Chile as in any other country, are linked closely, by thousands of ties (of class origin, family relation, education, economic interests etc.) to the big bourgeoisie, the bankers and landowners. All this is ABC for any Marxist. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie and its political representatives, the Christian Democrats, saw this perfectly clearly. This 'pact' was not a secondary question, a detail or whim. It was the essence of the matter, as became clear three years later, with catastrophic consequences for the working class and the whole Chilean people.

Nevertheless, the formation of the Popular Unity government opened up a new phase in the revolutionary process in Chile. Just as in Spain in 1936, the government's initial program was very rapidly left behind by the movement of the masses. As is explained in the document '45th Anniversary of the CSP':

"During the first year and a half of the government, the carrying out of bourgeois-democratic measures rapidly exhausted the scheme of reforms of the Popular Unity, and the masses began to demand the carrying out of a program of measures in fields such as the economy, health, education, housing. In this way these masses began to mobilize around aspirations such as the handing over of the big monopolies in the textile and wood industry to the workers, etc. Aspirations which the government could only partially satisfy, given the degree to which it was compromised with the opposition and the obstacles which the vociferous representatives of reformism in the ranks of the Popular Unity itself placed in the way of carting out these objectives. It was at this point that the reformist sections began to act in the sense of paralyzing each and every initiative which might have mobilized the masses behind socialist and revolutionary perspectives or objectives and brazenly imposed their representatives upon the leadership of the economic apparatus, utilizing the CUT for these ends. All this had as its consequences a divorce between the objectives of the masses and the objectives of the government." (p17, our emphasis)

Under the pressure of the masses, the Popular Unity government went much further than what many of the leaders had foreseen. The mechanistic schema of Stalinism of an artificial division between the bourgeois democratic tasks of the proletarian revolution were broken by the movement of the masses. The Allende government carried out important measures of nationalization, which represented a hard blow against the interests of the oligarchy.

The 'Chileanization' measures of the Frei government had left 49% of the control of the copper industry in the hands of the big US monopolies like Anaconda, Kennecott Copper, etc. Moreover, Frei had paid out enormous sums in compensation ($80 million to Kennecott Copper between 1967 and 1969 for El Teniente alone). The masses of Chilean working people had to bear the brunt of this extra burden. In July, 1971, Allende explained that the US monopolies had invested between $50m and $80m in Chile and that their profits amounted to $1.566 million. Therefore, the companies owed Chile about $642 million.

The nationalization of copper in July 1971 was a great step forward. The coalmines, the iron and nitrate mines, the textile industry, ITT, INASA and other industries were also taken into public ownership. A series of social reforms in the interests of the working people also served to increase dramatically the popular support of the government: the free distribution of milk to schoolchildren, the freezing of rents and prices, wage and pension increases, etc.

In turn, these measures gave an enormous impetus to the movement of the masses. At long last, the most benighted, apolitical and apathetic elements of society could see a government that was acting on their behalf. The result was a growing wave of radicalization in town and village. The inability of the Frei government to carry through a serious agrarian reform was one of the main reasons for Allende's victory at the polls. On the eve of the elections, the situation in the countryside was characterized, according to the words of the ex-minister of agriculture of the Allende government, Jacques Chonchol by a "growing frustration." The same writer explains how the initiation of the agrarian reform was set in motion under the strong pressure of the masses in the rural areas:

"The first aspect that had to be dealt with by the Popular Unity government in the agrarian policy... was the acceleration of the process of expropriations in order to meet the pressure and concern of the peasants. The latter, in effect, thought that, as the new government was of the working people, all their manifold aspirations to access to the land must be satisfied with the utmost rapidity." ('Chile-America,' No. 25-7, p27-8)

On the other hand, the latifundists began a systematic campaign of sabotage in the countryside, abandoning their estates and dismantling installations on their farms. Many of them were already giving money to armed ultra-right-wing groups with a view to resisting the agrarian reform. Pablo Goebbels, a big landowner of Cautín province made public statements to the effect that any government official who tried to expropriate his lands would be met with machine guns. According to an official police report "more than 2,000 men have been recruited into assault groups with a view to causing the breakdown of the transport system, interruptions in the gas electricity and water supply, and, in this manner, cause general discontent." ('Militant' 1/10/71)

From the very first, the Chilean ruling class was making its preparations for a counter-coup. As the same article in 'Militant' explained:

"While Allende preaches 'responsibility' and 'discipline' to the masses, the reaction is accumulating forces for a counter-stroke. Profoundly demoralized by the victory of Allende and frightened by the movement of the masses, the landlords and capitalists understand the impossibility of overthrowing Allende immediately. They are prepared to wait.

"Nevertheless, careful preparations are being made, arms are being stored, conspiracies are being hatched among the top levels of the general staff. The danger is very real." ('Militant' 1/10/71)

The only way of disarming the reaction and smashing the resistance of the big landowners would have been the arming of the poor peasants, organized committees of action for the occupation of the land, with government support. Faced by the powerful movement of the armed masses, the landowners and their armed gangs would have been defeated with a minimum loss of life. In fact, the only defense of the conquests of the masses under the Popular Unity consisted precisely in this. But the leaders of the Popular Unity lacked all confidence in the revolutionary initiative of the masses and were terrified of the idea of "provoking the reaction.' For this reason, they stubbornly opposed every attempt by the poor peasant to carry out 'illegal land occupations,' even sending 'forces of public order' to evict peasants who had carried out such actions. Nowadays, some of the former leaders of the Popular Unity attempt to justify themselves, alleging that these movements were organized by ultra-left groups and that, at times, the peasants 'went too far,' taking over not only the lands of the latifundists, but also those of the 'middle peasants.'

Undoubtedly, in every revolutionary movement, especially those that involve the most oppressed and backward layers of society, there is always a tendency to 'go to far' and these 'excesses' are inevitable, to a certain extent. It also may be true that some small ultra-left groups may have taken advantage of the spontaneous movement of the peasants to increase their influence. But the responsibility for this situation rests totally with the leaders of the Popular Unity, and in the first place, of the CP and SP.

The best way to avoid abuses and 'excesses,' to reduce violence and bloodshed to a minimum and to ensure the most peaceful and organized transfer possible of ownership of the lands of the big landowners to the poor peasants was if the workers' leaders, instead of denouncing these 'illegal actions' and sending the police to 'restore order' in the villages, would have put themselves at the head of the mass movement, giving it an organized character. Jacques Chonchol, in the above-mentioned article, tries to play down the importance of the peasant committees. Nevertheless, he himself explains the reasons that prevented the development of these organs of popular power in the countryside.

"Seeing to broaden these (committees) to allow the participation of these groups, there began, moreover, a political struggle between the Popular Unity and the Christian Democracy and between the parties of the Popular Unity themselves to try and take over the committees, a situation which subsequently led some parties of the Popular Unity to not support the organization of peasant committees." ('Chile-America,' p32)

An incredible admission! Some of the leaders of the Popular Unity were opposed to the setting up of peasant committees because of the existence of a struggle for control of these organizations carried on by the different parties... But does the same struggle not go on in the factory, in every workers' district, in every local and national election, in every trade union? And nevertheless, the Popular Unity leaders did not advocate the abandonment of the trade unions and parliament. The real reason was that "some leaders" of the Popular Unity did not trust the movement of the peasant masses and were afraid that this movement might escape their control. The elementary duty of the workers' leaders was to support each and every revolutionary initiative of the mass of poor peasants, actively pushing for the setting up of peasant committees, despite all the difficulties, and wage a struggle within the committees for a revolutionary socialist policy, against the poisonous influence of the Christian Democrats.

From the first moment, the Popular Unity leaders placed all their confidence in bourgeois legality and the possibility of carrying out the transformation of society leaving intact all the old state apparatus. This fact had disastrous consequences in the field of Agrarian Reform. As Jacques Chonchol himself admits: "In addition to all this, the judicial limitations of the government prevented it from giving the peasant committees a legal status for their leaders and finances for their work, unless by the passing of a law which had no chance of getting through as the government was a minority in parliament." ('Chile-America,' p32)

The utopian character of the idea of using the old bureaucratic apparatus of the bourgeois state to carry through the Agrarian Reform is implicitly, though reluctantly, recognized in the following words of Chonchol, which admits that the "peasant committees" frequently came into collision with the resistance of the bureaucratic state apparatus: "In the same way, one of the problems which the Popular Unity government proved unable to resolve in spite of all the efforts made, was the working of the bureaucratic state apparatus.

"For all the process of agrarian change, which included such diverse problems as expropriations, technical assistance and credits to the peasants, the reorganization of the economic system between agriculture and the rest of society etc., we needed to provide the bureaucratic apparatus, which have a considerable responsibility for all the process of change (!) a far superior dynamism, coherence and efficiency to what had been its transitional mode of behavior.

"Several attempts were made during the Popular Unity government to attain this objective, but finally legal limitations, the resistance of the bureaucracy to change its habits, the class differences between the bureaucrats and the peasants, the urban situation of a great part of this agrarian bureaucracy and party in-fighting prevented significant progress in the transformation of the more traditional bureaucracy into a more organic (?) and efficient body in the service of agrarian transformation." ('Chile-America,' p33)

All of Jacques Chochol's arguments clearly show the impossibility of bringing about a radical and irreversible change in the social relations in the Chilean countryside unless as a result of the revolutionary struggle of the peasantry, armed against the counterrevolution and organized in peasant committees, closely linked to the landworkers' unions and the organizations of the working class in the cities.

But in spite of everything, as a result of the pressure of the masses (already before the 1st of January 1971 there were between 250 and 300 "unlawful" occupations), the Popular Unity government carried through the most profound Agrarian Reform in the whole history of Chile. In the words of Jacques Chonchol: "Under these circumstances, the Popular Unity government fixed a target for 1971 of a thousand farms to be expropriated, which was almost as many as were taken over by the Christian Democratic government during its six years in office (1,139 farms) and which meant almost quadrupling the expropriations of 1970 (273 farms with 634 thousand hectares had been expropriated by the Frei government in 1970).

"This implied an enormous effort for the bureaucratic state system, given the complications and limitations of the expropriative process contemplated in the law no. 16,640. In spite of this, and under the pressure of the peasantry, the speeding-up of the process had to be still greater and at the end of 1971, 1,378 farms had been taken over, with 2 million, 600 thousand hectares. This rhythm was speeded up still more in 1972, when 2,000 farms were taken over, with 2 million 800 thousand hectares, with which the big latifundia were practically finished in Chile. In 1973, up until the coup, a further 1,050 farms were taken over, particularly poorly worked medium-sized farms and the remaining latifundia with 1 million 200 thousand hectares." ('Chile-America,' p28)

The measures taken by the Allende government in the interests of the workers and peasants gave rise to an enormous wave of popular enthusiasm, clearly reflected in the following results of the local elections of the 4th of April 1971.

Party	Vote	%	% '67
Socialists	631,939	22.4	13.9
Communists	479,206	17.9	14.8
Radicals	225,851	8.0	16.1
PSD	38,067	1.4	-
USOPO	29,132	1.0	-
DC	723,623	25.6	35.6
National	511,669	18.2	14.3
Radical-Dem.	108,192	3.8	-
Nat-Dem.	13,435	0.4	2.4
Independent	23,907	0.8	0.7
Invalid	38,772	1.4	2.2
TOTAL	2,823,784	100%	100%

Whilst in the presidential elections, Allende only got 36% of the votes, the Popular Unity parties now got 49.7% of the votes, ad against 48.05% of the combined opposition. When the votes of Raúl Ampuero's Popular Socialist Union (USOPO) are added in, the left had an overall majority.

The wave of radicalization in the country found its expression in the appearance of incipient organs of workers' power in the factories and the workers' districts. In the countryside there were attempts of the poor peasants to seize the lands. This ferment among thee popular masses also shook the traditional parties of the middle class, provoking a whole series of convulsions and split in their ranks. Seven MPs broke away from the Christian Democratic Party to form a new party, the MIC (Movement of the Christian Left) to which 20% of the party's youth wing joined up, declaring themselves in favor of "the construction of socialism jointly with the UP government." The Radical Party suffered a split on the right after its 25th congress when the party formally declared in favor of "the class struggle and the need to end the exploitation of man by man."

Alberto Baltra, who led the formation of the misnamed 'Left' Radical Party (PIR) "to represent the interests of the middle class" did not even dare to come out openly against the UP government straight away. The popular groundswell in favor of the government was too strong even among the masses of the petty bourgeoisie.

In fact, the correlation of forces on the parliamentary plane was no more than a pale reflection of the enormous strength of the workers' and peasants' movement at that moment. All the objective conditions were given for the peaceful transformation of Chilean society. The ruling class was demoralized and vacillating. The movement of the masses was in a moment of upswing and, in fact, had left far behind the reformist schemes of the labor leaders. The middle class and especially the peasantry, was looking hopefully towards the government. The socialist and communist leaders occupied key positions in the government and public administration. They had the advantage of being the legitimate government of the country, which facilitated the task of the socialist revolution in the eyes of the more backward masses of the middle class. Even in the armed forces, the Popular Unity had a lot of support, not only among the soldiers and sailors, but also among broad layers of NCO's and junior officers who supported the SP or the CP. The president of the Republic had the right to hold referendums on important issues. It is impossible to imagine a more favorable objective situation. Yet the leaderships of the SP and the CP failed to take advantage of the moment to strike the decisive blow and finish off the power of the oligarchy.

In this situation the elements of dual power emerged in Chilean society: "On this point it is very important to stress the fundamental contradiction which was given by the aspirations of the masses towards popular power expressed in the so-called communal commandos, 'cordones industriales,' popular assemblies, forms of control of food supplies, works' administrative councils, etc." ('45th Anniversary of the CSP,' p17)

Nevertheless, the leaders of the labor movement left all the levers of power in the hands of the ruling class. They did not dare to lay a hand on the army and the police. "The Popular Unity had the executive power," states Sepúlveda, "but the enemy controlled all the bourgeois institutionality and shielded itself behind it in order to make its counterrevolutionary preparations."

The government had legal powers to convoke plebiscites and new general elections, which, without the slightest doubt, would have meant a decisive victory for the workers' parties. But in a moment so favorable, the leaders of the UP wasted their opportunity, confiding blindly in the "good will" of the class enemy.

"The Popular Unity triumphed with 36% on the 4th of September. On the 5th of November after the assassination of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, general Rene Schneider, President Allende assumes office in the face of a terrified and divided bourgeoisie. The armed forces themselves were expecting a thoroughly cleanout. Not a single person was moved from his post. The application of the general lines of the 40-point program was begun. Within five months of its term of office the mayoral elections were held: the UP won 51% of the votes."

In this way, the leaders of the UP lost the opportunity to bring about a relatively peaceful transformation of society: the calling of new elections, the winning of a solid majority which would have robbed the bourgeois parties of their last legal pretext for blocking socialist legislation, and then an appeal from the government to the whole working class and peasantry to carry through the total elimination of the power of the landlords and capitalists in Chile: arming the workers, peasants, soldiers, housewives and small shopkeepers to organize production and oversee the maintainance of revolutionary order: the generalization of these councils to every corner of the country at all levels to constitute themselves finally into the real organs of power of the Chilean workers and peasants, democratically elected with the right of recall at any moment. Once confronted with a revolutionary movement with these characteristics, the ruling class the military caste and the state bureaucracy would have remained suspended in mid-air, without any kind of social base. But the leaders of the principal workers' parties, forgetting the most elementary principles of Marxism, wasted the opportunity, and the initiative passes into the hands of the reaction.

Making use of their control of the press, the Chilean oligarchy, with the active support of the CIA, began their counter-offensive in the pages of El Mercurio. The Christian Democracy intensified its campaign against the government in alliance with the Nationalist Party, demanding the "disarming of all armed groups." These people, logically, were only thinking about the left-wing groups, since the armed gangs of fascism were carrying on their terrorist provocations in the streets with total impunity. In this way there was established a convenient division of labor between the "respectable" opposition of the Christian Democracy which systematically blocked legislation, and the armed aggression of "Patria y Libertad" sowing terror and confusion on the streets.

The capitalists and landlords sabotaged the national economy. US imperialism cut off all economic aid to the Allende government and tried to organize a worldwide boycott of Chilean copper. The nationalizations, which had been carried out piece-meal and without overall planning of the economy, gave rise to convulsions. This provoked an enormous increase of inflation, which swiftly undid the advantages of the wage increases and seriously affected the middle class. Very rapidly, the sympathy of the middle classes towards the new government turned into a growing opposition.

The counterrevolutionary offensive began with the lorry-owners' strike in October 1972. The masses of the working class, understanding the danger, replied with massive mobilizations, which succeeded in frustrating the counterrevolutionary attempt. But how did the leaders react? With a government reshuffle which for the first time included representatives of the military caste in the cabinet. Once again, the triumph achieved by the mobilization and initiative of the working class was turned into a defeat as a result of the bankruptcy and reformist shortsightedness of their leaders.

"The Armed Forces were called in as arbitrators in a fight which had already been won," comments A. Sepúlveda bitterly. The Central Committee of the Chilean Socialist Party, giving voice to the indignation of the working class rank-and-file at the government's capitulation, protested against "that outcome which tricked us of victory in a decisive phase of the process." ('Socialismo Chileno' p40)

Between the strike of October and the 4th of March there were four months of counterrevolutionary preparations: propaganda against the "shortages of supplies" and the "black market," artificially brought about by the bourgeoisie. At the same time, the reactionary conspiracies were stepped up in the barracks. In this situation the leaders of the Popular Unity, sticking stubbornly to their reformist schemes and blindly placing all their confidence in the "loyalty" of the "patriotic" generals, displayed their utter impotence to stop the right-wing offensive. Despite everything in the elections of March 1973, the Popular Unity got 44% of the votes. "In the first instance, the people regarded it as a triumph and the enemy was flabbergasted. This was the moment to go over onto the offensive ... This is what the Socialist Party put forward. But there was no offensive." ('Socialismo Chileno' pp40-41)

Without doubt, the working class rank-and-file, both of the Socialist and Communist parties wished to go over to the offensive. The workers were waiting for the word from their leaders to come out onto the streets and smash the reaction. The workers asked for arms. But they only received fine-sounding words, promises and appeals to discipline, responsibility, serenity ... Nonetheless, as Sepúlveda says, already by March 1973, the proletariat "did not want anymore processions, but was aspiring to power." ('Socialismo Chileno,' p41)

In the words of the document of the Sp cited previously: "The UP government, confronted by the insurrection of the bourgeoisie was not capable, because of its reformist positions, of resolving the situation in favor of the Chilean revolution, with organized mass actions to put an end to this offensive, and attempted by conciliation to postpone the final reckoning in a situation which was becoming ever more untenable." ('45th Anniversary of the CSP,' CSP p18)

The working class base of the Socialist Party, basing itself on its class instincts, firmly opposed the entry of the military into the government. In this way, the socialist workers showed that they understood much better than the leadership what was happening in the country. The capitulation of the UP leaders in November only stimulated the appetite of the reactionaries. The March election results only served to postpone the fatal reckoning. If it had depended only on the leadership, the counterrevolution in Chile would have triumphed almost one year earlier. Fortunately the enormous power of the workers movement and its great capacity for struggle caused the reactionary forces to hesitate. As the English journalist Laurence Whitehead wrote in an article in 'The Economist' (30/7/73): "If the Chilean army has hesitated up till now, the explanation is not to be looked for in any peculiar national tradition, but in the formidable power now accumulated by the workers' movement."

The proof of this enormous power was the complete failure of the "rising of the tanks" of the 29th of June. In a matter of hours, thousands of workers staged strikes, occupied the factories and, leaving pickets to guard the occupied workplaces, marched to government buildings, the Palacia la Moneda. "Yet another extraordinary chance to advance and to strike," states Sepúlveda. "The peasants were watching closely. The peasants were watching closely. The movement having been altered, the right-wing MPs were trembling in the corridors of parliament." ('Socialismo Chileno,' p41)

And what was the leadership's reaction? Allende made an appeal to the workers to go back to work. The police were sent to disperse the masses who were wandering aimlessly, without direction or leadership, through the streets of the capital. This behavior of the government gave fresh heart to the forces of reaction who again launched a new lorry-owners' strike. The workers replied with a 24-hour general strike on the 9th of August. As an article in the 'Militant' of 17 August commented: "There is no lack of courage or will to fight. What is lacking is leadership." Nearly three years later the socialist leader Adonis Sepúlveda, looking back, arrives at the same conclusion: "The leadership of the movement would give no orientation whatsoever. Neither would the CUT." ('Socialismo Chileno,' p41)

Here was the tragedy of the Chilean working class. In spite of all the enormous power that rested in its hands, in spite of the fighting spirit and heroism of the working people, their leaderships let them down in the decisive moment. By contrast, the representatives of the capitalist class acted seriously. They couldn't have cared less about "the rules of the fame." They knew that their class interests were at stake and acted in a decisive manner to defend them:

"The enemy always knew what it had to do," adds Sepúlveda, "He retreated or advanced in order to attain his objectives according to the circumstances. In complete contrast to the Popular Unity, he did not lose any opportunity to gain ground. He organized the coup seriously and with determination and he dealt his blow at the most propitious moment, when the bewilderment and contradictions about what to do had virtually paralyzed the leadership." ('Socialismo Chileno,' p42)

Perhaps Sepúlveda exaggerates the intelligence and foresightedness of the Chilean ruling class, but what is certainly true is that, if the leaders of the Chilean labor movement had acted with one quarter of the seriousness in defense of the interests of the working class which the bourgeois politicians had done in defense of theirs, the Chilean proletariat could have come to power not once, but three or four times during the lifetime of the Popular Unity. The conditions were there. The will to fight was present. What was lacking was a revolutionary leadership with a Marxist-Leninist policy and the will and ability to carry it into practice.

The attempts of Allende and the other leaders of the Popular Unity to reach agreement with the reaction by concluding a pact with the Christian Democrats and allowing the military into the government only served to disorientate the working class and encourage the counterrevolutionaries. A great part of the responsibility for this policy belongs to the Corvalán and the leaders of the "Communist" Party, who, from the word go, put pressure on Allende and the socialist leaders to follow this disastrous road. After the failure of the tank rising in June, Corvalán made a speech ironically reproduced in the journal of the British CP 'Marxism Today' in September 1973 in which he praised "the speedy and decisive action of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the loyalty of the Armed Forces and the Police."

Indignantly rejecting the idea that the CP was in favor of a workers' militia, Corvalán answers: "No, gentlemen! We continue to support the absolutely professional character of the armed institutions. Their enemies are not in the ranks of the people, but in the camp of reaction." But Allende and the SP leaders also had a large part of the responsibility for what happened, as they had accepted the same policy, for example, on the 24th of June, Allende "asked his supporters to undertake a dialogue with those groups of the opposition which also wanted the transformation of the country" (this refers to the very same Christian Democrats who precisely at that moment were supporting the fascist conspirators), and "warned against classifying the Armed Forces as 'reactionaries' and thus preventing the latter from becoming a dynamic force in the development of Chile." And all this is only five days before the tank uprising of June 29th!

There can be no doubt that the intentions of Salvador Allende and the other leaders of the UP were honest. They sincerely desired a "peaceful change without traumas" of society. Unfortunately, to carry out the socialist revolution, good intentions are not enough. As was very well said by one of the leaders of the Chilean Socialist Party (Interior Leadership) in an article published in the Spanished Marxist paper 'Nuevo Claridad' (No. 24, April 1978): "If processes were measured by intentions, we would have to say that the intention of the UP was the construction of socialism in Chile. But nevertheless we have fascism and dictatorship."

Nowadays, some of the leaders of the UP in exile try to justify themselves approximately along the following lines: "If we would have fought, that would have meant a bloody civil war, with thousands dead." How ironical these words sound today! Thousands of workers and peasants, the cream of the working class, have been exterminated, tortured, imprisoned in concentration camps or simply "disappeared." And still there are people who persist in the need of "avoiding violence at all costs." Of course, no socialist wants violence. We all want a "peaceful change, without traumas," but we also learned something from history: that no ruling class in the whole of history has ever given up its power and privileges without a fight with no holds barred.

The socialist and communist workers wanted to fight against reaction. This fact was clearly demonstrated on the 4th of September when 800,000 workers, many of them armed with staves, marched through the streets of Santiago. Sepúlveda describes the events in the following words:

"The backward layers of the poor suburbs, peasants, many housewives and the most poverty-striken sectors of society were not formally members, but they were part of the social force of the Popular Unity. On the 29th of June, they responded to the attempted coup by a formidable demonstration of strength. The President of the Republic stood for more than five minutes on the balcony of the Moneda Palace before he could begin to speak amidst the deafening roar of the masses as they demanded the closing down of parliament. On the 4th of September, seven days before the coup, in every town and village in Chile massive concentrations took place in support of the government. In Santiago 800,000 people, in feverish enthusiasm, demonstrated demanding: "Strike hard, strike hard, we want tough measures!" "Build people's power!" "Allende, Allende, the people will defend you!" ('Socialismo Chileno, pp36-37)

The Chilean workers had confidence in their leaders, from whom they requested arms and a plan of struggle. If, instead of sticks, these workers had arms, even though few in number and deficient in quality, the history of Chile today would have been radically different. The gigantic demonstrations of the 4th of September showed that the working class had not lost its will to fight, and was asking for weapons to resist. Unfortunately, their leaders, instead of weapons, offered them nice-sounding words and appeals to "serenity," to go home quietly, which only served to disarm them on the eve of the coup.

At this point the question of the army naturally comes in. According to some stories, Allende asked Altimirano: "And how many masses are required in order to stop a tank?"

However, this is a completely erroneous way of posing the question. If the question of the army could always be reduced to "so many generals controlling so many bayonets," no resolution would have been possible in the whole of history. But as King Frederick of Prussia once remarked: "When the bayonets begin to think, we are lost."

In the Chilean army there were many soldiers, NCOs, even officers who sympathized with the Popular Unity. Many of them even carried SP and CP cards. The attempted uprising by left-wing sailors on the 7th of August was an indication of what was possible if a serious appeal had been made by Allende to the working-class base of the armed forces.

Unfortunately, up to the very last moment, Allende was confident that the generals would not break with legality and even that they would defend his government. As a macabre irony of history, shortly before the coup, Allende himself nominated generals Guzmán and Pinochet as heads of the air-force and army respectively. Until the end, when the tanks were already on the streets, Allende asked the workers to remain "calm" and "serene" whilst vainly attempting to contact Pinochet by phone.

The fundamental error of the leaders of the UP was to imagine that the bourgeois state could adopt an "impartial" attitude in the development of the class struggle, and that Chile was an exceptional case because of the "democratic traditions" of its armed forces. These illusions were fostered up to the last moment by the generals. Shortly before the coup, after the nomination of Leigh Guzmá, the latter made a speech in which he affirmed that the armed forces "would never break with their tradition of respect for the legally constituted government." These self-same illusions were shared by the leaders of the UP, especially those of the so-called "Communist" Party. From the outset, Luis Corvalán never tired of insisting on the "professionalism" and "patriotism" pf the Chilean military. In an article published in 'World Marxist Review' (Dec. 1970), Corvalán emphasized the special character of the Chilean armed forces which "maintained their spirit of professionalism, their respect for the Constitution and the Law." According to him, it would be incorrect to say that "they are the loyal servants of the imperialists and the upper classes." Again, in November 1971, in the same journal, Corvalán insisted that "In spite of their diversity, the military men have common moral values: respect for the Constitution and the government." The same Corvalán wrote in the 'Morning Star' (29/12/70): "To maintain the inevitability of an armed confrontation implies the formation of an armed people's militia. In the present situation, this would be tantamount to a challenge to the army ... (this) must be won over to the cause of progress in Chile and not pushed towards the other side of the barricades.

If the leaders of the UP had spent one tenth of the energies they had dedicated to win the energies they had dedicated to win the confidence and respect of the military caste in serious work to win over the rank and file of the army for the labor movement, the defeat of the 11th of September would have been totally impossible.

If Allende had used his enormous personal prestige and his legal authority as President of the Republic to make an appeal to the ranks of the army over the heads of the generals, the outcome of the situation would have been very different. The rank and file soldiers, once confronted with the movement of the masses, would have inevitably experienced a series of tensions and splits. Although in every army the apex of the pyramid of the military caste is connected by thousands of invisible threads to the ruling class, the "other ranks" are always close to the working class and the peasantry. The soldiers and sailors sympathized with the workers' movement and with the UP government. But in order to produce an active movement of solidarity in the ranks of the army, it is necessary that the soldiers be convinced of the firm will of the workers to carry through the struggle to its ultimate consequences. In short, the soldiers must have faith in the possibility of success. Without this, fear of officers on the part of the troops will suffice to maintain discipline.

The fact that on the 11th of September only a minority of the soldiers participated actively in the coup, whilst the majority remained confined to barracks, indicates that Pinochet understood far better than Allende the tensions that existed in the ranks of the army. But in the absense of a massive and ferocious resistance, there was not the slightest possibility of winning over that part of the soldiers who, in a passive sort of way, sympathized with the workers' cause. In this sense, the "pacifist" methods of reformism always lead to results that are diametrically opposed to those intended.

Now, in exile, many of the people who had a personal responsibility for the defeat, attempt to provide themselves with some sort of justification using all kinds of arguments. One of the arguments which has been used is that the working class, in the decisive moment, found itself "isolated." In answer to this argument, Sepúlveda says: "The working class was not isolated. It is true that there were signs of tiredness. The class did not see the reward for its efforts in the showdown with the enemy. It was tired of parades. It wanted real actions to liquidate the social conflict and it did not perceive any will on the part of its political leadership. But it was ready to fight the moment the order was given. On the 11th and in some cases, even on the 12th and 13th the workers remained in waiting." ('Socialismo Chileno,' p37, our emphasis)

Both the SP and the CP had arms, and, in theory, a military policy. But in the moment of truth the weapons failed to materialize, the military policy proved worthless, and the majority of the leaders fled, leaving their members to save themselves as best they could.

It was an unworthy end to three years of heroic struggles carried out by the working class and peasantry of Chile. There are those who say that the death of Allende "saved the honor" of Chilean socialism. As if it were a question of "honor" and morality in the abstract, and not the victory or defeat of the socialist revolution. As if it were a question of the life or death of one man, on a day in which the flower of the working class was massacred without the least possibility of saving itself. Without doubt, the fact that Salvador Allende stayed behind to die in the ruins of the Moneda is one that compares favorably to the behavior of many of those who abandoned their membership to its fate, in order subsequently, from comfortable places of exile, to write lengthy articles about "the heroic resistance in Chile." Salvador Allende has become a martyr of the labor movement, but all the sympathy in the world cannot change what took place on the 11th of September 1973, nor absolve Allende from his part of the responsibility for what occurred. The attempts to divert the attention of the workers from what really happened by means of all kinds of sentimentality and myths are unworthy of socialists and revolutionaries. If we really wish to pay homage to the memory of Allende, and the thousands of other men and women who were killed that day and afterwards for the cause of the working class, our first duty is to learn from the experience in order not to repeat it.

All history shows that there is nothing worse for the working class than to surrender without a struggle. Seeing the paralysis of their organizations in the moment of truth, the masses fall into a profound demoralization. Even a defeat after a heroic struggle, like the Paris Commune or the Asturian uprising in Spain in 1934 have less harmful effects, leaving behind a tradition upon which the new generation can build.

The most terrible example of this process was in Germany in 1933. Using almost the same arguments as the leaders of the Chilean Popular Unity, the leaders of the German Social Democracy allowed Hitler to come to power "without breaking a window pane" as he himself later boasted. What were the results of the pacifist and conciliatory attitude of the labor leaders in Germany? The German labor movement, previously the strongest in the world, fell to pieces overnight, and practically disappeared from the face of the earth. The despair and disorientation of the German working class, as a result of the political blindness of its leaders, was the most fundamental explanation of its passivity under the Hitler tyranny and the practical absence of an organized resistance to the Nazis in Germany, in comparison to what existed in other countries.

After the coup of the 11th of September, there were many who characterized the Pinochet regime as "fascist." And, in fact, the methods used against the working class by the Junta - murders, torture, concentration camps - are the same methods used in the past by Hitler, Mussolini and Franco.

Nevertheless, between the cases of Chile and Germany, there were fundamental differences. In the first place, the conditions in Chile on the eve of the coup were much more favorable for the working class than in Germany. The working class in Germany had suffered a series of very serious defeats between 1919 and 1933. On the contrary, in Chile, the workers had defeated various attempts at counterrevolution in the months before the coup and showed on the 4th of September, their willingness to fight.

But the fundamental difference was that Hitler based himself on a mass fascist movement, "national socialism," which counted on the active support of millions of frustrated petty bourgeois and hundreds of thousands of armed lumpen proletarians organized in the SA. It is precisely this mass base that distinguished fascism from other forms of reaction, however violent and bloody they may be. The objective of fascism is the total destruction of the workers' organizations, the complete eradication of the embryos of the new society within the womb of the old.

But the normal instruments of the bourgeois state are not sufficient for this work of destruction. The base of the state is too narrow to achieve the total atomization of the proletariat. In order to do this, a mass base within the population is necessary: for this reason, fascism is characterized in the first place as a mass movement of the petty bourgeoisie which "goes mad" as a result of the crisis of capitalism and, losing confidence in the ability of the working class to offer a viable alternative, seeks a way out in fascism, with its radical demagogy and its "national socialism." It is this mass base which gives a fascist regime and permits the total destruction of the labor movement. (In Germany, even the workers' chess clubs were closed down). Fascism in Germany lasted 12 years, in Italy 20, in Spain, almost 40 years, although it is true that, in its later stages, the last-named regime had become transformed into a military-police dictatorship resting on the temporary inertia of the masses.

The Pinochet regime never had a mass base comparable to the traditional fascist regimes. Fascist groups like "Patria y Libertad" sowed terror and confusion but were always in a small minority. They did not play the slightest independent role, byt acted as the jackals of reaction, preparing the way for the intervention of the generals. They were neither more nor less than an auxiliary arm of the bourgeois state. They did not even reach the same level of support as the Spanish Falange of the '30s.

IT is true that, when the coup took place, a certain section of the middle classes, hard hit by a rate of inflation (more than 300%) and demoralized by the policies of the UP government, looked upon the generals with a certain amount of sympathy in the hope of finding a solution to their economic problems. But in no way could this passive support be compared to the fascist movements of Italy or Germany in the 1930s. Pinochet's coup was a military coup with the same characteristics as many other coup d'etats in Latin America, but with one terrible difference. The particularly savage and bloody characteristic of this coup was something new even for Latin America. The explanation of this fact consists in the fear which the ruling class had experienced under the Allende government which, under the pressure of the masses, had gone much further than what had gone much further than what had been foreseen. The capitalists and landlords took a terrible revenge with the aim of "teaching them a good lesson." On the other hand, the very strength of the workers' movement meant that the reaction had to resort to a more large scale and bloodier repression than in other countries.

A military-police dictatorship that bases itself on the "rule of the sword" is a bonapartist regime. But the bonapartist regime in Chille, for reasons already mentioned, necessarily had a particularly virulent character. It is a bpnapartist regime that tries to imitate the methods of fascism. But Pinochet does not have, and never has had, the mass social base that would be necessary to carry out the central task of fascism: the total destruction of the labor movement and the atomization of the working class. Despite the extraordinarily repressive nature of the Junta, it is an intrinsically unstable regime that has not the slightest possibility of lasting as long as the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. Rather, it is a type of regime similar to the dictatorship of the colonels in Greece, which hung on for seven years, unable to solve anything for Greek capitalism, and finally collapsed, opening up the way to a new wave of radicalization and social convulsions.

What has, in the short term, given a false appearance of stability and solidity to the Junta is the profound disappointment of the masses in Chile and their feeling of powerlessness before the triumphant reaction, after the collapse of the workers' organizations of the 11th of September. The terrible massacre of labor activists, the disarticulation of their parties and trade unions created an atmosphere of generalized disorientation. In this situation, the economic crisis, unemployment and hunger, far from stimulating the struggle, only served to dampen still further the spirit of the workers. It is this disappointment and the inertia that flows from it that explains how the dictatorship has prolonged its life, in spite of all its problems and internal contradictions.

It is ironical to see, in the months following the 11th of September, how the same leaders who had systematically refused to arm the workers and peasants when this would have led to victory now, on many occasions, dedicated themselves to write articles, from the most distant and secure places, about the need for armed struggle against the dictatorship.

More than a year after the coup, a spokesman of the CP made a series of declarations in the Italian paper 'La Stampa,' affirming that "the organizations of the Chilean left still possess considerable quantities of arms" and that "a struggle is being waged to overthrow the military regime." What a world of dreams these heroes of the exile lived in!

Of course, the last thing that ought to have been suggested under these conditions was armed struggle, guerilla war or individual terrorism. The only results achieved by those minority groups which were pushing these ideas in Chile have been totally negative: the senseless and unnecessary loss of a series of young and heroic comrades, with completely mistaken ideas, and the wholesale breakup of the groups in question.

Nonetheless, the small nuclei of working class cadres, both socialists and communists, began, slowly and painfully, to undertake serious work in the underground.

These comrades, unlike the leaders in exile, have never attempted to conceal a terrible situation with fine words, but speak honestly of the reality of "a subjugated, oppressed, starving and terrorized people." The best elements of the working class, in the prisons, in the underground, in the concentration camps, are trying to fulfill their elementary duty: to draw correct conclusions from their terrible experience. Unfortunately, it seems that many of the old leaders are incapable, or unwilling, to do the same.

The misfortune of the Chilean dictatorship was that the coup d'etat took place on the eve of the most serious recession since the end of World War Two. The Chilean economy, which has always been dependent on its exports, suffered very serious effects as a result of the falling-off of demand in outside markets, which brought about a steep fall in the price of copper.

In the years before the 1974-75 recession, the exports of copper represented almost 75% of the total exports of the country. The value of copper exports in 1975 was 45% lower than in 1974, and 34% lower than the average of 1973-4. The external deficit stood at around $400 million (436 million SDRs). Only the generosity of world imperialism saved the Junta from bankruptcy. In June 1976, the IMF approved a figure of 79 million SDRs (Special Drawing Rights) in aid to make up for the trade deficit of 1975. In December of the same year, the World Bank, at the instigation of the USA and West Germany, approved two loans of a total of $60 million for Chile - the fourth and fifth loans since the coup d'etat.

In May 1976, a group of 16 banks based on the USA and Canada gave Chile a loan of $125 million for 3-5 years. In July of the same year, the Inter American Development Bank approved a further loan of $20 million for a period of 20 years. Just in the first four years after the 11th of September, the Junta received approximately 1 billion dollars in loans from private banks in the USA. All this contrasts with the systematic boycott of the Allende government by world imperialism.

The attitude of imperialism is not difficult to understand. No sooner in power, the Junta began the systematic destruction of the conquests of the working class, handing back the nationalized factories to their former owners and the land to the latifundists. The Junta's economic policies are those of the notorious "Chicago school of economics" of Milton Friedman, which, among other things, stands for the policy of the "open door" for foreign investments. Once more, Chile is subjugated to the humiliation of a double exploitation: that of the Chilean capitalists and latifundists and that of the big US monopolies.

After the military takeover, Friedman visited Chile and coldly recommended a 20% cit in state expenditure and the sacking of large numbers of state employees. There was a devaluation of the escudo against the US dollar. Nevertheless, in 1975, the cost of living went up by 340